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Abstract
Corporate governance has succeeded in attracting a good deal of public interest
because of its importance for economic development and society in general. Shleifer and
Vishny (1997, p. 737) note "corporate governance deals with the w a y in which suppliers of
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment". Corporate
governance has been a subject of continuing debate since Berle and M e a n s (1933) suggested
that the growing dispersion of ownership can give rise to separation of ownership and control.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that the existence of the separation ownership and control
leads to a conflict of interests between ownership and firm performance (agency problem),
which can intensively affect a firm's performance. A s a result, corporate governance
mechanisms are demanded. O n e possible corporate governance mechanism that can alleviate
agency problems is 'ownership structure'. Ownership structure, including ownership
concentration and managerial ownership, it is argued in this respect, can control a firm's
management and impact on maximizing shareholders' and stakeholders' wealth. Several
studies examined to see whether there is a relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance. T h e outcomes of this research, however, are inconclusive. In Thailand, it is
argued that ownership structure, particularly family ownership and managerial ownership, is
one of the causes of the decline in firm performance and the financial crisis. The evidence on
the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the case of Thailand,
however, is scarce and needs further in-depth examination.
This study examines the relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance of 243 Thai firms for the period prior to the financial crisis (1993-1996). Firm
performance is measured using market returns and accounting profitability. The results show
that controlling ownership, including family-controlling ownership, is positively related to
firm performance during this period. There is evidence to support the view that managerial
ownership is positively related to firm performance; in fact, such positive relationship is
derived from managerial-family ownership. Moreover, there is little evidence on a non-linear
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. This relationship,
however, is significant between managerial-non-family ownership and market returns.
This study also conducts further analysis of the relationship between ownership
structure and firm performance on the period after the crisis (1998-2000). This enables an
assessment of whether the effect of ownership structure and firm performance is different
between the period prior to and after the crisis. The results show that, overall, the association
between ownership structure and firm performance in these two periods is similar. However
some of the results of the period after the crisis are less significant than those found prior to
the crisis. The results show that controlling ownership, including family-controlling
ownership, is positive and significant to profitability, but it is less significant for market
returns. Also, the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in the
period after the crisis (1998-2000) is less significant compared to that found in the period
prior to the crisis (1993-1996). In fact, managerial family ownership firms perform better
than non-managerial ownership firms. Interestingly, there is a non-liner relationship between
managerial ownership and market returns during this period. This relationship is also found
between managerial-family ownership and profitability.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Corporate governance has been discussed for m a n y decades. It has succeeded
in attracting a good deal of public interest owing to its importance for economic
development and society in general. Corporate governance is broadly defined as the
rules and incentives by which the management of a firm is directed and controlled so

as to maximize the profitability and long-term value of the firm to the shareholders

while taking into account the interests of other stakeholders (Berle and Means, 1932
Blair, 1995; Vives, 2000; Price Waterhouse, 1997; The Stock Exchange of Thailand,
2001). Shleifer and Vishny note that
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEALS with the ways in which
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return
on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to
return some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers
do not steal the capital they supply or invest in bad projects? How do
suppliers offinancecontrol managers? (1997, p. 737)
Interest in corporate governance has arisen since Berle and Means (1932)

demonstrated that there existed a separation between ownership and control. That is,
in modern corporations (from the end of 1929) the shareholders of large firms
became widely dispersed and the management of these firms was separated from the
ownership. Consequently most of the firm's businesses were transferred to the hands
of managers, whose interests may not have coincided with those of the dispersed
shareholders. Managers had more opportunity to pursue their own interests at the
expense of shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983a,b)
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and M y e r and Majuf (1984) argue that the separation of ownership and control
creates a conflict of interests between owners and managers (or so-called agency
problems), which directly affects the firm's performance. In this regard, several
studies suggest that concentrated shareholders can closely control managers to run
the firm in the interests of shareholders (Monsen et al., 1968; Radice, 1971;
Boudreaux, 1973; Steer and Cable, 1978; Levin and Levin, 1982; Alba et al, 1998;
Xu and Wong, 1999). Some studies, however, argue that there is no link between
ownership concentration and firm performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1983,1985).
Alternatively, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Kim et al., (1988), Oswald and Jahera
(1991) and Yeboah-Duah, (1993) argue that when management personnel hold a

proportion of shares in the firm (managerial ownership), the interests of shareholder
and managers are aligned. As a result, the agency problems decrease and in turn the
firm's performance increases. Morck et al. (1988), McConnell (1990), Wong and
Yek (1991), Mat-Nor et al. (1997), Short and Keasy (1999) and Wiwattanakantung
(2001), however, confirm that managerial shareholders do not always encourage a
firm's performance. They suggest that there is an opposite relationship behind the
assumption of the linear relationship between managerial ownership and a firm's
performance. That is, a certain level of managerial shareholders entrench their
power and derive benefits from control of the firm rather than those associated with
the firm's performance maximization. In other words, the relationship between
managerial shareholders and a firm's performance is non-linear. This issue has been
further emphasized in chapters two and three.

1.1 Statement of Problem
In Thailand, during the 1990s, a decline in firm performance (for example the

profitability and stock index, see Appendix A) following the financial crisis (in 19
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entirely discouraged confidence of both domestic and international investors to
invest in the Thai stock market. This situation sparked an intensive debate, which
sought to explain the cause of such deterioration. One of the fundamental causes of

such deterioration within Thai firms, including the crisis, has been attributed to the
ineffectiveness of the corporate governance system and its mechanisms, particularly
ownership structure (Nikomborirak, 1999; The Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2000; Pitiyasak, 2001). Alba et al. (1998), Kongchan (2000), for
example, suggest that one of the problems associated with weak corporate
governance in Thailand is ownership structure, including concentrated ownership,
family ownership and managerial ownership.
In this regard it should be noted that ownership in Thailand is highly
concentrated, especially in the hands of family shareholders. Also, most family
shareholders are members of the boards of directors (La Porta, 1998;
Wiwattanakantung, 1999,2000; Claessens et al., 2000; Suehiro, 2001). Alba et al.
(1998) argue that concentrated shareholdings, especially founder-family
shareholders, tend to resist the recruitment of professional managers. As such the
management of the firms may have less flexibility to change the firms' behaviour to

adjust to current economic circumstances, and this can affect the firm's performance.
(Their empirical study in detail is presented in chapter three).
There are a number of empirical studies, which examine the relationship
between ownership structure and a firm's performance; however, the results are
mixed. Also the majority of previous studies (cf., Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck et al., 1988; McConnell, 1990; Han and Suk, 1998;
Short and Keasy, 1999), regarding this relationship, have been conducted from the
case of developed countries such as the UK and the US where ownership
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concentration is very low and the legal protection of minority shareholders is
relatively strong, unlike in developing countries, such as Thailand, where ownership
is highly concentrated with less protection of minority shareholders. The identity of
shareholders, particularly family shareholders, in Thailand is correspondingly
important. As well, the hazard of power entrenchment by managerial shareholders
may be different to that of developed countries. Moreover, according to
Limpaphayom and Polwitoon (2001), Thailand's corporate governance system is a
bank-based system while the US and the UK have a market-based system. Banks
play an important role as the main financial source for most Thai firms and they are
allowed to hold up to 10% of shares in the firm. Consequently, the effect of
ownership structure on firm performance in Thailand could possibly be different
from that in developed countries. There are few empirical studies (cf., Alba et al.,
1998; La Porta, 1998; Wiwattanakantung, 1999, 2000), which have examined this
relationship in the case of Thailand. Also some aspects of this relationship are yet
be determined and there needs to be a further in-depth examination.

1.2 Motivation of this Study
Ownership structure was selected as an explanatory factor of a firm's
performance because, as suggested by Limpaphayom (2001), ownership structure is
an important mechanism for improving corporate governance and therefore a firm's
performance (Limpaphayom, 2001). Porter (1990) and Jensen (2000) note that
ownership structure can intensively determine the firm's objective and the
shareholders' wealth. Also, concentrated ownership is a mechanism to control
management where the protection of minority shareholders is not active (common in
most developing countries such as Thailand) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
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Furthermore, Thailand was chosen as the case for this study because it has a centre
(the Library of the Stock Exchange of Thailand) that provides complete data of most
listed firms. A s well, communication with Thai people for the data collection stage
is easier for the researchers than in other countries.

1.3 Research Questions
This study attempts to examine the relationship between ownership structure
and the performance of Thai listed firms during the period prior to (1993-1996) and
after the crisis (1998-2000). The questions associated with such a relationship are
drawn as follows:
(1)

Is concentrated ownership (or controlling ownership) positively
related to firm performance in Thailand?

(2)

D o firms controlled by different types of ownership (i.e., individual
or family, domestic-corporation, and foreign ownership) perform
differently in Thailand?

(3)

D o firms with bank ownership and firms with non-bank ownership
perform differently in Thailand?

(4)

Is managerial ownership (including managerial-family ownership and
managerial-nonfamily

ownership)

positively

related

to

the

performance of Thai firms?
• (5)

Does a non-linear relationship exist between managerial ownership
(including managerial-family ownership and managerial-nonfamily
ownership) and firm performance in the case of Thailand? If yes,
what are the performance turning points?

1.4 Contributions of thisJStudy
The outcomes of this study are expected to provide several important
contributions to the literature as well as inform the Thai regulators. First, this study
will provide evidence on the relationship between controlling ownership and firm
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performance in the case of Thailand both in the period prior to and after the crisis
(1993-1996 and 1998-2000). The other categories of controlling ownership are also
examined to provide richer evidence of the effect of these categories of controlling
ownership on firm performance (as different types of ownership may be associated
with firm performance in different ways).
Secondly, this study is an extension of previous studies in regard to the effect
of managerial ownership on firm performance. Managerial ownership is classified
into two important categories, namely managerial-family ownership and managerialnonfamily ownership. In the past, there has been no evidence on the effect of these
categories of ownership on firm performance and this study will compare the impact
of them on firm performance with non-managerial ownership. The influence of
each of these categories of managerial ownership on firm performance may be
fundamentally different. Combining them into one class may mask certain important
results, which can only be determined when they are examined individually.
Moreover, this study provides additional evidence on the non-linear relationship
between categories of managerial ownership, (managerial-family ownership,
managerial-nonfamily ownership) and firm performance. In this study, the method
used will allow the coefficient of such ownership to determine their turning points.

In particular, the results of this study will cast some doubt on the distinction betwe
certain levels of shareholding of these two categories of ownership.
Thirdly, this study extends Limpaphayom and Polwitoon's (2001) study
regarding the relationship between bank ownership and firm performance. They have
suggested that a bank may not be able to intervene and influence borrowing firms
with managerial shareholders. Firms with bank ownership are therefore categorized

Chapter 1: Introduction

7

into firms with bank-managerial ownership and firms with bank-non-managerial
ownership, and their performance is compared with non-bank ownership.
Fourthly, this study utilizes the data from two periods: prior to the crisis
(1993-1996) and after the crisis (1998-2000) in Thailand. The results of the effect of
ownership structure on firm performance during the period prior to the crisis will be
confirmed by the results during the period after the crisis and the new outcomes of
the differences or the change in the effect of ownership structure on firm
performance between these two periods will be captured.
Fifthly, since the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) have been working on a framework for the
development of corporate governance mechanisms and good corporate governance
practices, the results of this study will ultimately benefit the SET and SEC regulators
in developing the limits of shareholdings by the largest shareholders, the best
practices of the members of the boards of directors, and the legalities for shareholder
protection. Consequently, the Thai market capital can restore its pre-crisis situation
and the investors' confidence in it, and thereby encourages a more stable as well as
long-term international investment flows.
Finally, this study can provide the framework for future researchers who intend
to examine the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the
case of other such developing countries as Indonesia and Korea.

1.5 Structure of Thesis
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter one introduces the general
concept of corporate governance. It is also directed to the relationship between
ownership structure and firm performance. The purpose of this study, including the
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research questions, and the contributions are also presented (see above). Chapter
two presents the theoretical framework of this study. It provides an understanding in
regards to the agency and the asymmetric information problems as well as the
concept literature of corporate governance. Chapter two will be set out as follows.
First, there is a general discussion on the concepts of agency problems and
asymmetric information problems. Secondly, the definitions of corporate
governance and corporate governance systems, which commonly comprise a capital
market-based and a bank-based system, are indicated. Thirdly, corporate governance
mechanisms including (1) ownership structure, (2) debt financing and creditors, (3)
shareholder protection, (4) market control and (5) securities market regulations are
discussed. The final section deals with a summary and conclusions.
The ultimate concern of chapter three is with reviewing the literature associated
with the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance across
countries. A number of studies related to this area are reviewed and the theoretical
and statistical outcomes are drawn. This literature revision not only aims to present
the outcomes of the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance
from evidence of various countries, but it also steps towards an understanding in the
development of the hypotheses (which will be presented in Chapter five). The
summary and conclusions are then presented.
Chapter four aims to illustrate the ownership structure of Thai non-financial
firms between 1993-1996. It is designed as follows. In the first section, the Thai
capital-market's history and the registration requirements for firms that wish to
register on the Stock Exchange of Thailand are shown. In the second section, the
legal and regulatory environment of Thai governance is presented, in terms of (1)
roles and responsibility of the Board of Directors, (2) transparency and disclosure
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requirements, (3) shareholder protection and (4) creditor protection. The structure of
the Stock Exchange of Thailand, including market capitalization, and its financial
performance, which is represented by profitability and leverage ratios, between 1993
and 1996 are also illustrated.
The corporate Thai ownership structure is presented in the third section. The
secondary data, for example, the shareholders, the boards of directors' lists, and the

financial statements of the firms in the sample are used for this analysis. This section
begins with an illustration of the largest and the top five-ownership concentrations.
Following on from this, the largest shareholders are classified as: individual or
family, domestic-corporations, foreign investors, other financial institutions, banks,
and government. These categories of shareholders are then examined in terms of the
number of firms in the sample they controlled and their ownership concentration.
The frequency distribution of firms controlled by shareholders, which have been
classified into three levels based on the shareholding (0%-25%, >25%-50% and more
than 50%), is analyzed. Also, the number of firms with managerial ownership
(including managerial-family ownership and managerial-nonfamily ownership) and
non-managerial ownership is investigated. Next, the frequency distribution of firms
in which these ownerships participate is examined.
In the fourth section of chapter four, the financial performance of Thai firms
between 1993-1996 is investigated. The financial performance presented is

profitability (as represented by return on assets, return on equity, and the gross profi
margin) and leverage (as represented by total debt to asset and total debt to equity).
Following on from this, the financial performance of firms based on the different
categories of- shareholders is examined. As well, the performance of firms with
managerial shareholders and with non-managerial shareholders is investigated. In
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thefinalsection, the number of firms with bank ownership and those with non-bank
ownership, and also their financial performance is analyzed.
Chapter five, in the first section, deals with a discussion of the data and the
statistical methods selected for this study. In the second section, there is an
illustration of which measurement of firm performance will be used for the analysis.
There then follows a discussion of ownership measurement in regard to controlling
shareholders, their categories (individual or family, domestic corporations, foreign
investors, and banks), and managerial shareholders including managerial-family
shareholders and managerial-nonfamily shareholders.
The third section of chapter five illustrates the control variables that will be
included in the model for this analysis. This section comprises the background
literature and a review of previous studies that have discussed the relationship of
such control variables and firm performance. As well, the methodology of
measurements of these control variables is shown. In the last section, the
development of the hypotheses and empirical models for the regression analysis are
presented.
Chapter six is conducted for the empirical analysis by using both univariate
and multivariate regressions. It is organized as first, the results of the univariate
analyses regarding the comparisons of firm performance between (1) controlling
ownership and non-controlling ownership, (2) categories of controlling ownership
and non-controlling ownership, and (3) managerial ownership and non-managerial
ownership are presented. Secondly, the results are presented of the multivariate
regression analyses, which include not only ownership structure variables, but also
other selected control variables in the model. The relationship of ownership structure
and firm performance (examined in this section) is presented in various aspects as
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follows: (1) the effect of controlling ownership on firm performance, (2) the
comparison of performance between firms with controlling ownership and noncontrolling ownership, (3) the effect of each category of controlling ownership
(family, domestic-corporations, foreign ownership), on firm performance, (4) the
comparison of performance between firms within each category of controlling
ownership and firms with non-controlling ownership, (5) the effect of managerial
ownership (including managerial-family ownership and managerial-nonfamily
ownership) on firm performance, and (6) the comparison of performance of firms
with managerial ownership (including its two categories) and non-managerial
ownership.
Thirdly, the different performance between firms with bank ownership and
those with non-bank ownership is investigated. Limpaphayom and Polwitoon
(2001) suggest that banks may not be able to intervene and have influence on firms
with managerial shareholders. That is, managerial shareholders have adequate power
to shelter themselves from the influence of banks. Firms with bank ownership are
therefore classified as: firms with bank-managerial ownership and firms with banknon-managerial ownership. The performance of these two categories of ownership is
compared with that of firms with non-bank equity shareholders.
The last section of chapter six investigates whether or not there is a non-linear
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. In so doing, this
thesis adopts the Short and Keasy (1999) cubic form1, in which the estimated
coefficients of the managerial ownership variables (DIR, DIR2, and DIR3) are able to
determine their own turning points associated with firm performance. The maximum
and the minimum turning points will be examined from the estimated coefficient of

1

The cubic model in Short and Keasy's (1999) study is as follows: Performance = a +pi DIR + p
DIR 2 + p 3 DIR 3 + y Control Variables.

3 0009 03314833 4
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The managerial-family

ownership and managerial-nonfamily ownership are also investigated for this nonlinear relationship, and their turning points are then examined.
Chapter seven is designed to conduct further analysis in order to examine the
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance during 1998-2000,
which was the period after the crisis in Thailand. This study is prevented from
including the year 19972 owing to the data incompleteness of most firms in the
sample. The number of years on which this study is focused is also limited to the
year 2000, as the data collection was conducted at the beginning of 2001. The results
of this further analysis can confirm the robustness of the results of the relationship
between ownership structure and firm performance during the period prior to the
crisis (presented in chapter six). However, if the results regarding the effect of
ownership structure and firm performance in the period after the crisis are not
consistent with those found in the period prior to the crisis, the different results
between these two periods are captured.
Before conducting the analysis of such a relationship, the early part of chapter
seven begins with an investigation into Thai corporate ownership structure in the
period after the crisis (1998-2000). Next, a comparison of the ownership structure in
the period prior to the crisis (1993-1996) and after the crisis (1998-2000) is
examined. The same methods and models used in chapter six are employed in this
further study. Based on multivariate regression analysis, the results of the
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance of the period after
the crisis are presented. Finally, the summary and conclusions are drawn.
Chapter eight provides a summary and conclusions to this thesis. It begins
with, first, a conclusion to the background and theoretical framework associated with
2

It should be noted that year 1997 was the year when Thailand seriously faced the financ
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the effect of ownership structure on firm performance. The major outcomes of the
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance from the literature
are presented in the second section. In the third section, there are highlights of Thai
ownership structure as well as its financial performance in the period prior to the
financial crisis (1993-1996). The data and methodology of the ownership structure
and firm performance measures are presented in the fourth section. In the fifth
section, the major findings of the analysis regarding the relationship between
ownership structure and firm performance in the period prior to the crisis (1993 and
1996) are presented. Following this, the findings of the analysis of this relationship
after the crisis (1998-2000) are shown. The comparison of the results of the effect of
ownership structure on firm performance between the period prior to crisis (1993-

1996) and after the crisis (1998-2000) is illustrated. Finally, there is a discussion of
the research implications, limitations of this study, and the recommendations for
further research.
The aim of this study is to examine the influence of ownership structure - one
of the important mechanisms of corporate governance on firm performance. The
outcomes of the study are expected to benefit the Thai stock market and investors as
well as the regulators in shaping securities market policies. The next chapter reviews
the extant literature on corporate governance, corporate governance mechanisms, and
agency problems all of which impinge on the central research questions of the study.

Chapter 2

Background Literature on Corporate Governance and
Agency Problems

2.1 Introduction
Corporate governance has been discussed for many decades. It has succeeded in
attracting a good deal of public interest because of its importance for economic
development and society in general. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.737) state
"corporate governance deals with the way in which suppliers of finance to
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment". The focus
on corporate governance resulting from the separation of ownership and control and
was introduced by Berle and Means (1932). That is, in the modern corporation (from
the middle of the nineteenth century), corporations began raising funds by selling
stocks and bonds to anonymous individual investors in the securities market. The
investors who bought corporate securities thus became more numerous and their

shareholdings were dispersed. As a result, those shareholders lost control over their
resources and their power to control management performance. Managers have more
freedom to use the firm's resources than where the shareholders are more
concentrated. This situation of 'separation of ownership and control' can lead to
agency problems as well as information problems that are the most significant from
the point of view of determining the problem of corporate governance and firm
performance (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Myer and Majuf, 1984; Demsetz, 1983). In this regard, the
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corporate governance mechanisms are therefore demanded so as to ensure that the
investors or shareholders can control the managers, and so the agency or asymmetric
information problems are able to be alleviated (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Stone et
al., 1998; Tirapat, 2001).
In embarking on a study of corporate governance, it is important to enhance an
understanding of agency theory, asymmetric information theory, as well as the
background of corporate governance including its systems and mechanisms. This
chapter is therefore organized as follows. The first section will deal with agency
theory, which will be elaborated upon and analyzed in relation to the conflict
between (i) shareholders and managers, and (ii) equity shareholders and debtholders. The second section will illustrate the theory of asymmetric information in
greater detail. The third section will focus on corporate governance systems and
governance mechanisms. The corporate governance mechanisms will be divided into
five subsections: these are (1) ownership structure, (2) debt financing, (3)
shareholder protection, including the responsibility of the board of directors,
shareholder rights, and transparency and disclosure requirements, (4) market control,
and (5) securities market regulations. The summary and conclusions will be drawn
in the final section.

2.2 Agency Problems
In traditional, neoclassical economic theory, a firm is regarded as a
homogeneous entity, which aims to maximize its total value and the discounted value
of its expected future cash flow. In modern corporations, however, Jensen and
Meckling (1976) define a firm_as a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of
contracting relationships among all related parties (for instance, managers,
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shareholders, suppliers and customers). This can be explained by the fact that a firm
will raise funds from investors by borrowing from creditors or banks, or by issuing
equity shares. In exchange, creditors or banks are promised to have priority and be
paid before any payments are made to equity stockholders and are sometimes
secured by the assets of the firm. Creditors generally charge some rate of interest in
exchange for the use of their funds. Their claim against the firm, however, is limited
to the outstanding principal and interest on the loan. The firm will give equity
shareholders, in exchange for the equity funds, securities (stock). Unlike creditors,
equity shareholders can claim the income after all the payments have been made to
all other parties (including creditors, management, employees, and suppliers); this is
called a 'residual claim'. It is possible that the equity shareholders may receive
nothing if the firm's benefits have dried up after payments to all other parties.
However, if the firm is profitable, all of those profits will go to the shareholders in
the form of either dividend paid to the shareholders or as a reinvestment in the firm.
In this modern corporation, a number of investors or financiers invest their
money in the firm. As a result, ownership becomes dispersed, and it is separated
from management. It should not be surprising that the existence of the 'separation of
ownership and control' can create agency problems (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama
and Jensen, 1983a,b; Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen and
Meckling (1976, p. 308) define the agency relationship as "a contract under which
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making
authority to the agent". In other words, it is the shareholders (who provide risk
capital for an opportunity to receive appropriate returns from profits anbLan increase
in the firm's value) will hire managers as their agents to run the firm's business(es),
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including making decisions that are supposed to maximize the shareholders' wealth

and the value of the firm. In this regard, it has been argued across the literature th
it is possible when the shareholders are dispersed, and the significant controlling
power in the firm is transferred to managers. The managers, however, are likely to
make less effort to manage the firm's resources and may transfer the firm's resources
to maximize their own interests.
This conflict of interests does not only exist between shareholders and managers,
but can also be incurred between equity shareholders and debt shareholders/creditors.
Creditors, especially banks, have the right to insert their power over the borrowing
firm's management. They usually prevent firms, for example, from investing in
high-risk projects. This is because, in general, debt contracts provide that if an
investment obtains returns well and above the face value of debt, the equity
shareholders capture most of the benefits. If the investment fails, banks bear most of
the cost (Blair, 1995; Prowse, 1992; Aoki, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Banks
therefore have a strong incentive to monitor the lending firm's management and
decision-making. Banks have to ensure that the firm's management allocates the
funds efficiently in their investments so that firms will be able to achieve the
repayment (Hoshi et al., 1990; Prowse, 1992; Aoki, 1994; Gorton and Schrnid,
1996). Such interests of a bank can conflict with those of management, which
somehow perceive that the banks' monitoring is too conservative, and as a result,
agency problems between them arise. This issue will be further discussed in a later
section in terms of the costs and benefits of debt financing.
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2.3 Asymmetric Information Problems
Myer and Majluf (1984) argue that the separation of ownership and management
is one of the causes of asymmetric information problems. That is, managers, who are
hired to operate the firm's business, will know more about the firm than
shareholders. Managers may try to use information about the firm they have, which
is not available to shareholders, for their own benefit (Gitman and Madura, 2000).
When shareholders are dispersed, there are large information asymmetries between
these shareholders and managers. In general, small shareholders lack expertise and

incentives to substantially close this information gap and monitor mangers to act for

their benefit. This is because the benefits they receive in doing so sometimes cannot
offset the cost they have to bear.
In addition, Myer and Majluf (1984), James (1987) and Mayer (1988) suggest
that asymmetric information problems occur when the issuing of new equity is
announced. This can be explained by the fact that when managers control firms, they
tend to finance the firm by issuing new securities rather than borrowing from
external sources, such as a bank. This is because such borrowing will discipline
managers. If managers cannot provide payments according to the debt contracts,
they will be in a difficult situation. For example, banks may force the firm into

liquidation, reorganize the firms or seize the firm's assets (Harris and Raviv, 1990;

Blair, 1995). In contrast, if managers issue new equity in financing a firm' projects,
they can postpone paying out dividends to those equity shareholders in cases where
the firm faces financial distress (Wiwattanakuntung, 2000). Myer and Majluf (1984)
note that when a firm issues new shares, outside investors will assume that managers
of the firm know more about a firm's vahieihan them. The managers will act in the
interests of existing shareholders by issuing new equity when it is overvalued.
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Issuing shares can therefore convey negative information about the firm to the
market. This consequently affects the firm's share prices. Myer and Majluf (1984)
also suggest that a firm's share prices drops with the stock issue announcement. On
the other hand, Wiwattanakantung (1999) suggests that additional debt for the firm's
projects provides a positive signal of confidence in the manger in their successful
projects and their debt payment management.
Myer and Majluf (1984) and James (1987) argue that if managers act in the

interests of existing shareholders, they will refuse to issue shares (even if doing so
means passing up some good investment opportunities) because their stock prices
will be under-estimated by the market. However, in some cases, firms with a high
concentrated ownership will prefer borrowing to issuing new shares in order to
finance the firm. This is because they are attempting to avoid the dilution of their
concentrated ownership (Limpaphayom, 2001).
To finance the firms, Myer and Majluf (1984) and Myer (1984) suggest that

firms should begin with internal finance. If this is not sufficient, then low-risk deb
will be required. This is because debt provides a positive signal of the manager's
confidence in future earnings. Issuing equity should then be used as a last resort.
Myer and Majluf (1984) and Fama (1980) suggest that bank loans are a form of
inside debt because banks have information about the borrowers, which is not

available to other securities holders. Schumpeter (1939, p. 116) states "... the banker
must not only know what the transaction is which he is asked to finance and how if is
likely to turn out but he must also know the customer, his business and even his
private habits, by frequently "talking things over with him". James (1987) indicates
that share prices would have positive responses for the firm that announces bank
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loans, because borrowing may act as a signal about the ability of a firm to meet
repayments to a creditor.
MacKie-Manson (1990) suggests that asymmetric information appears to be an
important determinant of financing options for firms since different fund providers
have different access to information about firms, and therefore have different
abilities to monitor firms' management behaviour. In addition, Rajan and Zingles
(1995) document that industries with high external financing requirements in welldeveloped financial markets grow faster than in less developed financial markets.
Further discussion of asymmetric information problems will be covered in the debt
financing section.
Overall, in regard to the agency problems and information problems,
shareholders attempt to find a way to guarantee or ensure that they will receive fair
returns back from their investments. Therefore, good corporate governance and its
mechanisms are called for.

2.4 Corporate Governance
Based on the problems discussed earlier, a basic question arising from
shareholders is how can they effectively monitor managers and exercise their power
so that the managers will act in their interest. From a theoretical viewpoint, the
shareholders and the managers will sign the contract which will specify what the
managers must do with the funds, and how returns will be allocated (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997). However, it is very difficult to write such perfect contract which can
specify all possible future decisions on how the firm's resources and assets will be
used or allocated by managers effectively, guarantee that the managers will run the
firms in the best interests of the shareholders and leave no room for corporate
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governance (Prowse, 1998). As such, managers will have more freedom to operate a
firm's management in their interests, which may not coincide with those of
shareholders. This condition makes it difficult for shareholders to ensure that their
funds are appropriately and well managed in attractive or profitable projects, which
will bring appropriate returns to them (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this regard, it
has been suggested that good corporate governance and its mechanisms can alleviate
those problems and ensure that shareholders (or investors) will receive their returns
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Hoshi, 2001; Tirapat, 2001). These governance
mechanisms will also strengthen and improve the efficiency of a governance system
and result in an increase in firm performance.
The concept of corporate governance is difficult to define because it potentially
covers a large number of different economic phenomena. Different people have

provided different definitions that basically reflect their special interests in the fi
However, traditionally, corporate governance is associated with the relationship
between a principal (owners or shareholders, or sometimes investors) and agent
(managers) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Mayer, 1998). According to the report of
Price Waterhouse in Thailand (1997, p.6) "corporate governance is the system or
process by which organizations are directed and controlled by the directors and
senior management for the benefit of their shareholders, viz, employees, customers,
bankers and suppliers". The Stock Exchange of Thailand (2001, p.4) defines
corporate governance as "a set of structures and processes of relationships between a
company's management, its board and its shareholders to enhance its
competitiveness towards business prosperity and long-term shareholder value by
taking into consideration the interests of other stakeholders".
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According to Peng Lim Choo, President of the Stock Exchange of Singapore
(1997, p.6), corporate governance is a "process and structure used to direct and
manage the business and affairs of the corporation with the object of enhancing
shareholder value, which includes ensuring the financial viability of the business.
The process and structure define the division of power and establish mechanisms for
achieving accountability among shareholders, the board of directors and
management". Alternatively, Mayer (1998) suggests that corporate governance is
defined as a way of bringing the interests of owners and managers (principal and
agent) into line and ensuring that firms are run for the benefit of the owners.
Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that corporate governance is concern with
how investors ensure that managers provide them with ample returns and not
expropriate money to finance poor projects.

2.4.1 Corporate Governance System
In general there is a large literature on corporate governance systems in
particular. It describes the two major governance systems, their functioning as well

as their different objectives: (1) a capital market-based (or arm's length) system, a
(2) a bank-based (or relationship) system (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1988; Moreland,
1995; Magdi and Nadereh, 2000; Vives, 2000). As noted by Shleier and Vishny
(1997), there are four countries, including the United States (US), the United
Kingdom (UK), Germany and Japan, "that have some features of the best corporate
governance systems in the world" (p. 737) (see the Best Practices of these four
countries in Appendix B). These four countries also represent the international
corporate governance model systems. That is, the US and the UK represent the
capital market-based model system. This model promotes dispersed debt and equity
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ownership, while Germany and Japan represent the bank-based model system, where
banks hold a proportion of shares in most firms.
In the US and the UK (with the capital market-based system), shareholders are
dispersed among institutional and individual investors. This makes it very difficult
for such shareholders to monitor and supervise a firm's management. In this case, it
appears that the market for corporate control plays an important role in monitoring
management behaviour with the threat of a hostile takeover, (the market for
corporate control that will be discussed more in section 2.4.2.4). In terms of the
bank-based system, transaction costs that result from the behaviour of small
shareholders who are not interested in making an effort to direct and control a
management's progress (free-rider problems) are reduced. This is because the bank
will represent these small shareholders in order to control the management of the

firm. In this case, it should be noted that indeed small shareholders are interested i
monitoring the firm's management but the benefits they receive will actually be
outweighed by the costs of doing so. As a result, these small shareholders leave most
of the firm's business in the hands of managers. The bank-based system, however,
is not without limitations. That is, with a bank-based system, the control
mechanisms may no longer be based on the process set by the market's financial
assets. It may be based on the banks' ability to monitor and supervise the firms with
which the bank has commercial and financial relationships. Moreover, the bankbased system somehow has an over-tendency to invest and this action can create an
excess production capacity in those firms (Hoshi et al., 1991).
Prowse (1990, 1994) mentions that the difference in corporate governance
between those four countries (US, UK, Japan, and Germany) may be a consequence
of some different legal and regulatory structures across those countries. Prowse
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(1994) and Vives (2000) suggest that the reason that the US and the UK have

characteristics of a capital market-based system (not a bank-based system) is becaus
of financial regulatory constraints. In the US, banks face several significant
regulatory constraints, known as the 'Glass-Steagall Act'. This limits banks from
holding a large firms' equity and using it to control firms for their own purposes.
example, banks are not allowed to own any stock on their own account more than 5%
of any single firm (Prowse, 1994). In the UK, there are no formal regulations that
prohibit or limit banks and financial institutions owning stocks in non-financial
firms. Banks, however, are required the explicit approval from the Bank of England
before they can hold the shares of any single firm. Also, they must report to the
Bank of England if they hold more than 10% of a firm's equity (Prowse, 1994).
These prudential rules in the UK are probably strict enough to preclude banks from
holding shares in firms (Prowse, 1990,1994).
Japan and Germany, as emphasized earlier, are the countries that represent the
bank-based model system. These two countries have different legal restrictions from
those of Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US and the UK. That is, since the postwar period the Japanese economy commenced a period of reconstruction. Families
or individuals owning firms were replaced by professional managers or by banks

(Kester, 1986). At that time, there were a few regulations on the subject of Japanese

financial institutions or banks owning corporate stock in their own right and contro
firm's management in which they held stock (Hoshi et al., 1990; 1994; Aoki, 1994;
Prowse 1994; Weinstein, 1998). Until 1987, banks had been subjected to the AntiMonopoly Act, in which Japanese banks could not own more than 5% of the total
number of shares in a single non-financial firm entity (Prowse, 1990, 1992; and
Bartholdy et al., 1997). At that time, a number of large firms in Japan had been
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reformed as an affiliated group or so-called 'keiretsu group'. This was a group of

firms that was based in different industrial sectors, which were headed by a core se

of large financial institutions, especially banks. Consequently, banks had a powerful
position as monitors of a firm's management either through the board or through
their control as funds providers. Several studies (for example, Aoki, 1994; Hoshi et
al., 1990, 1991; Canals, 1997; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998) argue that the keiretsu
relationship is able to decrease the impact of transaction costs as for example the
free-rider problems or monitoring costs. It also provides a better flow of
information, which may reduce the risk of information asymmetry. In this regard,
however, if banks fail to have adequate information about the firms, the strategy of
bank-controlled firm may be too risky or too conservative.
In Germany, the universal banks control a large part of the ownership and
management of German firms (Prowse, 1994). This is because the financial
regulation is not as strict as in the US and the UK. The main regulation for banks
holding shares of non-financial firms in Germany is that if banks are holding in
excess of 10%, they must report to the Bundesbank (the German central bank in
Frankfurt). Banks can invest in firms, both shares and loans, but not more than 50 %
of the banks' share capital (Canals, 1997). Because of the bank-based system in
Germany, however, it does not mean that most German banks hold an overwhelming
proportion of shares in non-financial firms. The three largest German banks
(Dutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerz Bank) have the most significant
holdings in some of the large German firms (Kester, 1986; Canals, 1997). An
alternative mechanism by which German banks influence the borrowing firms is

3

According to Gorton and Schmid (1998, p. 6) universal bank means "banks are allowed to offer the
full range of commercial and investment banking service (including lending, deposit-taking, and all
aspects of the securities business: purchase and sale of securities for others, securities custody
business, holding and trading on their o w n account, etc.)".
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through the bank appointing directors to the boards of these firms. Prowse's study

(1994) indicates that the differences in the legal and regulatory structures of thes
four countries (US, UK, Japan and Germany) have implications for ownership
structure of the firms as shown in Table 2.1. (see also in Appendix C).
Table 2.1
Ownership Structure in 1990 for Firms in the United States, United Kingdom,
Japan and G e r m a n y
Investors

United
States

United
Kingdom

Japan

Germany

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

Banks
Other Financial Institutions
Non-Financial Institutions
Individuals
Foreign Investors
Government
Total

0.0
30.4
14.0
50.2
5.4
0.0
100

4.3
48.5
10.2
28.0
6.5
2.5
100

18.9
29.1
24.9
22.4
4.0
0.7
100

10.0
12.0
42.0
17.0
14.0
5.0
100

Source: Prowse (1994), p. 21.
Quoted from: U S Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, U K Financial Statistics, Japanese Flow of Funds,
Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report.

In addition, Shliefer and Vishny (1997) argue that indeed corporate governance
systems, for instance those of the US, UK, Germany and Japan, rely on the fact that

there is some combination of ownership structure and legal protection for investors
(Prowse, 1994; Mayer, 1998). For example, in the UK, where the shareholders are

dispersed, they are well protected through intensive regulations. These include the

provision of extensive power to shareholders to take legal action against directors
violations of fiduciary duties.

2.4.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Corporate governance mechanisms that have been most extensively studied in

several countries can be broadly characterized as follows: (1) ownership structure,
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(2) debt financing, (3) shareholder protection, (4) market for corporate control, and
(5) securities market regulations.

2.4.2.1 Ownership Structure
According to Porter (1990); Jensen (2000); the Asian Development Bank (2001)
ownership structure is the most important factor in determining the firm's goals and
the shareholders' wealth. In general, ownership structure can be considered in terms
of (i) ownership concentration, (ii) ownership categories and (iii) managerial
ownership. Some studies regard a creditor ownership as another category of
ownership structure. This study, however, will discuss the creditor ownership on the
part of debt financing.

Ownership Concentration
The degree of ownership concentration in a firm is a determinant of the power
distribution between managers and shareholders. Ownership concentration refers to
when most of the shares in the firm are concentrated in the hands of a shareholder or
a small number of shareholders, the so-called 'concentrated shareholders or
controlling shareholders (Blair, 1995). These shareholders have adequate control

rights (through their voting rights or through representation on the board of director
to influence the management including the way the firm's resources are allocated.
They are also able to exert their influence over management by obtaining
representation on the board from their voting rights at shareholders' meetings
(Prowse, 1994). Since concentrated shareholders can monitor a firm's management
effectively, agency costs and information problems tend to be decreased, and
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consequently a firm's performance increases (Blair, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny,
1997; Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990).
Concentrated ownership, however, is not without limitations. That is, the
interests of such concentrated shareholders may not coincide with those of other
small shareholders. With sufficient power in the firm, the concentrated shareholders
can act in their own interests at the expenses of minority shareholders and other
stakeholders (e.g., creditors, employees and suppliers). For example, concentrated
shareholders can pay themselves special dividends, take on risky projects inasmuch
as they share in the upside while minority shareholders or creditors bear most of the
cost of failures.
Regarding dispersed ownership, the monitoring power (or control rights) of
dispersed shareholders is inadequate to control manager behaviour. This leads to not
only the agency and the asymmetric information problems, but also the free-rider
problem. The dispersion of ownership can be explained as shown in Figure 2.1
(adopted from Blair, 1995). From Figure 2-1, Blair (1995) explains that the voting
power of any individual (dispersed) shareholder is much less influential. As such,
these dispersed shareholders will mostly not pay attention to the firm's business and
monitoring management (as they are supposed to and wish to) because, as mentioned
earlier, the benefits they receive cannot outweigh the cost arises in doing so. Mayer
(1998) suggests that in most cases, dispersed shareholders will assume that exit is
cheaper than intervention in the firm's management behaviour. Also, the revelation
of an intervention may convey bad news to the stock market about a firm's
management. In regard to dispersed ownership, Fama and Jensen (1983a,b) argue
that dispersed ownership creates the diversification of risk bearing, which can
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outweigh the agency costs, and then firms w o u l d have m o r e ability to raise capital
from outside investors.
Figure 2.1
Basic Model of the Modern Corporation

Security Markets

Quarterly
renorts

Share price info
Shareholders

Dividends

Board of directors
Supervisory
power

Debt capital
Corporation

Wages
«

(management and physical capital)
Lenders

Employees

Interest payments
(market rates)

Labour

Market price

Inputs
Market price

Goods and
services
Customers

Source: Blair (1995, p.31).
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Concentrated Ownership Categories
The importance of ownership structure is not only in concentrated ownership,

but also in its categories. It refers to 'what categories' or 'what type' of concentra
ownership that controls firms. Ownership can be mainly categorized as: individual
or family, domestic-corporation, foreign investor, bank and financial institution.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that different categories of large shareholders may
have different monitoring skills and even have different objectives on corporate
decisions. For example, the individual or family shareholders will be concerned with
both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns (for example, benefits from having control

over the firm as well as the social status of the family). On the other hand, banks ar
more likely try to avoid risky investments, rush for repayment from the firms they
control whereas institutional investors owners concern more on the firm's
profitability and shareholder value.

Managerial Ownership
Shareholders can monitor management in order to operate a firm's business in
their interests by aligning the interests between them and those of managers. Jensen
and Meckling (1976) suggest that when managers hold a significant proportion of
shares in a firm, the interests between managers and shareholders will be aligned,
resulting in a decrease of agency problems, and consequently, the firm's performance
increases.
However, when managerial shareholding fails, managerial shareholders have

less incentive to devote effort to the firm's business (for example, searching for new
profitable investments) and this result in the firm's value being lower than what it
should be. In this regard, Geneen (1984, p. 28) states, "among the boards of
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directors of Fortune 500 companies ... 95% are not fully doing what they are legally,
morally, and ethically supposed to do". He suggests that when board members are

not insiders (shareholders-managers), they may not be paying their best attention to a

management's decision, as their risk is not involved with the firm's benefit. In other
words, it can be argued that if the boards are insiders (or when their money is
involved), they will pay more attention to a firm's management and the efficient
running of the firm's management.
However, managerial shareholding does not always benefit corporate
performance. That is, at a certain level of managerial shareholding, managerial
shareholders will entrench their power and operate the firm's business for their own
benefit (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short amd Keasy, 1999).

Stulz (1988) suggests that it is very difficult to remove such shareholders even if th
perform poorly. Morck et al. (1988) MeConnell and Servaes (1990) suggest that the
relationship between managerial shareholders and firm performance is non-linear.
They explain that at the early stage of managerial shareholding, the interests of
managers and shareholders becomes aligned and results in a decreasing of agency
problems, and consequently firm performance increases. However, when their
shareholding rises to a certain level, managerial shareholders may act for their own
benefit at the expense of minority shareholders or creditors, and this reduces firm
performance.

2.4.2.2 Debt Financing
Debt is also regarded as an alternative mechanism of corporate governance.

The influence of debt over a firm is that creditors will perform an important function

in monitoring firms. It is essential to note that the creditors, in this study, are ban
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It is a fact that banks are generally the main source of external finance around the
world (Gorton and Schmind, 1996) and also the sample of this study focuses on
Thailand where a bank-based system is engaged. Various theoretical and empirical
studies (for example, Suzuki, 1985; Hoshi et al., 1990, 1991; Akoi, 1994; Prowse,
1990,1992,1994; Lichtenberg and Pusher 1994; Kang 1997; Shleifer and Vishny,
1997; and Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998) examine the relationship between banks and
firm performance and find that there are both costs and benefits with this
relationship.
The main benefits of debt financing are, first, banks usually have strong

incentives to monitor firms as well as exert their influence over the making of major

decisions by firms through a variety of controls as, for example, by the directors of
the firms (this action however depends on the laws and regulations of creditor
protection in each country). Banks may also prevent managers from investing in
poor or risky projects. This is because if a firm's management makes a poor decision

by investing in a risky project, the banks will bear most of the costs if such projec
fail. However, if these projects are successful, no matter how much these firms earn,
banks will still only receive their fixed pay-off and interest payments while owners
or shareholders capture all the gain above the debt repayment (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997; Blair 1995; John and Sunbet, 1998).
Secondly, for firms with debt it will be perceived by outside investors that such
firms tend to make efficient business decisions as well as have profitable projects.
Jensen (1986) suggests that outside investors sometimes use bank loans to evaluate
the quality of a firm's management if they are uncertain about it. Harris and Raviv

(1990) also note that firms with a higher debt tend to have a higher market value tha
other similar firms with lower debts. Alternatively, Mayer (1998) notes that the
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existence of a bank can overcome a free-rider problem that afflicts firms, especially
when shareholders are dispersed because there is little incentive on any single
shareholder to exercise corporate control (see ownership concentration section).
Thirdly, lending, particularly short-term, will allow a bank to have
opportunities to investigate a firm's management regularly (Wiwattanakantung,
2000). Moreover, having a close relationship with bank, banker(s) will be allowed to
join the board of the firm. This ultimately improves the flow of information between
bank and firm. As a result, it is possible for the firm to obtain more financing from
the bank in the future. Also, having a banker on the board is a signal to the market

that this firm has less possibility of failing in their projects (Kroszner and Strahan,
1999). Prowse (1994) also suggests that when firms are in default in payment,
renegotiation can be relatively easier, especially if a bank is both a debt-holder and
an equity-holder in the firm. However, if firms have a large number of creditors,
renegotiating with these creditors may be extremely difficult, and finally these
creditors may force firms into bankruptcy (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In regard to
the influence of banks over borrowing firms (discussed above), it should be noted
that it typically depends on the governance environment and how well banks are
protected legally in each country.
The cost of bank borrowing, however, still exists. First, firms may be
prevented from raising additional funds because of debt covenants. Banks may also

force firms to liquidate even if it is detrimental for the firms to do so (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997; Wiwattanakantung, 2001). In the case where borrowing firm defaults

on payment, banks have certain rights, for instance, to repossess collateral or to forc
firms into bankruptcy. Secondly, conflicts of interest between banks and a firms'
management may arise. This is because as banks mainly hold debt claims, they are
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responsible for most of the cost if the borrowing firms fail in risky projects (as
discussed earlier). The interests of banks, for example, in the investment policies,
may be excessively conservative, which may conflict with those of a borrowing
firms' management. Moreover, firms with a bank relationship may experience a
problem when banks attempt to manipulate the firms' activities for their benefit
rather than maximizing the firms' profits. Hoshi et al, (1991) argue that some firms

choose to reduce bank ties in order to avoid conflict between the bank and the firm's
management at the expense of becoming more liquidity constrained. Caprio and
Levine (2002) suggest that the conflict of interest between a borrowing firm's
management and a bank's managers also exist. That is, the bank's managers may

have enormous discretion to act for their own interests rather than those of the bank
institutions or the borrowing firms. As a result, bank's managers may allocate
capital of the borrowing firms less efficiently, and such an action benefits bank's
managers but hurts overall firm performance.
Finally, due to the close-bank relationship, banks may have information about
borrowing firms and can use such information in a way that benefits themselves
rather than the borrowing firms and shareholders in those firms. Banks may also use
informational advantage that only they have to limit the extent to which borrowing
firms are able to seek alternative sources of finance (Diamond, 1984; Hoshi, 2001).
Gorton and Schmind (1996) and Mayer (1998) suggest that banks may charge higher
lending rates to those firms than they might, otherwise, have to pay. Moreover,
Diamond (1984) argues that mature or successful firms sometime choose external
funds from other sources that will not have influence over their management in order
to avoid the conflict of interest of a firm's management and bank.
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2.4.2.3 Shareholder Protection
Shareholder protection is another important mechanism of corporate
governance. The main reason that investors provide (or invest) their funds in a firm
is to obtain controlling rights to control managers to act in the shareholders best

interests. This relies on the fact that external financing is a contract between the fi
(as a legal entity) and the external finance providers, who are given certain rights
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Shareholders' protection can be reflected through
factors including the role of the board of directors, minority shareholder rights, and
transparency and disclosure requirements.

Role of the Board of Directors
One of the important legal rights for shareholders is the right to vote in electing
a board of directors to process the firm's business on behalf of them in order to
maximize their benefits (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Prowse, 1994; Limpaphayom,
2001). Members of boards will generally be elected from shareholders, management
teams, and outsiders by shareholders. Basically, a board of directors must perform
its duties honestly and prudently to guard the interests of firms and shareholders.
Their response must approve the firm's strategies, major policies, financial goals and
budgets. Also the directors are required to pay attention to all issues brought to the
board meeting, including corporate governance matters (The Stock Exchange of
Thailand, 1999c, 2000). Moreover, directors should be independent from
management and controlling shareholders.
The structure of a corporate board varies across countries. The way it is
governed by rules and regulations, can lead to differences in the effectiveness of
these boards (Prowse, 1994). In the US and the UK, for example, most of the board
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of directors is elected from CEOs, management teams or outsiders. In Japan, large
shareholders are not directly represented in the board's positions. They prefer to
gather information and influence the firm through a closely related 'keiretsu' group
(Prowse, 1994). In Germany, it appears that large creditors are represented on the
board and influence the management of me firm, (see also in Appendix D). Jensen
(1993) argues that boards in the US are captured by the management, whilst Kaplan
and Minton (1994) support the view that in Japan and Germany, boards seem to be

passive except in extreme situations as, for example, financial distress. In Thailand,
the structure of the board, however, seems to be related to the power of large
shareholders (in cases where shareholders choose to exercise their power through
directors). That is, controlling shareholders can appoint board members without the
approval of other small shareholders. Those board members therefore represent only
the interests of the controlling shareholders that render the efficiency of internal
control. A number of regulations have been established to promote the independence
of the director in the corporate governance literature. The Cadbury Codes of the UK
recommend that there be at least 3 non-executive directors while the Stock Exchange
of Thailand requires at least two independent directors (Nikomborirak and
Tangkitvanich, 1999; Nikomborirak, 2001).

Minority Shareholder Rights
Minority shareholder rights are a governance mechanism, which requires that
shareholders can actively participate in and have an influence over the management
decision-making in a firm (Asian Development Bank, 2001; The Securities and
Exchange Commission, Thailand, 2001). Minority shareholders need to be protected
against the large shareholders or controlling shareholders who may run the firm's
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business for their private benefit at the expense of the minority shareholders (as has
been emphasized in the ownership structure section). Also, the minority
shareholders should be given the potential to actively fight for their interests. In
general, the minority shareholders have the right to (1) secure methods of ownership

registration, (2) convey transfer of shares, (3) obtain relevant information of the fir
on a timely and regular basis, (4) participate and vote in annual meetings, including
participation in making decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes, such as
mergers and dissolutions, (5) elect members of the boards and (6) share in the
residual profits of the firm (OECD, 1999, p. 27; and Asian Development Bank,
2001). Limpaphayom (2001) also suggests that shareholders can claim
compensation in the case of management negligence or dishonesty in its duties.
Yet the effectiveness of shareholders' rights depends on the differences in law
and regulations of each country. In the US, for example, where corporate ownership
is typically dispersed, the major mechanism for shielding shareholders from the
expropriation by incumbent managers is legally intensive protection. La Porta et al,
(1998) and Prowse, (1998) note that the US has the most extensive system of
shareholders' protection. For example, it maintains the election of directors
relatively free from managerial influences, and gives shareholders extensive power to
sue directors for violations of fiduciary duty. In Thailand, Limpaphayom (2001)
suggests that the gap in the system of minority shareholder protection still exists.

That is, (i) there are no standards in the content and timing of notices for shareholde
meetings, (ii) the roles and responsibilities of the major government agencies
regulating shareholder rights (e.g. the Ministry of Commerce, the Stock Exchange of
Thailand, the Securities and-Exchange Commission, and the Bank of Thailand) is not
clearly defined and (iii) the requirement to exercise the rights of minority
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shareholders, in terms of appointing an outside inspector to investigate the
management's operation and firm's financial condition, is very high (This issue will
be covered in Chapter 4).

Transparency and Disclosure Requirements
The quality of transparency and information disclosure contributes to an
effective shareholders' protection system (Limpaphayom, 2001). A firm's
information disclosed to shareholders should be complete, adequate, reliable,

creditable and timely. A firm's information usually includes its financial situation, a
list of major shareholders and board of directors' members, governance structure,
and a firm's objectives and policies. Both the positive and negative features should
be disclosed regularly. However, such information should not confuse or mislead
users. This is because regulators, policy makers, shareholders and outside investors
need such information for decision-making and for evaluating management
performance. In addition, the quality of transparency and information disclosure also
significantly depends on accounting and auditing standards as well as financial
systems. The international accounting standards are a necessary contribution for a
higher quality of transparency and information disclosure in the firm. Also,
independent auditing and good financial reporting systems should be called for. This
is because these systems can ensure that information disclosed to shareholders and
other investors is adequately reliable and credible (OECD, 1998, 1999; Asian
Development Bank, 2001; Limpaphayom, 2001).
In the US and UK, for example, accounting standards are set by professional
bodies of accountants, who ultimately understand the rules. In some countries, for
example Thailand, there are an inadequate number of well-qualified accountants and
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auditors and a professional self-regulatory body (Alba et al., 1998; and Prowse,

1998). In 1999, the Stock Exchange of Thailand required all listed firms to establis
an audit committee which would be responsible for examining the quality and
reliability of a firm's financial reports.
The summary of shareholders legal protection in different countries, namely the
US, the UK Japan, Germany, Thailand, Malaysia and Korea, is presented in Table
2.2. It shows that shareholders' protection is weakest in Germany and Korea, while
it seems to be in the middle for Thailand, Malaysia, and Japan. The US and the UK
have the highest protection. The degree of judicial enforcement, in the US, the UK,
Japan and Germany seems to be very high compared to that of Malaysia, Korea and
especially Thailand, that appears to be the lowest one. In regard to accounting
standards, the UK has the highest of this measure followed closely by the US and
Malaysia. Japan, Germany, Thailand and Korea's accounting standard measures

seem to be in the same range, which is lower than those countries already mentioned
Table 2.2
Shareholders Legal Protection
Shareholder Degree of Accounting
Protection
US
UK
Japan
Germany
Thailand
Malaysia
Korea

5
4
3
1
3
3
2

Judicial
Enforcement
9.5
9.4
9.4
9.4
5.9
7.7
6.7

Standard
71
78
65
62
64
76
62

Source: La Porta et al, (1998).
For shareholder protection measure: the scale is from 1 to 5, with 5 representing the strongest
degree of shareholder protection, and 1 representing the weakest. For enforcement: the scale is from 1
to 10, with 10 representing the highest degree of judicial enforcement and 1 representing the lowest.
For accounting: the higher the measure the higher the standards.
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2.4.2.4 Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control, including mergers and acquisition
(takeovers), is generally viewed as an important mechanism to control a manager's
discipline in operating the firm for the shareholders' benefits as well as for
maximizing a firm's value (Herman, 1981; Mayer, 1998). That is, if managers do
not attempt to maximize a firm's value, the firm may be taken over and subsequently
result in a change of policies, reorganization or even remove poor performance
managers. Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Palepu (1986) suggest that most takeover
targets are poor performing firms and once a takeover succeeds, the mangers of

target firms are removed. The prospect of a takeover seems to increase incentives fo
managers to act in the best interests of the shareholders in order to avoid being a
hostile target (Magdi and Nadereh, 2000). Takeovers seem to be common in the US
and the UK, where ownership is dispersed, while they seem not to be active in most
of East Asian countries, such as in Thailand where ownership is concentrated. There
is evidence that since the introduction of the Public Limited Company Act of 1978,

there are only a limited number of successful mergers and acquisition in Thailand as
shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3
Merger and Acquisition Activities in Thailand during 1993-1999
Tender Offer Value Purchase Value Number of Firms
(billion Baht)
(billion Baht)
1993
5.4
"
4.6
1994
23.1
17.3
1995
19.2
11.2
1996
8.3
6.9
1997
6.2
3.5
1998
7.7
6.2
1999
11.0
6.7
Source: Limpaphayom, 2001, p. 251).
Tender offer value refers to the minimum offer value.
(US$ 1 is approximately equal to 40 baht on average during this period).

8
27
14
6
9
13
23
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2.4.2.5 Securities Market Regulations
It is common that all countries have their own securities market regulations. The
basic objective of securities is to instill public confidence. According to the Asian
Development Bank (2001, p 15) the securities market regulations usually include
"(i) requirement for registration of companies and of securities offered or sold to the
public, (ii) requirement for timely and accurate reporting and disclosure of financial
information, (iii) restriction on securities trading by certain groups of people, (such
as "insider", ie., controlling shareholders and managers), (iv) prohibition against
certain types of trading activities and behaviour such as fraud or deceit or
manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances, (v) rules of stock exchange and
membership requirements of associations of securities dealers and, (vi) restrictions
on levels of shareholdings by financial institutions in non-financial corporations (in
some countries). The in-depth securities market regulations in Thailand will be
discussed in Chapter 4.

2.5 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has presented the theoretical framework on corporate governance,
the corporate governance systems and its mechanisms. It begins with, first, a
theoretical framework of agency problems and asymmetric information theory,
which results from the separation of ownership and control. The agency problems
are discussed in the way that they arise from the conflicts of interest between
shareholders and managers. That is, the shareholders, who invest their money in the
firm, will hire managers to run the firm's business in their interest. Managers,
however, tend to run the firm's business for their own interests rather than that of the
shareholders. The conflicts of interest exist not only between shareholders and
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managers, but also between shareholders/managers and creditors (or debt
shareholders). When creditors become involved in a firm's management, their
interests may not coincide with those of shareholders, most likely because they have
different objectives in respect of the business's operation.
In regards to the asymmetric information problems model, it exists when
managers know more about the firms than do the shareholders. Managers may abuse
shareholders by using such information for their own benefit and managers also tend
to finance a firm by issuing new equity instead of borrowing. This is because
borrowing subjects them to the discipline of repayment. Issuing shares, however,
will convey negative news about the firms to the market and this affects firm
performance.
Secondly, corporate governance systems have been discussed. In general, the
corporate governance systems have been categorized as a capital market-based
model and a bank-based model. The capital market-based model is mainly a

reflection of the US and UK's practice, while the bank-based model is a reflection of
the Japanese and German's practice. It has been argued that the reasons for having
the capital-market-based system in the US and the UK (not the bank-based system) is
mainly because of the financial regulatory constraints. It is argued in this respect
banks holding shares in their client firms are stricter than those in Germany and
Japan.
Thirdly, because of the problems (agency and asymmetric information)
discussed earlier, corporate governance mechanisms are discussed. These
mechanisms include: (1) ownership structure, (2) debt financing, (3) shareholder
protection, (4) market for corporate control, and (5) securities market regulations.
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Ownership structure is elaborated under the following subsections: (i)
ownership concentration, (ii) ownership categories and (iii) managerial ownership.
A number of studies suggest that ownership concentration can play an important role
in a firm because concentrated shareholders have adequate controlling and voting
power with which to monitor managers to run the firm's business efficiently in order

to maximize the shareholders' benefits. However, it is also possible that the interests
of these concentrated shareholders may not coincide with others such as small
shareholders, employees and creditors. They may control firms in a way to
maximize benefits only for themselves as, for example in the transferring of the

benefits of firms to their accounts. It is also argued that different categories (types
of concentrated shareholders may lead to the managing of firms differently and with
different objectives.
In regard to managerial ownership, it has been argued that when managers hold
a significant proportion of shares in the firm, the interest between owners and
managers is aligned, agency costs are then reduced, and consequently firm
performance increases. However, several current studies argue that managerial
ownership does not always mitigate agency costs and contribute to firm performance.
That is, at a certain level of managerial shareholding, managerial shareholders may
entrench their power and work for their own benefit, which is negatively related to
firm performance.
Debt financing has been discussed in terms of when creditors or banks lend
funds to a firm and/or hold a proportion of shares in such a firm. In this case banks
will have an incentive to control the firms' management in which they lend or invest.
Banks have to ensure that mangers are not inappropriately investing funds in poor
projects since this affects a bank in responding the costs if these projects fail.
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Several studies suggest that firms with a bank relationship will have better flow of
information between banks and firms. A close bank relationship can mitigate the
free-rider problem, as a bank can represent small shareholders, who have insufficient
controlling power to influence the management. However, a conflict of interests
between banks and mangers or shareholders of the firms does exist. This is because,
in some situations, banks may ask firms to take some action such as liquidation,
which intensively disadvantages a firm. Banks may sometimes use the information
about the firms for their own benefit.
Finally, shareholders' protection can be reflected through several mechanisms
including the role of the board of directors, minority shareholder protection, and
transparency and disclosure requirements. As well a market for corporate control and
a securities market regulation have been argued as mechanisms for good governance.
All these have been discussed in terms of how they can promote good corporate
governance systems.

Chapter 3

A Review of the Literature on Ownership Structure and
Firm Performance

3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present a discussion on the development of the
previous studies concerning the relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance. The ownership structure focused on in this study is ownership
concentration, ownership categories, managerial ownership, and bank equity

ownership. In doing so, this chapter is organized as follows. First, the literature on
the relationship between ownership concentration, including its categories, and firm
performance is presented. The impact of managerial ownership on the corporation
will be discussed in the second section. In the third section, the literature on the
influence of creditors or debt financing on firm performance with evidence from
Germany, Japan, and Thailand is reviewed. Finally, a summary of this chapter will
be presented.

3.2 Ownership Concentration, Ownership Concentration Categories and Firm
Performance
When Berle and Means (1932) presented the issue of the 'separation of
ownership and control', it leads to two significant problems: agency and asymmetric
information problems, by suggesting that ownership concentration can mitigate these
problems and enhance firm performance. The relationship between ownership
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structure and firm performance has been the subject of debate for several decades.
Several studies attempt to examine whether or not concentrated ownership can
overcome such problems and increase firm performance. However there has been no
conclusion as to whether ownership concentration does significantly affect corporate
performance. Monsen et al. (1968), Radice (1971), Boudreaux (1973), Stano (1976),
Steer and Cable (1978), Kesner (1987), Alba et al. (1998), and Xu and Wong (1999),
for example, suggest that there is a significant positive correlation between
ownership concentration and firm performance.
Stano (1976) finds that owner-controlled firms provide significantly higher
rates of return, while management-controlled firms are associated with higher
leverage and more volatile stock returns. Similarly, Steer and Cable (1978) show
that owner-controlled firms significantly outperform management-controlled firms
for a return on equity and long-term debt. In a recent study, for example, Xu and
Wong (1999) examine the impact of ownership concentration and its categories,
including domestic institutions, individual, and state shareholders, on its corporate
performance in China between 1993-1995. The performance in their study
represented market-to-book-value ratio, returns on equity and return on assets. Xu
and Wong (1999) reveal that, there is a positive correlation between ownership
concentration and firm performance. Moreover, they suggest that firm performance
is positively associated with domestic institution shareholders. In contrast, it is
negatively related to state shareholders and individual shareholders.
Similarly, in the case of China, Chen (2001) investigates the relationship
between ownership structure and firm value, as measured by Tobin's Q. The sample
was selected from the 434 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges in 1997. The main ownership structure was classified into three groups
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namely: state shareholders, domestic institutional shareholders and managerial
shareholders. The results of his study suggest that there is a strong relationship
between ownership concentration and corporate value (Tobin's Q). Also, a positive
relationship between corporate value and domestic institutional shareholding is
statistically significant. Chen (2001) argues that domestic institutional shareholders
have the incentive to monitor managers as the gains from so doing outweigh the
agency costs. As well he mentions that the coefficient of managerial shareholders is

positively related to the corporate value regression while that of state shareholders i
negative and significant to corporate value (Chen, 2001).
Alternatively, in the case of Thailand, Alba et al. (1998) investigate the
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance of listed firms
in 1992 and in 1996. In their study, they hypothesize that a high concentration of
ownership will display a higher level of profitability. The findings of their study
support the hypothesis, showing that ownership concentration is positive and
significant to profitability. They further hypothesize that firms with ownership
concentration will be associated with low performance in the future. This may be
because firms with high ownership concentration might have less flexibility in
changing their corporate governance according to the new economic environment.
To examine this hypothesis, they regress the concentration of ownership in 1992 on
the profitability in 1996. Surprisingly, the results show that there is a negative
relationship between ownership concentration in 1992 and profitability in 1996.
Alba et al. (1998) conclude that where there is high ownership concentration there is

a high incentive to control a firm effectively. It, however, creates less flexibility i
changing a firm's corporate governance system, which ultimately leads to
deterioration in future performance. In their study, however, the relationship of
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other types of concentrated ownership has not been examined, for example foreign
investors or managerial ownership and firm performance. This issue should be
considered because different types of concentrated shareholders can be
fundamentally different in the way they influence a firm's performance.
In addition, Wiwattanakantung (2001) examines the impact of ownership
structure and firm performance (as measured by the return on assets, sales to assets,
and a firm's value (Tobin'sQ) in the case of Thai non-financial firms listed in the
Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1996. The outcome of her study suggests that there
is no evidence to support the idea that controlling shareholders (which was measured
by the percentage of shares with more than 25% holding by the largest shareholders
in the firm) extract corporate assets away for their own benefits. That is, firms with
controlling shareholders have a higher profitability (ROA and S/A) than those with
non-controlling shareholders. In her study, the controlling ownership has been
classified into three levels (25%-50%, 50%-75% and 75%-100%). Their
performance therefore is compared with that of the largest shareholders (holding 0%25%) or non-controlling shareholders. The results illustrate that there is a positive
and significant relationship between the first two controlling shareholding levels
(25%-50% and 50%-75%) and the ROA. The coefficients of controlling ownership
(between 50%-75%) are positive and significant to the sales to asset ratio. In terms

of Tobin's Q regressions, the estimated coefficients of controlling ownership are less
significant.
The effect of the type of controlling shareholders in Thailand is also

investigated. Firms with controlling shareholders are classified as firms with family,
foreign investors, government, or more than one type of controlling shareholder.
The performance of these firms is compared to those with non-controlling
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shareholders. The results show that firms with family-controlling shareholders,
foreign-controlling shareholders or firms with more than one controlling shareholder
have a higher profitability than firms with non-controlling shareholders. In the sales
to asset ratios or Tobin's Q regressions, the estimated coefficients, of those types of
controlling shareholders are less significant. Wiwattanakantung (2001) suggests that
family-controlling shareholders or foreign-controlling shareholders are not
opportunistic and expropriate a firm's assets for their own purpose, which is
detrimental to firm performance. In this case, however, the effect of these types of
controlling ownership on firm performance should be investigated individually rather
than as a comparison with that of non-controlling ownership.
In the case of the Czech Republic, Claessens and Djankov (1999) examine the
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performances of 706 Czech
firms between 1992-1997. The results show that the coefficient of ownership
shareholding is positively related to firm profitability and a firm's market valuation.
They also further examine the effect of different types of ownership on firm
performance. The ownership variables include ownership concentration, bank
ownership, non-bank ownership, local investors, and foreign investors. They find
that certain types of owners, in particular foreign investors or non-bank ownership
are positive and significant to profitability. Claessens and Djankov (1999) therefore
conclude that overall ownership concentration and particular types of ownership
(foreign investors or non-bank ownership) are positively related to a firm's
profitability and market values.
Contrary to this, there are some studies argue that concentrated ownership has
no relationship to firm performance. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) investigate the
effects of concentrated shareholders on the accounting rate of return and the firm
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value (as measured by Tobin's Q). They compare the mean percentage of these
performance measures between firms with concentrated owners and those with
dispersed owners. The result shows that firm performance is not significantly
different between these firms. Mulari and Welch (1989) support this notion as they
find that performances of firms with high ownership concentration do not differ from
other firms with dispersed ownership. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) examine the effect
of ownership concentration on firm performance. The ownership concentration was

also classified into three groups: all investors, family and individual investors, an

institutional investors. The results suggest that there is no significant relationshi
between ownership concentration, including these ownership categories, and firm
performance (as represented by the return to shareholders). Demsetz and Lehn

(1985, p. 1176) note that "the structure of corporate ownership varies systematically
in ways that are consistent with value maximization". That is, if diffuse ownership
does exist, the decision to separate the functions of ownership and control must be
guided by the goal of value maximization. Several studies (Demsetz 1983; Fama and
Jensen 1983a; and Chen 2001) argue that ownership is determined endogenously in
equilibrium, which means that the investors or owners may select the ownership
structure with the optimal market value of the corporation. Referring to Demsetz and
Lehn's (1985) study, Craswell et al. (1997) argue that if the shareholding of family
board members is distinguished from individual ownership, Demsetz and Lehn may
find different results for the relationship between ownership structure and its
corporate performance.

3.3. Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance
In reference to the conflict of interests between owners and managers or 'agency
problem' (resulting from the separation of owners and managers), several studies
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focus on the way to 'control' managers to work in the shareholders' interests. Most
of them suggest that concentrated ownership directs a firm's management effectively
and mitigates agency problems. Alternatively, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest

that when managers hold a proportion of shares in firms, the interests of shareholders
and managers are aligned and the conflict between them declines. In this regard,
managers are less inclined to divert resources towards their own accounts.
Moreover, with a higher proportion of shares in the hands of managers, they will
work harder to improve the firm performance, which will increase the value of the
firm and consequently the managers' wealth. Kesner (1987) investigates the
relationship between the proportion of shares held by the members of the board of
directors and firm performance measures, namely: profit margin, return on equity;
returns on assets; earnings per share; stock market performance and total returns to
shareholders. The sample was selected for 250 companies of the Fortune 500 in
1983. The result reports that the proportion of shares held by board members is
positive and significant in regard to only two of the performance measures: viz. the
profit margin and return on assets. Vance (1964) suggests that managerial

shareholding is not significantly related to a firm's financial performance, except fo
the profit margin, while Pfeffer (1972) finds that managerial shareholding is
positively related to profit margin and return on equity.
Kim et al. (1988) examine the relationship between managerial shareholders
and the market returns of 270 selected firms from 1975 to 1978. The results show
that the relationship between managerial shareholders and stock returns is positive.
In this regard they suggest it may be because the existence of managerial ownership
leads to less effect of agency costs-on a firm's stock prices. As well, Oswald and
Jahera (1991) examine whether or not there is a relationship between managerial
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ownership and firm performance in terms of both market-based and accountingbased measures. The sample includes 645 firms listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) between 1982 and
1987. The results indicate that a higher level of managerial ownership leads to
higher excess market returns, as well as accounting returns (including return on
assets and return on equity). They conclude that the higher level of managerial
ownership improves the decision-making of management, resulting in a higher
performance. Similarly, Hudson et al. (1992) also examine whether managerial
ownership affects a firm's excess market returns while a firm's size and earningsprice levels variables are controlled. The sample in their study includes 652 firms
listed on the NYSE and the AMEX covering the period from 1982 to 1985. The
result is found to be consistent with that of Oswald and Jahera (1991) which
indicates that firms with a high managerial ownership have higher excess returns.
In the case of Malaysia, Yeboah-Duah (1993) examines the impact of
managerial ownership on excess market returns. Based on a sample of 210 firms
listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange from 1984 to 1991, the study finds that
there is a significantly positive relationship between managerial ownership and
excess returns. There is no difference found in respect of excess returns between
firms with low managerial shareholding and those with high managerial
shareholding. With this result, Yehoah-Duah (1993) argues that this is because, as
Fama (1980) suggests, agency costs exist in neither firms with high managerial
ownership nor low managerial ownership if they are in a well functioning market for
productive resources.
Alternatively, Morck et al. (1988) examine the relationship between
managerial ownership and firm performance and argue that this relationship is 'non-
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linear'. That is, at a certain level of managerial ownership, managerial shareholders

can entrench their power in the controlling of a firm's activities, and make it diffic
for external shareholders (or small shareholders) to control their actions. Short

(1994) supports this notion and suggests that the results of studies, which implicitly
assumed a linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance,
possibly bring misleading results. This is because there may have the opposite
relationship at a certain range of managerial shareholding. For example, the findings
of any 'linear' positive relationship between managerial shareholders and firm
performance may mask any negative relationship that may exist within some
ownership ranges. Morck et al. (1988) investigate whether or not there is a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, based on
market value (represented by Tobin's Q) and accounting returns (represented by a
profit rate) for 456 of the Fortune 500 firms in 1980. To capture this relationship,
they categorize the managerial shareholding into three different levels: 0-5%, 5%25%, and beyond 25%, and regress them on firm performance. The results show that
market value is positively related to managerial shareholding in the 0% to 5% range,
and negatively related at the 5% to 25% range, and positively related when
managerial shareholding goes beyond 25%. Morck et al. (1988) explain that at the
early stage of managerial shareholding (0% to 5%), there is a convergence or (an
alignment) of interests between owners and managers, and after that, (at 5% to 25%)

there is an entrenchment of managerial shareholder's power in the firm. That is, with
adequate power of control in the firms, managerial shareholders can extract a firm's
assets away to their own accounts and this result in a reduction in performance.
Beyond 25% of the shareholding, however, managerial shareholders' interests align
with the firm's interest again and hence the firm's performance increases. In the
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profit rate regression, Morck et al. (1988) report that the profit rate is positively
related to managerial ownership in the 0%-5% range only. Thus it can be concluded
that a non-linear relationship is found to be significant between managerial

shareholders and market returns, and a less significant relationship is found for pro
rate measure. This can be compared with Demsetz and Lehn's (1985) study, as
emphasized in section 3.2, who find no relationship between ownership structure and
firm performance. Morck et al. (1988) argue that it is possible that if Demsetz and
Lehn test for any existence of a non-linear relationship, they may find a different
result.
Since Morck et al. (1988) introduce the 'non-linear' relationship between
managerial shareholders and firm performance, there are a number of studies which
attempt to examine whether there is a non-linear relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance across the country. McConnell and Servaes (1990)

investigate the effect of managerial shareholders on a firm's value. Instead of fixin
the level of managerial shareholding (as was conducted in Morck et al's (1988)
study), McConnell and Servaes adopt managerial shareholding and managerial
shareholding squared as ownership variables. The sample was selected from 1,173
firms in 1976 and 1,093 firms in 1986. A firm's value is positively related to
managerial ownership, ranging from 0% to (approximately) 50%, and negatively
related to managerial ownership beyond 50%. Similarly to that of Morck et al.
(1988), McConnell and Servaes suggest that the impact of managerial ownership on

a firm's value is non-linear (or U-shape). That is, the value of a firm is, first, pos
since there is a convergence of interests between shareholders and mangers.
However, at a certain level of shareholding, the negative relationship between
managerial ownership and a firm's value is detected. This is because managerial
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shareholders, with a high concentrated shareholding, have enough power to control
firms in their own way at the expense of minority shareholders. However, between
these two studies, the minimum turning point (where managerial performance goes

to the lowest point) is different. That is, those of McConnell and Servaes (1990) are

found to be higher than those of Morck et al. (1988). In this case, it is possible th
Morck et al. (1988) fixed the level of managerial shareholding at 5% and 25% while
McConnell and Servaes (1990) allow the coefficient of managerial shareholders to
determine their own turning points by using managerial variables and managerial
squared variables.
The empirical test of a non-linear relationship is applied in the case of
Malaysia. Following Morck et aPs (1988) study Mat-Nor et al. (1997) apply the

effect of managerial shareholders of 79 listed firms in 1997 on the firm performance,
as measured by earnings per share, and price-earning ratio. The managerial
shareholding, based on the percentage of shares held by the members of the board of
directors, is classified at three different levels: 0-5%, 5%-25% and beyond 25%.
Their result is consistent with Morck et al's (1988). That is, firm performance is
positively related to managerial ownership in the 0%-5% range, negatively related in
the 5% to 25% range and positively related when managerial shareholding exceeds
25%. They suggest that it is also possible that the positive relationship between
certain levels of managerial shareholding and firm performance may be influenced
from other factors such as the discipline of the managerial labour market and the
market for corporate control, which forces the board of directors to maximize firm
performance (Mat-Nor et al., 1997).
Short and Keasy (1999) investigate whether there is a non-linear relationship
between managerial ownership and firm performance (based on both return on
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shareholders' equity and market value) in the case of the UK. Also they attempt to
compare whether the turning points of managerial ownership in UK will be different
from those found by Morck et al. (1988) as in the case of the US. Short and Keasy
examine this non-linear relationship by using the cubic model4. With this model, the

coefficient of managerial ownership (DIR) will be allowed to determine their turning
points. The turning points refer to a maximum point (where managerial performance
goes to the highest point) and a minimum point (where managerial performance goes
to the lowest point). The three variables that describe managerial ownership are
presented as DIR (the percentage of shares owned by managers), DIR2 and DIR3 (the
square and cube of the percentage of shares owned by managers respectively). The
results suggest that the performance (as measured by the returns on shareholders'
equity) is positively related to managerial shareholding in the 0% to 15.58% range,
negatively related in the 15.58% to 41.84% range, and becoming positively related
again when this managerial shareholding exceeds 41.48%. Moreover, in Tobin's Q
regression, Short and Keasy suggest that Tobin's Q is positively related to
managerial shareholding in the 0% to 12.99%o range, negatively related in the 12.99%
to 41.99% range, and turning positive again in relation to managerial shareholding
beyond 41.99%. Comparatively, Short and Keasy (1999) confirm that UK
managerial ownership becomes entrenched their power at higher levels than those of
US counterparts. They also find the non-linear relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance are found in terms of both accounting and market
measures, while Morck et al. (1988) find the non-linear relationship between
managerial ownership and firm performance only in terms of market measures (a
firm's market-value), and not for accounting measures.
4

The cubic model in Short and Keasy's (1999) study is as follows: Performance = a +P[ DIR + p2
DIR 2 + p 3 DIR 3 + y Control Variables. The control variables include firm's sales, growth in sales,
debt, and research and development expenditure.
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Recently, Kim et al. (2001) examine the non-linear relationship between
managerial ownership and firm performance, based on return on assets and cash flow
ratio, by adopting Short and Keasy's model (the cubic form). A sample was selected
from 76 IPO firms in the Thai Stock market between 1987 and 1993. They confirm
that the relationship between managerial shareholders of Thai IPOs and firm

performance is non-linear. The result is consistent with that of Morck et al. (1988)
and Short and Keasy (1999), for example. The turning points of Thai IPOs are 21%
(a maximum point) and 64% (a minimum point). These turning points are found to
be higher than those of Morck et al. (5% and 25%) in the case of the US, and also
higher than those of Short and Keasy (15.58% to 41.48%) in the case of the UK. In

this regard, Kim et al. (2001) argue that the managerial ownership entrenchment rage
in the case of Thailand differs from those of US and UK based studies possibly
because (i) they investigated IPO firms while the other two studies investigated
public firms, and (ii) they investigated an emerging market while the other two
studies examined developed markets.
Wong and Yek (1991) also investigate the non-linear relationship of
managerial shareholders and firm performance of 35 firms listed on the Stock
Exchange of Singapore between 1982-1987. The performance is measured by the
firm market value (Tobin's Q) and stock excess returns. The results illustrate that
non-liner relationship exists between managerial ownership and a firm's market
value. That is, a firm's market value is positively related to management
shareholding in the 0% to 25% range, negatively in the 25% to 45% range, and
positively again when managerial shareholding goes beyond 45%. The results of
their study, however, suggest that the relationship between managerial ownership

and excess market returns is not significant. Craswell et al. (1997) investigate the
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relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in the case of 349
public traded Australian firms from 1986 to 1989. Firm performance is represented
by the firm's market value. From the analysis, they suggest that there is no
relationship between managerial ownership and a firm's market value (linear or nonlinear). Han and Suk (1998) examine the non-linear relationship between managerial
ownership of 301 firms and the average stock returns from 1988 to 1992. To capture
the existence of the non-linear relationship, the inside ownership and inside
ownership squared variables are applied in their study. The inside ownership in this
study consisted of not only the board members, but also the officers, beneficial
owners and principal stock holders owning ten percent or more of the firm's stock.
Institutional ownership is also included as another ownership variable. The results
reveal that inside ownership is positively related to stock returns. However, the
inside ownership squared is negatively related to stock returns. The minimum
mrning point in their study is at 41.8% of insider shareholding. Han and Suk (1998,
p. 153) conclude "as insider ownership increases, stock returns increase. But
excessive insider ownership rather hurts corporate performance". They also find that

the stock returns are positively related to institutional ownership (represented as on
of the ownership variables). Based on this positive relationship, Han and Suk
suggest that it is possible that the institutional owners are active in monitoring
management.
In the case of Thailand, Wiwattanakantung (2001) examines the relationship
between managerial shareholders and firm performance in 1996. In her study, the
managerial shareholding is categorized into three levels (25%-50%, 50%-75% and
75%-100%), and their performance is compared with that of controlling shareholders
(who are not involved in a firm's management). The results show that there is a non-
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linear relationship between managerial shareholders and firm performance as
measured by the return on assets and sales-asset ratios. It is found that only
managerial shareholders who control between 25%-50% of outstanding shares have
poorer returns on assets and sales-asset ratios compared to controlling shareholders
who are not involved in a firm's management position. In terms of market value
(Tobin's Q) regressions, Wiwattanakanung (2001) finds that managerial ownership
(between 75%-100%) is less significantly related to Tobin's Q. Based on the results
of Wiwattankantung's study, if the coefficients of managerial shareholding have
been allowed to determine their turning points instead of being fixed at a
predetermined level of managerial shareholding, the different turning points may be
detected.
The literature discussed so far suggests that it is not clear whether managerial
ownership has a positive relationship with corporate performance. Although
managerial ownership can align the interests between shareholders and managers, it

appears that at a certain level of managerial shareholding, they tend to entrench thei
controlling power in the firm and result in the decline of a firm's performance.
Based on the literature, it is not only managerial ownership or concentrated
ownership, but also debt equity ownership that can have an influence over firm
performance.

3.4 Debt Equity Ownership
Debt financing is one of the corporate governance mechanisms used to
discipline a firm's management (Fama, 1980; Myer and Majulf, 1984; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997; Kongchan, 2000). As discussed in Chapter 2, creditors or banks have
a responsibility for most of the costs of failure in the firm businesses/projects. As
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result, banks have an incentive to control management so as to increase a firm's
performance and to achieve repayment. Managers therefore cannot divert a firm's
assets away for their own benefit, so consequently firm performance increases
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In Japan and Germany, the
bank is the main source of a firm's financing. This is because banks face less
restricting financial regulations compared to other countries such as the US and the
UK. Therefore, several studies on the relationship between debt-equity ownership
and firm performance are conducted in regards to Japan and Germany.
James (1987) examines the difference in share prices that may arise from
differences of debt offerings in the case of 300 companies (random) from the
population of firms contained in the Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP)
in 1983. The study suggests that stock prices (as represented by abnormal stock
returns) is positively related to the announcement of new bank loans more than to the
announcement of a private placing (placing a new issue of shares with a group of
selected financial institutions) or to that of public offerings (offering new shares
corporation for sale to the public). Based on this result, he argues that it may be
because banks have information about the borrower and, the information, which

ultimately benefits borrowers, is not available to other securities holders (Myer and
Majluf, 1984 and Fama, 1980). In addition, bank loans announcements reflect the

prospect for growth in a firm's earnings in the future. This signals positively to the
market and to outside investors about a firm's ability to meet the pay-off contracts
and this enhances a firm's stock prices (James, 1987; Myer and Majluf, 1984).
In Germany, banks are not only the main capital source, but are also long-term
investors, which sometimes use their controlling power throughJhe directors of the
borrowing firms (Gorton and Schmind, 1996; Canals, 1997). Gorton and Schmid
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(1996) examine the impact of bank equity ownership on firm performance for 88
firms in 1974 and 1985. The result of the effect of bank ownership on firm
performance in 1974 shows that bank ownership is positively associated with a
firm's profitability. The relationship between bank ownership and firm performance

in 1985 however is different from those found in 1974. That is, the result shows that

the relationship between bank ownership and profitability is not significant in 1985.
In this regard, Gorton and Schmid argue that it is difficult to explain the cause of
difference. However, it may be because the environment of German corporate
governance has changed over time, and the security market became more developed.
This may affect the impact of bank ownership on its borrowing firm.
Edward and Fischer (1994) argue that banks tend to withdraw their financing

when firms are in financial distress or when they encounter serious difficulties. The
suggest that a bank's commitment to a firm is not always long-term. Frank and
Mayer (2001) argue that banks do not always improve corporate performance in
Germany and suggest that firms with ownership concentrated in the hands of
principals, such as family shareholders or managerial shareholders, might perform
more effectively than banks. This is because such shareholders have a higher
managerial incentive than a bank to maximize a firm's value. However, the
existence of banks in the firms with dispersed ownership may overcome free-rider
problems since banks will exercise proxy votes on behalf of small or individual
shareholders. The problem may still occur when there is a conflict of interests
between banks and those small investors whom they represent. Frank and Mayer
(2001) suggest that a bank loan in Germany may seem to be costly as most German
firms rely heavily on banks to generate funds.
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A number of studies have also examined the effect of bank equity ownership
on firm performance in the case of Japan (for example, Hoshi, 1990, 1991; Prowse,
1990, 1992, 1994; Aoki, 1994; Lichtenberg and Pushner, 1994; Kang and
Shivdasani, 1995; Kang, 1997). This is because many firms in Japan have a very
close tie to a 'main bank'. Also banks provide debt financing to them, owns a
proportion of the firms' equity, and in most cases, the bank's executives hold top
management positions in these Japanese firms. The main bank relationship is a part

of the 'keiretsu' group, which is a group of firms affiliated with banks and financial
institutions (Hoshi et al., 1991). Corbett (1993); Sheard (1989) suggest that the
existence of a main bank leads to a better information flow between bank and the
firm, and the bank can use such information in order to guide and supervise
borrowing firms, as well as to solve problems such as insolvency for these firms.

Firms that rely on the main bank are able to avoid a bankruptcy situation and are able
to cope with financial distress.
Hoshi et al. (1990) examine the difference in capital investment patterns

between firms affiliated with a main bank (or dependent firms) and those unaffiliated
with a main bank (or independent firms). The sample of 125 Japanese firms listed on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange from April 1978 to the end of March 1985 was applied in
their study. The results suggest that dependent firms can invest more in the year

after the onset of financial distress than those independent firms. With these results
they suggest that it may be because firms with a close bank find it easier and less
costly to negotiate with the bank in a financial distress situation than independent

firms, whilst firms with a non-bank relationship may find that it is very difficult to
renegotiate with the bank. This leads firms with a non-bank relationship to underinvestment opportunities and inefficient liquidity (Myer, 1984; Bulow and Shoven,
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1978). Berglof and Perotti (1994) support the view that firms with a close

relationship to banks have less liquidity constraints and have a lower cost of financi
distress than independent firms. However, they note that banks can charge high
interest rates to these firms as compensation for insurance and monitoring services.
Prowse (1990) investigates whether or not Japanese's firms that allowed bank
to hold a firms' equities, will have more opportunities to reduce the agency costs
between creditor and shareholders than the US firms. In this regard Prowse
hypothesizes that Japanese firms that have high agency costs should show a high
debt ratio while US firms that have high agency costs should show a low debt ratio.
Prowse (1990) investigates the hypothesis by using a sample of 741 US's firms and
133 Japanese's firms during the period 1980 to 1984. The result is consistent with
the hypothesis and shows that US firms' agency costs are negatively related to debt
ratios, while Japanese firms do not show such a relationship. He concludes that the
agency costs are reduced more in Japanese firms with a bank relationship than those
in the US. Based on the result of Prowse's study, Aoki (1994) argues that the effect
and influence of the bank relationship may be a result of the particular corporate
governance structure of Japan, and it may not be so in the case of other countries.
Kang and Shivdasani (1995) suggest that the 'main bank' in Japan performs
important governance controls. For example, firms with a bank relationship have a
higher incidence of management turnover in response to poor performance than
independent firms. That is, as banks (or debt-holders in the firm) will replace
managers who perform poorly with managers who can reverse such performance.
Prowse (1992) investigates the difference of ownership concentration between
firms with a bank relationship and firms without a bank relationship. The firms in
the sample contain 734 Japanese firms between 1979 and 1984 with various types of
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large shareholders such as financial institutions, non-financial institutions or
individuals. The result suggests that the concentration of ownership of firms with a
bank and with non-bank ownership is not significantly different. The result also
shows that ownership concentration, of both firms with bank and with non-bank
ownership, is not significantly related to firm performance (as measured by the
profitability).
Although there are a number of studies which support the benefits of a close
bank relationship, Prowse (1990) argues that banks that only hold a small proportion
of shares in a firm but are appointed to a director's position might prevent policies
that tend to transfer wealth from debt-holders to shareholders. He also argues that
the keiretsu firms' management is disciplined through the complexity of monitoring
and control. The management of independent firms that is disciplined by large
shareholders (who mostly hold a large equity in the firms) tends to have a greater
performance than those firms with a bank relationship. Berglof and Perotti (1994)
indicate that the loosening of 'keiretsu' ties could contribute to increasing global
competitive demands and greater flexibility in corporate alliances. With 'keiretsu'
ties, banks may enjoy a certain amount of monopoly power in the firms, and they can
charge higher interest rates than those other financial institutions in a competitive
situation (Corbett, 1993; Meeschwam, 1991; Canals, 1997). With this notion,
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) examine whether Japanese firms affiliated with banks
have a lower profitability and slower growth rate than those unaffiliated with banks.
They use approximately 700 listed firms during 1977 to 1986. The result shows that
firms affiliated with banks do not have higher profitability or even grow faster than
firms unaffiliated with banks. This result is consistent with Nakatani (1984) and
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) who suggest that firms with a close bank relationship
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tend to have a lower profitability and a slower growing rate than independent firms.
Based on this result, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) argue that it is possible that the
main banks charge rent for access to capital in the form of higher interest payments
on returns. Banks may also assert pressure and influence over a firms' behaviour
according to the bank's preferences. For example, banks can induce firms to behave
more carefully in choosing their investment projects. This action may be a cause of
the firms affiliated with banks not growing faster than independent firms. Unlike in
Japan, in Thailand, so far, there is only one study, which examines the relationship
between firms with bank ownership and those with non-bank equity ownership.
Limpaphayom and Polwitoon (2001) examined 232 non-financial firms listed on the
Stock Exchange of Thailand from 1992 to 1993. Firms in the sample are classified
into two groups (1) firms that have bank representation in the top ten shareholders
(32 firms); and (2) firms that did not have bank representation in the top ten
shareholders (200 firms). The performance of firms is measured by profitability,
financial leverage, and liquidity. The results show that there is no significant
difference in all performance measures between firms with bank ownership and those
with non-bank ownership. From the result, they suggest that it is possible that bank
equity ownership has little influence on firm performance in Thailand. This is
because the majority of the top ten shareholders (who mostly are formed from the
managerial owners or families) have sufficient controlling and voting power to
shelter themselves from bank influence. This therefore prevents the banks from
using their controlling power to intervene in the firms' management. For this reason,
it commands the attention of this study to differentiate between the performance of a
bank with 'managerial ownership' and a bank with 'non-managerial ownership'.
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3.5 Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed the literature regarding the relationship between
ownership structure and firm performance across the country. Ownership structure is
mainly considered in terms of concentrated ownership, ownership categories,
managerial ownership and bank equity ownership. The main findings from the

literature review are that a number of previous studies confirm that there is a posit
relationship between concentrated ownership and firm performance, while some

other studies find no evidences to support the significance of this relationship. Als
some studies argue that different types of shareholders influence firm performance
differently.
In terms of managerial ownership and firm performance, a number of studies
(cf, Jensen and Meckling, 1997; Kesner, 1987; Kim et al., 1988; Hudson et al.,
1992) conclude (as having a linear relationship) that as managerial ownership
increases, firm performance also increases. The recent studies (e.g. Morck et al.,
1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Mat-Nor et al., 1997; Han and Suk, 1998; Short
and Keasy, 1999), however, argue that the relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance is non-linear. It is indicated by the maximum point
(the highest point of managerial performance), and the minimum point (the lowest
point of managerial performance). That is, excessive managerial shareholding,
managerial shareholders tend to entrench the controlling power of management in a

firm and run the firm's business for their own benefit and this results in deteriorat
in a firm's performance.
In addition, this chapter has reviewed the relationship of debt equity ownership
and firm performance. The main findings suggest that creditor or bank equity
shareholders can control a firm's management not to misallocate a firm's assets that
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will benefit a firm's performance. From most studies (which have been conducted in

the case of Japan) it is suggested that bank equity ownership can contribute to firm

in terms of, for example, less cost of negotiation with the bank in times of financia
distress, mitigation of free-rider problems and information problems. However, there
is some evidence from, for example, Nakatani (1984), Corbett (1993), Canals (1997)
and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) that firms with bank ownership have a lower
profitability and growth rate than those with non-bank ownership.

Chapter 4

Ownership Structure and Financial Performance of Thai
Listed Firms

4.1 Introduction
The importance of ownership structure is documented as being that it can
determine the direction and performance of firms and also the shareholders' wealth
(Porter, 1990; Jensen, 2000). This chapter attempts to increase understanding about
the ownership structure in Thailand, which may differ from other countries,
particularly developed countries. This chapter is organized as follows. In the first

section, the history of the Thai capital market is investigated. In the second section,

the registration requirements, including the listing of criteria and procedures, for th
firms which wish to be listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand are presented. The
legal and regulatory environment of the Thai governance system is illustrated in the
third section. In the fourth section, Thai ownership structure and its financial
performance are presented. A summary and conclusion is drawn in the final section.

4.2 History of the Thai Capital Market
In 1961, Thailand implemented the National Economic and Social
Development Plan to support the promotion of economic growth and stability. In

order to do so, a proposal was put forward for the first time to establish a securitie
market for mobilizing additional capital. The development of the Thai securities
market can be divided into two phases. It began with "The Bangkok Stock
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Exchange", which was privately owned, and then was followed by the establishment
of "The Securities Exchange of Thailand" (The SET, 1999).
The Bangkok Stock Exchange (BSE) commenced its operation in July 1962.
The BSE had an annual turnover value consisting of 160 million baht (or around
US$7.7 million) in 1968, and it dropped to 114 million baht (US$5.5 million) in
1969. It continuously fell to 87 million baht (US$4.2 million) in 1972. BSE finally

ceased its operation in the early 1970's. It is generally accepted that the BSE faile
because of insufficient official support, and also investors (at that time) had an
inadequate understanding of the equity market.
In 1970, an economist from the US Securities and Exchange Commission
(Professor Sidney) developed a comprehensive report entitled: "A Capital Market in
Thailand", which ultimately became the master plan for the development of the Thai
capital market. In May 1974, legislation establishing "The Securities Exchange of
Thailand" was enacted and trading started officially in April 1975. On 1st January
1991, its name was formally changed to "The Stock Exchange of Thailand" (or SET)
(The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 1999a, p. 11; Limpaphayom, 2001). The primary
roles of the SET were developed as follows (The Stock Exchange of Thailand 1999a,
p.3):
(1) To serve as a centre for the trading of listed securities, and to provide
the essential systems needed to facilitate securities trading;
(2) To undertake any business relating to the Securities Exchange,
such as a clearing-house, securities depository centre, securities
registrar, or similar activities;
(3) To undertake any other business approved by the SEC.
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Recently, the enforcement of all regulations has been operated by the SET
under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Referring to SEC, its major roles are to (i) reinforce the unity,
consistency and efficiency in supervision and development, and to oversee the
regulations of the Thai capital market under its direction and guidance; (ii) improve
the disclosure requirements of firms for their subsidiaries and shareholders
(Priebjrivat, 1992).
In regard to the firms, which want to register their securities on the Thai stock
market, they need to follow the SET requirements and procedures. The SET
requirements including its procedures, and the regulatory environment are presented
in the following section.

4.3 Registration Requirements
In order to ensure the quality of the capital market, the SET has certain
criteria for the firms that want to register their securities in the stock market as
follows: (1) listing criteria, (2) listing procedures.

4.3.1 Listing Criteria
The SET has listing criteria (presented in Table 4.1) for firms that wish to

register their securities. The criteria are set mainly on five qualifications (presente
in the first column of Table 4.1) including (1) paid-up capital, (2) total market

capitalization, (3) distribution of small shareholdings, (4) total shares held by small
shareholders, and (5) track record such as profit after tax record. According to these

requirements, the firms must have (i) paid-up capital of at least 200 million baht, (ii
at least 750 million baht for total market capitalization, (iii) a minimum of 600
shareholders for distribution of small shareholdings, (iv) total shares held by small

Chapter 4: Ownership Structure and Financial Performance of Thai Firms

71

shareholders must be at least 10-20% of paid-up capital, and (v) firms must have

been in operation for at least three years, have been substantially operated under the
same management for at least one year prior to the application date, and have a

positive net profit after tax for each of the previous three years. Such profit must b
complied with either (a) at least 30 million baht in the recent year, or (b) not less
110 million baht for the previous two years, or (c) not less than 110 million baht in
the recent year (US$1 « 30 baht average at that period). Moreover, the firm must

provide other data for example, (i) the nature of the firm's business, (ii) the qualit
and continuity of management and possible conflicts of interest among parties (such

as shareholders, managers and other stakeholders), (iii) an effective internal control
system, (iv) the establishment of an Audit Committee and (v) the preparation of a
Financial Statement and the hiring of Auditors and the firm's dividend policy (The
Stock Exchange of Thailand, 1999a; Kim et al, 2001).

4.3.2 Listing Procedure
Once the firms have met the listing criteria, they have to follow the listing
procedure. It is presented in Figure 4.1, first, the listing applications and other
documents and information required are submitted to the SET. Secondly, the firm is
visited and the firm management interview is operated. Thirdly, the listing
committee will consider the applications and after that the committee will forward
his/her recommendations to the Board of Governors of the SET to approve the
applicants. Finally, (once these applicants are approved) the stocks can commence
trading within 3 days (Limpaphayom 1997; The Stock Exchange of Thailand 1999a).
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Table 4.1
Basic Listing Criteria
Qualifications

Listed C o m p a n y Requirements
( M B = million baht)

1. Paid-up capital

200MB

2. Total market capitalization

> 750 M B

3.Distribution of small shareholdings

> 600 shareholders

4. Total shares held by small shareholders
Paid-up capital < 5 0 0 M B

> 2 0 % of paid-up capital

5 0 0 M B < paid-up capital < 1,000MB

> 1 5 % of paid-up capital or 10 million shares

1,000MB < paid-up capital <10,000MB

> 12.5% of paid-up capital or 15 million shares

Paid-up capitals 10,000MB

5. Track record

- Net profit after tax (either a,b,or c)

> 1 0 % of paid-up capital or 125 million shares

•

The business must have been in operation for at least
three years.

•

The business has been substantially operated under
the same management for at least one year prior to
the application date.

•

Positive net profit after taxes for each of the previous
three years must have at least one of the following
qualifications:
a) 5 M B (first year), 2 0 M B (second year), and
3 0 M B (third year), > 80 M B (combined), or
b) net profit (first year) average of 40 M B ,
(second and third years) > 110 M B
(combined), or
c) net profit (first, second years) 40 M B , (third
year) > 110 M B (combined).

Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand (1999a, p.7) and K i m et al. (2001, p.30).
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Table 4.2
Other Basic Listing Criteria
Qualification
1. Management
- Management and Control Persons

Requirements

•
•
•
•
•
•

B e ethical and honest;
B e competent and experienced in the business;
B e efficient;
Dedicated to the company's continuous operations and
growth;
Understand and be responsible to the public;
Not processing any characteristics as prohibited by the S E C ;

- Independent Directors
- Scope of the Audit

•
•

Have at least two independent directors;
Scope of duties and responsibility of the audit committee
members

2. Corporate Governance and Internal
Control

•

H a v e good corporate governance practices and a qualified
audit committee;

•

H a v e effective auditing and internal control system.

•

N o existing or potential conflicts of interest between the
applicant company with parent, subsidiary, affiliated or
other companies within the group, or other persons with
possible conflicts of interest;

•

Shareholding in subsidiaries and affiliated companies of
persons with possible conflicts of interest must not be
greater than 5 per cent of total shares of such subsidiaries
and affiliated companies unless approved b y the S E T .

•

T h e applicant and its subsidiaries must have the same
auditor or auditing firm which must have been approved by
the S E C ;

•

All auditors' reports must not contain any disclaimer of
opinion, or qualified opinion due to a limitation on the
scope of the auditors' work;

•

Financial statements are issued not more than four months
before the application date.

•

Financial statements for the previous year and the year of
application must be audited/reviewed b y the same auditor
or auditing firms, provided that the most recent financial
statement is issued not more than four months before the
application date.

•

Financial statements have been prepared in accordance with
S E T rules and regulations.

5.Dividend

•

Dividend policy must be clearly stated.

6. Provident Fund

•

O n the date the listing application isfiled,the provident
fund of the applicant must already be established.

7. Environmental impact

»

T h e applicant and its subsidiaries must not have any
litigation with government agency regarding environment
effects caused by their operations.

3. Conflicts of Interest

4. Financial Statement and Auditors

Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand 1999a; and K i m et al. (2001)
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4.4 Legal and Regulatory Environment of Thai Corporate Governance
From the past ties with the French Kingdom, Thailand adopted a Civil Code
(including rules and regulations governing listed firms), which were success by the
Public Company Act 1992 (PCA), the Civil Code, the Stock Exchange of Thailand
(SET) and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand (SEC). Thai legal
requirements and regulations have been established to protect shareholders against
fraud by, for example, major shareholders, directors and management. These legal
requirements and regulations also tend to align the interests of management with

those of shareholders. In Thailand, the regulations for shareholder protection mainl

relate to (1) roles and responsibilities of the Board of Directors, (2) transparency
disclosure requirements, (3) minority shareholder protection and (4) creditor
protection.
Figure 4.1
Listing Procedures
Limited

Financial
Advisor

Company

Public Limited Company

r

1

SEC

1
CT

- Listing committee
- S E T Board of Governors

30 days after all required
documents are submitted

I
Listing Pre-approval

}t
Initial Public

Final Filing

3 working days
Trading Begins

Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand (1999a); and K i m et al. 2001.
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4.4.1 Roles and Responsibilities of the Board of Directors
The law stipulates the following minimum requirements for a person to qualify
as a member of the board (1) must be at least 18 years old; (2) must not be a bankrupt
individual; (3) must not have been imprisoned; (4) must not have been removed from
the position for any kind of frauds (Nikomborirak, 2001). hi Thailand, the board of
directors consists of (a) executive directors and (b) non-executive directors (which
comprise independent directors and outside directors: see also Appendix E).
The main responsibility of directors is to provide business guidance and
strategic vision to the management as well as to monitor management performance in
order to achieve the firm's goal. The board of directors must ensure that the
management of a firm operates a firm's business in the interests of shareholders. In
general, the board of directors will be elected by shareholders at the shareholders
annual general meeting (i.e., one share one vote normally applied). In the case of
Thailand, for example, somehow the directors are dominated by shareholders who
have personal connections with them. The members of the board in the Thai listed

firms must not be less than 5, with at least 2 independent directors. Foreign director
are seldom appointed, unless the firm has foreign equity shareholders. The model for
a board of directors in Thai firms is a one-tier board model. There is only one board

that is accountable for a firm's operations to outsiders. The board has full power for

the provision of a firm's business strategy and monitoring. With this model, there are
insufficient factors to check the balance of the management mechanism within the
board (Nikomborirak, 1999; The Securities and Exchange Commission, 2000).
Therefore, independent directors are required to safeguard the interests of minority
shareholders against any abuse and fraud from the management or managerial
shareholders, and to alleviate other agency problems. The SEC and the SET have
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realized the necessity for having independent directors based on the reasons
discussed above. They therefore require listed or public firms to appoint at least 2
independent directors to their board of directors. (The Stock Exchange of Thailand,
1999a; Nikomborrirak, 2001).
To emphasize the effectiveness of the board of directors, the SEC is
considering the two-tier board model. Under this model, there are two independent
boards: (i) the supervisory (main) board and (ii) the operating board, and they work
separately from each other. The supervisory board is responsible for monitoring the
management's operation, while the operating board assists the management in
making decisions.

4.4.2 Transparency and Disclosure Requirements
Transparency and disclosure of accurate and comprehensive information of a
firm's performance is an important corporate governance mechanism to promote the
investors' confidence and market efficiency (Trairatvirakul 1998; The Stock
Exchange of Thailand, 1999a). In Thailand, generally, transparency and disclosure
are inadequate. This may be because the characteristic of Thai ownership, which is
mainly concentrated on family or a family group, traditionally discloses little
information (Limpaphayom, 2001). The SET and the SEC require listed firms to
disclose both financial reports (such as Quarterly Financial Statement, Audited SemiAnnual and/or Annual Financial Statements), and the non-financial reports (for
example, ownership information), on time, accurately and completely (see
information disclosure requirement of the SET in Appendix F).
In order to achieve the requirements of disclosure and transparency, the SET

and the SEC also require all listed firms to establish audit committees to (1) overse
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the financial report to be a sufficiently accurate and reliable form, (2) to ensure th
firms have adequate and effective internal control systems, (3) to ensure that firms
enter into transactions with no conflicts of interest among the parties (such as
shareholders and managers), and (4) to prepare an audit committee performance
report and disclose it in the firm's annual report (see Appendix G). The SET
requires that audit committees must comprise of at least 3 outside independent
directors, who must not directly or indirectly hold shares in the firm for more than
0.5% of the paid up capital (The Securities and Exchange Commission, 2000).
In this regard, accounting standards should also be embraced in order to further
enhance the effectiveness of disclosure. Thai firms often have two sets of accounting
reports: one for the management in the firms, and another one for the tax authorities
and the SEC (Nikomborirak, 2001). In Thailand, accounting standards and
regulatory supervision are inadequate. Also, auditors, who often have a good
relationship with their clients, are not willing to produce unsatisfactory reports
(Limpaphayom, 2001). This can lead to problems of being unable to produce
reliable and accurate financial reports. These problems stimulate the SEC, the SET,
and also the Institute of Certified Accountants and Auditors to improve Thai
accounting and auditing standards to meet the international level (Trairatvorakul,
1998).
In reference to the non-financial reports such as ownership information, it is
required to disclose the name of major shareholders (who hold shares at least 10% of
outstanding shares) and their percentage of shareholding. The information regarding
the structure of the board of directors, total remuneration of all directors, the
management team, and the top management staff must also be disclosed.
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The usefulness of the disclosure requirements is not only to reveal reliable and
accurate information to all shareholders and other investors for their decisionmaking, but also to facilitate the audit and examination processes of the SEC and the
SET in order to ensure that the management of a firm do not misallocate the firms'
resources or use them for their own benefit. The SEC and the SET have filed a
criminal complaint against the preparation of incorrect and incomplete financial
reports to mislead shareholders and other related parties in regard to their decisionmaking or rightful benefits. Penalties have been imposed not only on the
management but also on the auditors who have failed to perform their duties
appropriately.

4.4.3 Shareholder Protection
The SEC and the SET have established several different rights and entitlements
for shareholders in order to protect them against the management's activities in
unfair treatments, such as transfer pricing, takeovers and insider trading. They are

concerned also with the minority shareholders' rights, their participation in corporate
decision-making and initiatives management in a firm. In general, shareholders have

the rights to vote for the directors, to call a shareholders' meeting and to request th
inspection of a firm's affairs.
In Thailand, in order to have the right to call for an extraordinary shareholders'
meeting, to appoint outside inspectors to examine a firm's operation and its financial
conditions, a shareholder must own at least 20% of outstanding shares or there must
be at least 25 shareholders with a shareholding of at least 10% of outstanding shares
(Wiwatanakuntung, 1999). These requirements seem to be very high for the
minority shareholders to claim, if they suspect that the management's activities may
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disadvantage a firm's operations or their benefits. This is because most of the
percentage of shares (approximately 50% of outstanding shares) is in the hands of the
top five shareholders. This situation makes it difficult for minority shareholders to
make any claim in respect of any dubious management behaviour. Also, this leads
the minority shareholders to pay less attention or be unaware of their rights in the
firm's management. As a result, the major shareholders may have full rights for
business's decision within a firm. The Asia Development Bank (ADB) (2001)
reveals that in Thailand, the major shareholders conclude the business's decision
without the approval of minority shareholders. According to their survey, almost
82%o of shareholders who represent around 28% of outstanding shares do not vote.
In this regard, Limpaphayom (2001) notes that Thai major shareholders will appoint
the board of directors, who are mostly their friends or relatives, without approval
from the minority shareholders. Such actions will intensively weaken the protection
of the minority shareholders in Thailand.

4.4.4 Creditor Protection
Issuing equity or borrowing are the options when a firm needs to raise capital.
This depends on the management or the controlling shareholders to choose the
source of funds. In fact, if the controlling shareholders or the managerial
shareholders control firms, they will borrow rather than issue new shares. This may
be because they want to avoid the dilution effect of their concentrated ownership. In
Thailand, banks are an important source of finance providers and the relationship
between banks and firms is a long-term relationship. Banks are allowed to hold
shares in the firms up to 10%> of the outstanding-shares.
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According to the old bankruptcy law, the creditors or the banks have little
influence over the lending firm's management. At the same time, this law has made
it difficult for the creditors to obtain payment against bankruptcy borrowers. In
March 1999, Thailand introduced a new Bankruptcy Amendment Act, which aims to
prevent firms from going bankrupt because of a temporary liquidity problem. This
law also considers the elimination of any loopholes that may disadvantage the
creditors or the banks. That is, banks can exert more influence over the management
and decision-making of the borrowing firms (Limpaphayom, 2001; Asian
Development Bank, 2001).

4.5. Structure of the Thai Stock Market
The Stock Exchange of Thailand is organized into 31 sectors as presented in

Table 4.3 (Panel A). The major industries are represented by agribusiness, building,
chemical, commerce, communication, energy, and property. The average number of

listed firms in the Stock Exchange of Thailand is approximately 400 firms with 3,069
billion bath of market capitalization between 1993-1996 (US$1* 30 baht at this
focusing period) between 1993-1996. Table 4.3 (Panel B) shows that there were
347 listed firms in 1993, with a sharp increase to 389 firms in 1994, continuing
growth to 416 in 1995, and extending to 454 firms in 1996. The market
capitalization, in 1993, was 3,250 billion baht. It increased to 3,301 billion baht
1994, and reached the highest point at 3,565 billion baht in 1995, and then dropped
to 2,560 billion baht in 1996. Turnover value rose to the highest at 2,201 billion
baht as well as the SET Index at 1,683 points in 1993.

Table 4.3 (Panel C) illustrates the financial ratios of all listed firms in the Stoc
Exchange of Thailand between 1993-1996. The financial performance includes
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profitability and financial leverage. The profitability is measured by the return o
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and the gross profit margin. During 19931994, the ROA and ROE trending were fairly constant. The ROA was at 5.8% in
1993 and 5.3% in 1994. Then it dropped down to 4.4% in 1995 and continuously
down to 3.4% in 1996. The ROE was at 10.2%-10% between 1993-1994. It fell to
7.7% in 1995 and decreased continuously to 5.8% in 1996. The gross profit margin
did not change sharply. It was around 27.6% to 27.4% during 1993 to 1995 and
failed to 26% in 1996.
The financial leverage is also shown in Table 4.3 (Panel C). It is measured by

the total debt to equity and the total debt to asset. The total debt on equity drop
from 139.6% in 1993 to 125.9% in 1994. It rose sharply again to 140% in 1995, and

continuously increased to 145.7% in 1996. The total debt to asset slightly increased
from 49.5% in 1994 to 52.1% in 1995, and then rose to 52.7% in 1996. It seems to

be that the leverage ratios increased sharply, while the profitability declined dur

1995-1996. In this regard, it has been argued that the reason for such a high lever

is possibly that family shareholders, who control most of the Thai firms, have tende
to borrow more when capital is needed. This is because they attempt to avoid the
ownership dilution effects on the firm (Limphapayom, 2001).
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Table 4.3
Descriptive Statistics-Thai Stocks between 1993-1996
Panel A:
This table presents the industrial sectors contained in the Stock Exchange of Thailand between 1993-1996. It also shows the
average number of firms and the market capitalization in each sector. The data has been obtained from the Stock Exchange of
Thailand Annual Report and the Stock Exchange of Thailand Library.

Sectors

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

N u m b e r of Firms
Average 1993-1996

Market Capitalization
Average 1993-1996
(Billion Baht)

27
15
28
12
14
8
11
6
7
5
44
24
11
12
9
22
19
5
4
1
17
2
10
2
34
4
30
6
8
4
5
402

46.54
750.57
284.44
57.76
62.56
478.15
25.94
26.51
149.45
39.05
385.52
34.52
12.96
25.06
18.29
42.06
44.10
4.93
4.04
4.17
19.13
1.01
25.77
1.28
329.62
30.33
39.03
97.40
17.95
2.94
8.58
3,069.66

Agribusiness
Bank
Building
Chemical and Plastic
Commerce
Communication
Electrical Products
Electronic Components
Energy
Entertainment
Finance
Food and Beverage
Health Care Services
Hotel and Travel Services
Household
Insurance
Investment
Jewellery and Ornaments
Machinery and Equipment
Mining
Packaging
Pharmaceutical and Cosmetics
Printing and Publishing
Professional Services
Property
Pulp and Paper
Textiles, Clothing and Footwear
Transportation
Vehicles and Parts
Warehouse
Other
Total

Panel B

This table presents the average performance of firms listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand between 1993-1996. Th
performance includes market capitalization, the number of firms listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand, the turnover value,
and the SET index.

Corporate Securities

Market Capitalization (Billion Baht)
Numbers of Listed Firms
Turnover Value Q3illion Baht)
SET Index

1993

1994

1995

1996

3,250

3,301

3,565

2,560

347

389

416

454

2,114
1,360

1,535
1,281

1,303

2,201
1,683

832
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Panel C:
This table presents the mean of financial performance of firms listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand between 1993-1996.
T h e performance includes the profitability and the leverage ratios. T h e profitability ratios are represented by the return on
assets, the return on equity, and the gross profit margin. The leverage ratios are represented by the total debt to equity and the
total debt to asset.

Year

Return

Return

on

on

Assets
(%)
1993
1994
1995
1996

5.80
5.30
4.40
3.40

Total Debt

Equity

Gross
Profit
Margin

(%)

(%)

10.20
10.00
7.70
5.80

27.60
27.70
27.40
26.00

Total Debt

to

to

Equity
(%)

Asset
(%)

139.60
125.90
140.00
145.70

51.20
49.50
52.10
52.70

4.6. Structure of Thai Ownership
This section presents an analysis of the structure of Thai ownership between
1993-1996. The results of this analysis could provide a clear picture about Thai
ownership including who controlled most of the Thai firms, and the share

concentration in the firms they controlled. This section is organized as follows -.fir
the data sample sources will be shown. Secondly, the ownership concentration of the
largest shareholders will be investigated. The largest shareholders categories and
their shareholding concentration are examined in the third section. Finally, the
characteristics of managerial shareholders and their concentrated ownership are
analyzed.

4.6.1 Data Sample
The data sample of this study consists of cross-sectional data for 243 nonfinancial listed firms in the Stock Exchange of Thailand each year between 19931996. Firms in the sample are approximately 80% of all the non-financial listed
firms during this period. The data relating to shareholders, financial statements and
stock prices monthly was obtained from the database provided by the Stock
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Exchange of Thailand. The lists of the board of directors were collected manually
from the Stock Exchange of Thailand Library.
Before examining the Thai ownership structure, it is important to have a
discussion about the justification for the share ownership concentration. According
to the Stock Exchange of Thailand, a shareholder who will be entitled to be as 'a
controlling shareholder' must own more than 25% of shares in the firm. This
justification was also applied in Wiwattankantung's (2001) study. Based on the
Public Limited Companies Act, the controlling shareholder has an adequate voting
power and an influence over the firm in many important aspects (Wiwattanakuntung,
2001). First, a controlling shareholder is able to nullify any management decision.
Secondly, a controlling shareholder is able to call for the extraordinary meeting at
any time. Thirdly, a controlling shareholder has the right to request an inspection
into a firm's financial conditions and operations as well as the conduct of the board.
Finally, a controlling shareholder has the right to submit a motion to the court for
dissolution in the case where he/she suspects that the management's operation will
only bring losses to the firm. The ownership concentration of Thai firms is
presented in the next section.

4.6.2 Ownership Concentration of Thai Firms
This section presents the pattern of ownership concentration of Thai firms
between 1993 and 1996. The analysis examines the ownership concentration of the
largest shareholders as well as the others in the top five largest shareholders. This
section will first look at the ownership concentration for the largest shareholders.
Referring to the shareholders who have the same family name, this study follows the
criteria used in Wiwattanakantung's (1999) study to justify such shareholders. That
is, the percentage of shares (voting right) of the top five shareholders, who have the
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same family name as the largest shareholders, will be combined (as a single unit)
with those of the largest shareholders.
Table 4.4 reveals the characteristics of the Thai ownership concentration
between 1993 and 1996. The ownership concentration is measured from the
percentage of shares held by the five largest shareholders. The results of this
analysis show that the average ownership concentration of the largest shareholders
was 25.6% in 1993 and 25.48% in 1994. It slightly increased to 26.21% in 1995, and
increased to 27% in 1996. The ownership concentration of the second largest
shareholders was constant at around 11% in 1993 through to 1996. The third largest
shareholders held on average not more than 8% from 1993 to 1996. The ownership
concentration was about 5% for the fourth largest shareholders, and it was
approximately 4% for the fifth largest shareholders between 1993 and 1996. The last

section of Table 4.4 also illustrates that, on average, the top five largest sharehold
held more than 50% of outstanding shares in the firm between 1993 and 1996. This
was around 51%-52% of outstanding shares throughout the period.
This analysis suggests that Thai ownership was highly concentrated between
1993 and 1996. This study finds that, on average, the largest shareholders were
entitled 'controlling shareholders' because they were holding on average around 25%
of outstanding shares. Moreover, it is found that the top five shareholders between
1993-1996 controlled around half of the total outstanding shares in most firms.
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Table 4.4
Ownership Concentration for Thai Firms between 1993-1996
This table presents the ownership concentration of firms in Thailand between 1993-1996. The mean, median, standard
deviation, m i n i m u m and m a x i m u m of shares held by the largest, the second largest, the third largest, the fourth largest, the fifth
largest as well as the top five shareholders are presented.

Largest Shareholders
Mean
Median

SD
Min
Max
Second Largest Shareholders
Mean
Median

SD
Min
Max
Third Largest Shareholders
Mean
Median

SD
Min
Max
Fourth Largest Shareholders
Mean
Median

1993

1994

1995

1996

25.6

65

25.48
20.50
14.59
4.75
62.3

26.21
21.41
14.73
4.75
70.98

26.99
22.25
15.12
4.75
70.98

11.15
10.03
5.15
2.11
37.54

11.26
10.02
5.19
2.10
35.62

11.56
10.5
5.58
2.30
41.32

11.47
10.25
5.31
2.30
37.46

7.27
6.67
3.22
1.80
17.9

7.28

7.51
7.07
3.51
0.64
24.5

7.45
6.86
3.47
1.98
24.5
5.34
4.86
2.33
0.89

21
12.96
4.17

6.7
3.33
1.95
22.95

5.28
4.96
2.33
1.23
12.08

5.10

12

5.33
4.83
2.72
0.50
24.50

SD
Min

4.13
3.98
1.77
0.91

4.10
3.71
1.78
1.19

4.11
3.91
1.83
0.54

4.18
3.96
1.71
0.89

Max

12

12

12

12

51.54
50.82
14.79
16.14
95.71

51.2
50.6
14.7
17.23
95.27

51.91
51.06
15.37
12.84
99.66

52.65
51.89
15.11
18.44
95.27

SD
Min
Max
Fifth Largest Shareholders
Mean
Median

Top Five Largest Shareholders
Mean
Median

SD
Min
Max

4.5
2.3
1.57

16
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Table 4.5 presents the frequency distribution of firms based on the

shareholding level of the largest shareholders. The levels of percentage shareholdin
are categorized as 0-25%, >25%5-50% and more than 50%6 of outstanding shares.
Table 4.5 (Panel A) shows that the non-controlling shareholders (holding at 0%-25%
of shares) controlled around 103-109 firms (42%-45% of firms in the sample)
between 1993-1996. Controlling shareholders holding between >25%-50% of
outstanding shares controlled around 112-115 firms (47% of firms in the sample)
while those who held more than 50% of shares in a firm controlled ranged from 22
firms to 25 firms (10% of firms in the sample).
Table 4.5
Frequency Distribution of Firms Based on the Largest Shareholding in Thai
Firms between 1993-1996
This table presents the frequency distribution of numbers and percentage offirmscontrolled by the largest shareholders based
on various different levels of shareholding for listed firms between 1993-1996. The level of shareholding is divided into three
categories: 0%-25%, > 2 5 % - 5 0 % and more than 5 0 % .

Frequency
Distribution

1993

1994

1995

No. of (%) No. of (%) No. of (%) No. of (%)
Firms
Firms

0%-25%

106

43.6

104

42.8

1996

Firms

109

Firms

44.9

103

42.4

>25%-50% 115 47.3 114 46.9 112 46.1 115 47.3
More than 50% 22 9.1 25 10.3 22 9.1 25 10.3
Total 243 100 243 100 243 100 243 100

The analysis of this section clearly shows that more than 4 0 % of firms in the
sample were controlled by the largest shareholders who mostly hold more than 25%
of shares in the firm. However, numbers of firms controlled by controlling

shareholders are not significantly different from those controlled by non-controlli

5

The breakpoint > 2 5 % shareholding level is used because it is the minimum level of shares held by
controlling shareholders.
6
The breakpoint > 5 0 % shareholding level is used in order to break the range of controlling
shareholders who hold shares of more than half of outstanding of shares in the firm.
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shareholders. The analysis as to what categories of the largest shareholders
controlled most Thai firms between 1993-1996 will be shown in the following
section.

4.6.3 Thai Ownership Categories
This section presents the ownership categories structure. The ownership
categories are classified into six main categories as follows: (1) an individual or

family, (2) domestic corporation, (3) bank, (4) other financial institution (5) forei
investor, and (6) government. This analysis presents (i) the number of firms

controlled by each shareholder category, (ii) their ownership concentration and (iii
the frequency distribution of firms they controlled.
Firstly, Table 4.6 shows that individual or family shareholders controlled most
Thai firms between 1993-1996. The number of firms they controlled was
approximately 103 firms (42.3% of firm in the sample) in 1993, 101 firms (41.56%
of firms in the sample) in 1994, and around 110 firms (45.21% of firms in the
sample) in 1995 and 1996. Domestic-corporation shareholders appear to be the
second category of shareholders that controlled most Thai firms. They controlled
around 72 firms (29.63% of firms in the sample) in 1993, 68 firms (27.98% of firms
in the sample) in 1994, 70 firms (28.81% of firms in the sample) in 1995, and around
78 firms (32.1% of firms in the sample) in 1996. The third category is found to be
foreign shareholders who controlled 44 firms (18.11% of firms in the sample) in
1993, 50 firms (20.58% of firms in the sample) in 1994, and around 40 firms
(16.46% of firms in the sample) in 1995 to 1996. Other financial institution
shareholders controlled around 10-15 firms (6%-7% of firms in the sample) between
1993-1996. Bank and government shareholders controlled around 1-7 firms (2%-3%
of firms in the sample) through the period.
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This study suggests that individual or family shareholders controlled most Thai
firms between 1993 and 1996. The domestic corporation shareholders and the
foreign shareholders appear to be the second and the third largest categories that

controlled most Thai firms while the financial institutions, banks and the government
controlled only a few firms during the period.
Table 4.6
Ownership Categories of Thai Firms between 1993-1996
This table presents numbers and the percentage of firms controlled by each shareholder category. The largest shareholders were
categorized as: (i) individual or family, (ii) domestic-corporation, (iii) foreign investor, (iv) other financial institution, (v)
banksand (vi) government.

1993

Ownership Categories

No. of
Firms

1994
(%)

No. of
Firms

1995
(%)

No. of
Firms

199*
(%)

No. of
Firms

(%)

103

42.39

101

41.56

110

45.27

110

45.27

Domestic Corporation

72

29.63

68

27.98

70

28.81

78

32.10

Foreign Investor

44

18.11

50

20.58

40

16.46

41

16.87

Other Financial Institution

15

6.17

18

7.41

13

5.35

6

2.47

Bank

5

2.06

2

0.82

3

1.23

1

0.41

Government

4

1.65

4

1.65

7

2.88

7

2.88

243

100

243

100

243

100

243

100

Individual or Family

Total

Secondly, Table 4.7 illustrates ownership concentration of each shareholder
category, which is measured by the percentage of shares held by each shareholder
category. The results show that individual or family shareholders controlled around
31.87% of outstanding shares in 1993. It slightly increased to 33.7% in 1994 and
then dropped to 33.46% in 1995, and 32.03% in 1996. Domestic-corporation
shareholders controlled approximately 29.5% of outstanding shares in 1993, and this
slightly decreased to 24.2% in 1994, 24.56% in 1995, and it dropped to 23.3% in
1996. Foreign shareholders controlled around 30.54% of outstanding shares in 1993,
28-29% in 1994-1995, and this increased to 32.58% in 1996. Other financial
institution shareholders controlled between 15-17% of outstanding shares in firms
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between 1993-1996. Banks held, on average, 9% of outstanding shares, while the
government held around 20% during the period. From the analysis, it would seem to
be that, on average, individual or family shareholders, domestic-corporation
shareholders, and foreign shareholders controlled most Thai firms between 19931996.
Thirdly, Table 4.8 presents the frequency distribution of firms based on the
shareholding of each shareholders category. The shareholding is categorized into
three levels: 0-25%, >25%-50% and more than 50%. The results show that most
firms were controlled by shareholders holding in the >25%-50% range of outstanding
shares in the firm. These shareholders who were family shareholders controlled
around 64 firms (26.3% of firms in the sample) in 1993 and 1994, increasing to 79
firms (31.3% of firms in the sample) in 1995 and declining to 70 firms (28.8% of
firms in the sample) in 1996. Domestic-corporation shareholders controlled
approximately 50 firms (20.6% of firms in the sample) in 1993. The number of firms
they controlled dropped down to 32-27 firms (13.2% and 11.1% of firms in the
sample) in 1994-1996. Foreign shareholders (holding >25%-50% of outstanding
shares) controlled around 22 firms (9.1% of firms in the sample) in 1993. The
number of firms they controlled swung between 23-20 firms (9.5%-8.2% of firms in
the sample) from 1994 to 1996. Other financial institution shareholders and banks
controlled around approximately 1 to 2 firms respectively during the period.
At more than 50% of the shareholding level, individual or family shareholders
controlled approximately 13 to 18 firms (5%-7% of firms in the sample). Domesticcorporation shareholders and foreign shareholders controlled around 5-6 firms (5%
of firms in the sample) between 1993-1996. It is found that financial institutions,
banks, and government shareholders controlled around 1-2 firms during this period.
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Table 4.7
Ownership (Categories) Concentration of Thai Firms between 1993-1996
This table presents the mean, median, minimum and maximum shareholding of each category of the largest shareholders. The
largest shareholders were categorized as: (i) individual or family, (ii) domestic-corporation, (iii) foreign investor, (iv) other
financial institution, (v) bank and (vi) government.

Year 1993

Mean

Median

Individual or Family
Domestic Corporation
Foreign Investor
Other Financial Institution
Bank
Government

31.87
29.50
30.54
17.65
9.95
23.7

31.13
23.55
27.70
14.7

Year 1994

Mean

Median

Individual or Family
Domestic Corporation
Foreign Investor
Other Financial Institution
Bank
Government

33.7
24.2
28.65
15.73
24.97

33.06
25.01
26.08
12.84
9.50
24.79

Year 1995

Mean

Median

Individual or Family
Domestic Corporation
Foreign Investor
Other Financial Institution
Bank
Government

33.46
24.56
29.39
13.18
8.82

31.66
21.45
25.34
11.84

20

10
20

Year 1996

Mean

Median

Individual or Family
Domestic Corporation
Foreign Investor
Other Financial Institution
Bank
Government

32.03
23.3
32.58
15.88

31.10
24.41
29.95
12.88

10

10
20

9.5

20.01

10
24.79

SD
14.16
11.63
14.67
10.86
16.42
11.38

SD
14.15
10.73
14.16
9.46
0.70
9.38

SD
13.56
11.40
14.73
7.69
2.04
9.77

SD
14.94
12.01
14.29
9.39
9.77

Minimum

Maximum

4.75
6.96
4.17
7.54
8.98

65
53
65

9.6

Minimum

4.7
6.82
4.79

5.5
9

42.78
9.32
35.6

Maximum

65
53.37
62.63
34.88

10

14.71

35.60

Minimum

Maximum

4.5
6.18
9.87
4.79
6.47

9.6

66.74
63.75

65
34.01

10
35.6

Minimum

Maximum

4.75
6.44
9.87
8.07

69.89
65.43

10
9.6

65
33.88

10
35.6

91

92
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Table 4.8
Frequency Distribution of Firms Based on Ownership Categories in Thai Firms
between 1993- 1996

This table presents the frequency distribution of numbers and the percentage of firms controlled by the largest sha
in various levels of shareholding offirmsbetween 1993-1996. The shareholders were categorized as: (i) individual or family,
(ii) domestic-corporation, (iii) foreign investor, (iv) otherfinancialinstitution, (v) bank and (vi) government The level of
shareholding is divided into three categories: 0%-25%, >25%-50% and more than 50%.

1993

Frequency Distribution

No. of
Firms

1994
No. of
Firms

(%)

1995
No. of
Firms

(%)

1996
No. of
Firms

(%)

(%)

Shareholding 0 % - 2 5 %
Individual or Family
Domestic Corporation
Foreign Investor
Other Financial Institution
Bank
Government

26
16
18
12
4
2

10.7

64
50
22
3
1
2

26.3

6.6
7.4
4.9
1.6
0.8

21
31
23
14
2
2

8.6
12.8

9.5
5.8
0.8
0.8

18
43
20
12
3
5

7.4
17.7

8.2
4.9
1.2
2.1

25
45
16
5
1
5

10.3

28.8

18.5

6.6
2.1
0.4
2.1

Shareholding > 2 5 % - 5 0 %
31.3

9.5
1.6
0.0
0.8

79
25
16
1
0
1

6.6
0.4
0.0
0.4

70
27
20
1
1
2

18

7.4

15

6.2

15

6.2

2.5

3

1.2

2

0.8

5

2.1

4

1.6

4

1.6

5

2.1

5

2.1

Other Financial institution

0

0

0

0

1

0.4

0

0

Bank

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

243

100

243

100

243

100

243

100

26.3

9.1
1.2
0.4
0.8

64
32
23
4
0
2

13

5.3

Domestic Corporation

6

Foreign Investor

Individual or Family
Domestic Corporation
Foreign Investor
Other Financial Institution
Bank
Government

20.6

13.2

10.3

11.1

8.2
0.4
0.4
0.8

Shareholding more than 5 0 %
Individual or Family

Government
Total

So far, this section has presented the analysis of the ownership concentration,

including ownership categories in Thai firms between 1993-1996. A further questio

to be raised in this study is how many shareholders acted as managerial sharehold
and in how many firms did they participate in?
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4.6.4 Managerial Ownership
This section presents the number of firms with managerial shareholders and
their ownership concentration. The definition of managerial shareholders in this
study is adopted from Morck et al's (1988) and Short and Keasy's (1999) studies
who define managerial shareholders as members of the board of directors who hold
shares in the firm.
Table 4.9 (Panel A) shows that the number of firms with managerial
shareholders was around 151 firms (62.14% of firms in the sample) in 1993. It
slightly increased to 154 firms (63.37 % of firms in the sample) in 1994 and to 171
firms (70.3%) of the sample) in 1995, and it dropped to 158 firms (65% of the
sample) in 1996. The number of firms with non-managerial shareholders ranged
between 92 firms (38% of firms in the sample) to 85 firms (35% of firms in the
sample) during the period. Based on these results, it clearly shows that the number
of firms with managerial ownership is found to be more than half of total firms in
sample.
Table 4.9 (Panel B) presents the results of managerial ownership concentration.
The managerial ownership concentration is defined as the percentage of shares held
by the members of the board of directors. The results show that the managerial
ownership concentration was around 29.22% in 1993 and 30.26% in 1994. It then
decreased slightly to 29.52% in 1995, and rose to 30.51% in 1996. Table 4.9 (Panel
B) also presents the non-managerial ownership structure. Non-managerial ownership

is defined as the percentage of shares held by the members of the board of directors
who are not holding shares in the firm. The results illustrate that non-managerial
ownership concentration was around more than 25%-of outstanding shares in the

firm. From these results, it can be seen that, on average, the ownership concentrati
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of non-managerial shareholders was lower than that of managerial shareholders.
However, these non-managerial shareholders were holding adequate shares to be as
the controlling shareholders (>25% on average).
Table 4.9
Managerial Ownership of Thai Firms between 1993-1996
This table presents the number and the percentage of firms with managerial shareholders and non-managerial shareholders. The
mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and m a x i m u m of the managerial shareholding and non-managerial shareholding
are also presented. Managerial shareholders are defined as the members of the board of directors w h o hold shares in the firm.
The percentage of shares held by them was used as a basis to calculate the managerial shareholding. Non-Managerial
shareholders are defined as the percentage of shares held by the members of the board of directors w h o are not holding shares in
the firm. The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders was used as a basis to calculate the non-managerial
shareholding.

Panel A: Thai Listed Firms with Managerial Shareholders and Non-Managerial Shareholders
1993
No. of
Firms
Firms with Managerial Shareholders
Firms with Non-Managerial Shareholders
Total

1994\
No. of
Firms

(%)

151 62.14
92 37.86
243
100

1995
(%)

154 63.37
89 36.63
243
100

No. of
Firms

1996
No. of
Firms

(%)

70.3

158

65

29.7

85

35

100

243

100

(%)

171
72
243

Panel B: Managerial Ownership and Non-Managerial Ownership Concentration of Thai Listed Firms.

Year

Mean

Median

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Managerial Shareholding
1993

29.22

27.95

17.1

1.23

65

1994

30.26

28.56

17.61

1.78

85.93

1995

29.52

28.36

18.24

1.78

87.77

1996

30.51

29.98

18.62

2.51

87.76

1993

25.98

24

13.74

5.94

65

1994

25.33

24.67

13.63

4.79

62.63

1995

25.81

21.77

13.13

6.47

65

1996

26.81

22.04

14.28

8.5

65.43

Non-Managerial Shareholding

A s Thai firms were heavily controlled by family shareholders, this section will
therefore attempt to differentiate between the characteristics of managerial
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shareholders that had family members involved (managerial-family shareholders)
and those with nonfamily members involved (managerial-nonfamily shareholders).
This study relies on its own judgment to define these two managerial shareholders
categories because these ownership structures have never been examined in the
literature. In this study, managerial-family shareholders are defined as managerial
shareholders with at least two of them having the same family name. In contrast,
managerial-nonfamily shareholders are defined as managerial shareholders with none
of them having the same family name.
Table 4.10 (Panel A) indicates that firms with managerial-family shareholders
were found to be around 95-113 firms (40%-46% of firms in the sample) between
1993-1996. The number of firms with managerial-nonfamily shareholders was only
45 to 70 firms (19%-29% of firms in the sample). The ownership concentration of
managerial-family shareholders and managerial-nonfamily shareholders is shown in
Table 4.10 (Panel B). The managerial-family ownership concentration is defined as
the percentage of shares held by managerial shareholders where at least two of them
have the same family name. The managerial-nonfamily ownership concentration is
defined as the percentage of shares held by managerial shareholders where none of
them have the same family name. Interestingly, the results show that managerialfamily shareholding was very high. That is, it was around 34%-37% of outstanding
shares. Managerial-nonfamily concentrated shareholding, however, was found to be
only around 13%-16% of outstanding shares in the firm.
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Table 4.10
Managerial-Family Ownership and Managerial-NonFamily Ownership of Thai
Firms between 1993-1996
This table presents the number and percentage of firms with managerial-family shareholders and managerial-nonfamily
shareholders. The mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and m a x i m u m of the managerial-family shareholding and
managerial-nonfamily shareholding are also presented. Managerial-family shareholders are defined as the percentage of shares
held by managerial shareholders at least two of them have the same family name. The percentage of shares held by them was
used as a basis to calculate the managerial-family shareholding. Managerial-nonfamily shareholders are defined as the
percentage of shares held by managerial shareholders where none of them have the same family name. The percentage of
shares held by them was used as a basis to calculate the managerial-nonfamily shareholding. Non-Managerial shareholders are
defined as no members of the board of directors holding shares in the firm. The percentage of shares held by the largest
shareholders was used as a basis to calculate the non-managerial shareholding.
Panel A: The Number of Firms with Managerial-Family Shareholders and Managerial-Nonfamily
Shareholders.

Firms with

1993
No. of
Firms

1994
(%)

No. of
Firms

1995
(%)

No. of
Firms

1996
(%)

No. of
Firms

(%)

Managerial- Family Shareholders

95

40.04

97

39.9

102

42

113

46.5

Managerial-Nonfamily Shareholders

56

22.1

57

23.47

69

28.3

45

18.5

Firms with Non-Managerial Shareholders

92

37.86

89

36.63

72

29.7

85

35

243

100

243

100

243

100

243

100

Total

Panel B: Managerial-Family Ownership and Managerial-Nonfamily Ownership Concentration of Thai
Listed Firms

Year

Mean

Median

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Managerial with Family Shareholding
1993

34.55

35.2

15.22

64.66

1994

35.94

35

16.03

85.93

3.2
4

1995

35.63

36.6

16.17

87.77

4.02

1996

36.64

36.73

15.64

87.76

5.05

Managerial with Nonfamily Shareholding
1993

15.77

14

11.23

57.74

1.97

1994

16.07

13.2

12.42

64.88

1.78

1995

15.9

11.37

13.1

68.12

1.84

1996

13.5

10.5

10.25

66.27

2.51
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4.7 Financial Ratios of Thai Listed Firms
Based on the results regarding the Thai ownership structure presented, it is
found that ownership in Thailand is highly concentrated, especially family
ownership. This may influence on firm's financial performance as, for example, its

profitability and leverage. This section therefore presents the financial performanc
of Thai firms between 1993-1996. The financial performance presented here

consists of profitability and leverage. The profitability is represented by the retu
on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and gross profit margin ratios. The

leverage is represented by the total debt to asset and the total debt to equity. This

section is set out as follows. In the first section, the mean of financial performanc
of Thai listed firms between 1993 and 1996 is examined. There is an investigation of
the performance of firms with controlling shareholders and firms with non-

controlling shareholders in the second section. Financial performance of controlling

shareholders categories is then analyzed in the third section. In the final section,
performance of firms with managerial shareholders and firms with non-managerial
shareholders is investigated.
First, the results of the financial performance of Thai firms between 1993 and
1996 are shown in Table 4.11. It is found that the ROA was 9.5% in 1993. It
decreased to 8.4% in 1994 and 8.2% in 1995 and it sharply dropped to 6.9% in 1996.
The ROE was 11.3% in 1993. It was slightly down to 8.1% in 1994, 8.5% in 1995.
It then dipped to 4.1% in 1996. The gross profit margin had the highest level at
approximately 25%-27% between 1993 and 1995. After that, it declined to 18.8% in
1996. Moreover, the results show that the total debt to asset swung between 48% in
1993 to 51.4% in 1995 and it increased to 54.8% in 1996. The total debt to equity
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was maintained around 1 2 9 % - 1 2 7 % during 1993 to 1995, and it sharply increased to
148.5% in 1996.
Table 4.11
Financial Performance of Thai Firms between 1993-1996
This table presents the mean of financial performance, including profitability and leverage ratios, of Thai firms between 19931996. T h e profitability is represented by return on assets, return on equity and gross profit ratios. T h e leverage is represented
by the total debt to asset and total debt to equity ratios.
Financial Performance

1993

1994

1995

1996

Return on Assets (%)

9.5

8.4

8.2

6.9

Return on Equity (%)

11.3

8.1

8.51

4.1

Gross Profit Margin (%)

27

21.3

25

18.8

Total Debt to Asset (%)

48

50.7

51.4

54.8

129

120.2

127.2

148.5

Total Debt to Equity (%)

Secondly, thefinancialperformance of firms with non-controlling ownership
(0%-25% of shareholding) and firms with controlling ownership (in the >25%-50%

range, and more than 50% of shareholding) is investigated. The results in Table 4.
show that the profitability ratios (ROA, ROE and gross profit) of firms with non-

controlling shareholders declined between 1993-1996. However, these ratios did not

change rapidly during this period expect for the gross profit. They decreased shar
from 24.5%o in 1994-1995 to 15% in 1996. The profitability ratios of firms with
controlling shareholders (holding >25%-50% of outstanding shares) were not
significantly changed during this period except the ROE. It dropped from 11% in
1994 to 6.5% in 1995 and it decreased continuously to 6.2% in 1996. The

profitability ratios of firms with controlling shareholders (holding more than 50%

shares) were not significantly different through the period except the ROA and ROE
Tha.t is, the ROA sharply increased from 6.3% in 1994 to 14% and 14.4% in 19951996. The ROE also increased from 2.7% in 1993 to 5.9% in 1994 and it sharply
increased to 15.7% in 1995.
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In terms of leverage ratios, the results in Table 4.12 show that the leverage

ratios of firms with non-controlling shareholders (holding 0%-25% of shares) did not
apparently change during the period. The leverage ratios of firms with controlling
shareholders (holding >25%-50% of shares in the firm), however, significantly

changed, based on the total debt to equity ratio. That is, this ratio was maintained
approximately 100% from 1993-1994, but it rapidly increased from 101.18% in 1994
to 156.3% in 1995. It then declined to 144% in 1996. Total debt to equity for firms
with controlling shareholders (more than 50% of shares in the firm) declined from
227.3% in 1994 to 130% in 1995 and it slightly increased to 152% in 1996. Based
on these results, this study suggests that, on average, the firms with controlling
shareholders (owning >25%-50% and more than 50% of shares in the firm) perform
higher (in terms of profitability) than firms with non-controlling shareholders
(owning 0%-25% of shareholding). On the other hand, firms with controlling
shareholders owning more than 50% of shares seem to have the higher leverage
ratios than firms with controlling shareholders owning >25%-50% or firms with noncontrolling shareholders owning 0%-25%.
Table 4.13 presents an average amount of the profitability and the leverage
ratios between 1993 and 1996 of Thai firms. The results illustrate that the
profitability ratios between firms with controlling shareholders owning >25%-50%
and those with controlling shareholders owning more than 50% were not
significantly different. However, the profitability ratios of firms with noncontrolling shareholders seem to be lower compared to those of firms with

controlling shareholders. It is interesting that the leverage ratios of firms with t
three levels of shareholding (0%-25%, >25%-50% and more than 50%) were not

significantly different, except for the total debt to equity of firms with controlli
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shareholding owning more than 50% was apparently higher than firms with another
two levels of shareholding.
Table 4.12
Financial Performance of Thai Firms Based on the Level of Ownership
Shareholding between 1993-1996
This table presents financial performance, including profitability and leverage ratios, of Thai firms between 1993-1996 based on
the level of ownership shareholding. The level of ownership shareholding is divided into three categories: 0-25%, > 2 5 % - 5 0 %
and more than 5 0 % . The profitability is represented by the return on assets, return on equity and gross profit ratios. T h e
leverage is represented by the total debt to asset and total debt to equity ratios.
Financial Performance

1993
Ownership
Concentration

1994
Ownership
Concentration

0-25% >25-50% > 5 0 %

0-25%

1995
Ownership
Concentration

>25-50% > 5 0 %

1996
Ownership
Concentration

0-25% >25-50% > 5 0 %

0-25%>25-50% > 5 0 %

Profitability
Return on Assets (%)

8.57

11.38

8.5

7.4

10

6.3

7.9

8.1

14

6

7

14.4

Return on Equity (%)

10.5

15.63

2.7

8.4

11

5.9

8.4

6.5

15.7

5

6.2

14

Gross Profit Margin(%)

25.9

29.8

22

24.5

26.2

18.3

24.5

24.2

25.3

15

25.5

24.3

45

54.7

54.5

42.1

59.7

51.5

51.3

49.8

56

54

51.2

137.8i 100.5

205

120

101.8

227.3

113

156.3

130

150

144

152

Leverage
Total Debt to Asset(%)
Total Debt to Equity(%)

49

'

Table 4.13
Average Financial Performance of Thai Firms Based on the Ownership
Concentration between 1993-1996
This table presents an average amount offinancialperformance, including profitability and leverage ratios, of Thai firms
between 1993-1996 based on the level of ownership shareholding. The level of shareholding is divided into three categories: 02 5 % , > 2 5 % - 5 0 % and more than 5 0 % . The profitability is represented by the return on assets, the return on equity and gross
profit ratios. The leverage is represented by the total debt to asset and the total debt to equity ratios.

Financial Performance

Average 1993-1996
Ownership Concentration
>25%-50%
more than 5 0 %
0%-25%

Profitability
Return on Assets (%)
Return on Equity (%)
Gross Profit Margin (%)

22.3

Leverage
Total Debt to Asset (%)
Total Debt to Equity (%)

51.6
143.4

7.5
8.8

9.2

10.5

10.4
26.5

22.5

48.5

132

10

53.8
209.2
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Thirdly, this section presents the results of financial ratios based on categories
of the largest shareholders. Table 4.14 shows that the profitability ratios of firms
controlled by family shareholders, domestic-corporation shareholders and foreign
shareholders, on average, were not significantly different. Firms with family
shareholders, however, seem to have a higher total debt to equity than firms with
domestic-corporation shareholders or foreign shareholders. The profitability ratios
of firms with other financial institution shareholders, bank and government were not
found to be significantly different from each other. The profitability ratios of them,
however, were lower than those of firms controlled by family shareholders,
domestic-corporation shareholders or foreign shareholders.
Finally, the results of financial performance of firms with managerial
shareholders and firms with non-managerial shareholders are shown in Table 4.15

(Panel A). The results show that, on average, the profitability and the leverage ratios
between firms with managerial shareholders and firms with non-managerial
shareholders were not significantly different. Also the results in Table 4.15 (Panel
B) indicate that, on average, the profitability ratios of managerial-family
shareholders and firms with managerial-nonfamily shareholders were not found to be
significantly different. However, between 1993-1994, the leverage ratios of firms
with managerial-family shareholders seemed to be higher than those of firms with
managerial-nonfamily shareholders.
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Table 4.14
Financial Performance of Thai Firms Based on Ownership Categories between
1993-1996
This table presents the financial performance, including profitability and leverage ratios, of Thai firms between 1993-1996
based on ownership categories. The ownership categorizes were (i) individual or family, (ii) domestic-corporation, (iii) foreign
investor, (iv) other financial institution, (v) bank and (vi) government. Profitability is represented by the return o n assets,
return on equity and gross profit ratios. T h e leverage is represented by the total debt to asset and total debt to equity ratios.

Return

Return

on

on

Assets
(%)

Equity
(%)

10.45
9.24
11.18
9.52
6.69

15.38
8.82
9.92
5.58

5.9

1994
Individual or Family
Domestic Corporation
Foreign Investor
Other Financial Institution
Bank
Government
1995
Individual or Family
Domestic Corporation
Foreign Investor
Other Financial Institution
Bank
Government

Ownership Structure

1993
Individual or Family
Domestic Corporation
Foreign Investor
Other Financial Institution
Bank
Government

1996
Individual or Family
Domestic Corporation
Foreign Investor
Other Financial Institution
Bank
Government

Gross
Profit
Margin
(%)

Total Debt

Total Debt

to

To

Asset
(%)

Equity
(%)

5.84

26.83
29.23
33.69
28.97
15.51
17.49

47.9
44.8
44.26
52.26
63.7
49.18

126.65
126.17
106.1
147.63
114.26
150.94

10.48
6.13
10.65
5.24
6.92
6.49

9.54
8.21
11.55
3.75
6.51
5.81

25.93
19.19
29.07
20.32
13.3
25.58

49.43
57.7
41.99
55.6
64.8

49

134.3
103.05
109.13
210.1
137.6
128.6

8.29
8.85
8.77
3.78
13.72
4.83

6.07
7.94
13.53
3.85
16.25
4.63

25.07
24.11
26.25
22.7
14.5
14.2

54.3
50.7
44.33
48.67
76.29
48.68

172.56
89.8
104.8
132.04
289.36
273.08

6.14
8.26
7.53
3.88

8.04
9.15
9.33
4.48

21.43
24.09
25.97
26.53
12.57
10.18

59.11
53.9
42.46
65.3
79.7
57.64

152.4
138.72
105.19
212.83
395.1
148.69

6.3

1.5

2.8

3.53

2.15
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Table 4.15
Financial Performance of Thai Firms with Managerial Shareholders and NonManagerial Shareholders between 1993-1996

This table presents the financial performance, including profitability and leverage ratios, of firms with managerial sharehol
and firms with non-managerial shareholders. Also thefinancialperformance offirmswith managerial-family shareholders and
managerial-nonfamily shareholders are also presented. The profitability ratios are represented by the return on assets, return on
equity and gross profit ratios. The leverage ratios are represented by the total debt to asset and total debt to equity ratios.

Panel A: Financial Performance of Firms with Managerial Shareholders and Non-Managerial
Shareholders.
1993
Managerial
Shareholders

1994

1995

1996

NonManagerial
NonManagerial
NonManagerial
Managerial Shareholders Managerial Shareholders Managerial Shareholders
Shareholders
Shareholders
Shareholders

Profitability
Return on Assets (%)
Return on Equity (%)
Gross Profit Margin(%)

11.7
27.2

10.1
10.7
26.7

Leverage
Total Debt to Asset(%)
Total Debt to Equity(%)

48.8
130.6

46.8
128.1

9.1

7
8.8

10.3

24.7

6.3
24

54.2
119.3

45.1
129.2

7.8
6.8

NonManagerial
Shareholders

25.1

9.6
7.5
23

6.6
6.9
25

7.3
7.2
25.6

52.4
133.8

50.2
118.2

57.2
153.8

50.1
137.3

Panel B: Financial Performance of Firms with Managerial-Family Shareholder and ManagerialNonfamily Shareholder

1994

1993
Managerial
Family
Shareholders
Profitability
Return on Assets (%)
Return on Equity (%)
Gross Profit Margin(%)

13.2
21.6

Leverage
Total Debt to Asset(%)
Total Debt to Equity(%)

60.5
121.9

8.7

1995

Managerial Managerial Managerial
Managerial
Nonfamily
Family
Nonfamily
Family
Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders

6.8
9.9

1996

Managerial Managerial
Managerial
Nonfamily
Family
Nonfamily
Shareholders Shareholders Shareholders

8.9

5.5
10.3
25.5

8.3
8.1

7.6
6.1

5.6
6.3

5.2
7.5

25.3

10.4
24.1

24.8

25.1

20.5

18.1

47.3
96.6

58.2
132.5

47.4
96.9

50.4
136.4

54.7
143.8

58.9
159.4

60.3
163.9

4.8. Bank equity Ownership in Thai Firms between 1993-1996
In the case of Thailand, banks are the main source of funds. Banks are allowed

to hold shares in non-financial firms up to 10% of shares in the firm. Even thoug

banks are not able to hold up to 25% of shares in the firms so as to be controlli
shareholders, they still have the right to intervene and use their power in the
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borrowing firm's management. For example, banks have the power to prevent such

firms from investing in risky projects (see also section 4.4). Banks are able to f

firms to liquidate even if it is not the right time for a firm to do so (Blair, 199
Wiwattanakuntung, 2001). The difference between the financial performance of
firms with bank ownership and those with non-bank ownership is examined in this
section. The definition of firms with bank ownership is adopted from
Limpaphayom's (2001) study, which defines firms with bank ownership as a firm

that has a bank represented in the top ten shareholders. This section is set out as
numbers of firms with bank ownership and those with non-bank ownership is

examined; (ii) bank ownership concentration, and (iii) the financial performance o
firms with bank ownership and those with non-bank ownership is investigated.
Table 4.16 indicates that the number of firms with bank ownership was
approximately 58 firms (23.9% of firms in the sample) in 1993, 46 firms (18.9% of

firms in the sample) in 1994. It increased to 51 firms (21% of the sample) in 1995,
and continuously increased to 63 firms (25.9% of the sample) in 1996. The firms
with non-bank shareholders were approximately 70%-80% of the firms in the sample
between 1993-1996.
Table 4.17 illustrates that the percentage of bank shareholding was around 5%6.5%) between 1993 and 1996. The minimum shareholding was approximately 3%,
and the maximum was 10% of outstanding shares. The comparison between
financial performance of firms with bank ownership and non-bank ownership is

indicated in Table 4.18. The results show that the profitability ratios between fi
with bank ownership and those with non-bank ownership were not significantly

different. Surprisingly, the results show that the leverage ratios of firms with b
ownership were not significantly different from those with non-bank ownership,
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except total debt to equity during 1993-1994. That is,firmswith bank ownership

had significantly higher total debt to equity (146.8% in 1993 and 187.84% in 199
compared to firms with non-bank ownership (119.72% in 1993 and 114.98%) in
1994) respectively.
Table 4.16
B a n k Equity Ownership and Non-Bank Equity Ownership of Thai Firms
between 1993-1996
This table presents numbers and the percentage of firms with bank equity ownership andfirmswith non-bank equity ownership
of Thaifirmsbetween 1993-1996. Firms with bank equity ownership are defined as thefirmwith a bank represented in the top
ten shareholders. Firms with non-bank equity ownership are defined as thefirmswithout a bank represented in the top ten
shareholders.

1993
No. of
Firms

1994
(%)

No. of
Firms

1995

1996

(%)

No. of
Firms

(%)

No. of
Firms

(%)

58

23.9

46

18.9

51

21

63

25.9

Firms with Non-Bank Equity
Shareholders

185

76.1

197

81.1

192

79

180

74.1

Total

243

100

243

100

100

243

100

Firms with
Shareholders

Bank

Equity

243

Table 4.17
The M e a n of B a n k Ownership Concentration in the Top Ten Largest
Shareholders of Thai Firms between 1993-1996
This table presents bank ownership concentration of Thaifirmsbetween 1993-1996. The mean, median, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum of the bank ownership concentration is shown. Bank ownership concentration is measured by the
percentage of shares in thefirmheld by a bank shareholder.

Mean
Median
SD
Min
Max

1993

1994

1995

1996

5.86

6.53

5.95

6.34

5.5

6.47

5.79

5.89

2.71

2.56

2.63

2.67

1.3
10

1.54

1.53

2.16

10

10

10
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Table 4.18
Financial Performance of Thai Firms with Bank Equity Ownership and NonBank Equity Ownership between 1993-1996
This table presents the financial performance of firms with bank equity ownership and firms with non-bank equity ownership
between 1993-1996. The profitability ratios are represented by the return on assets, return on equity and gross profit ratios.
The leverage ratios are represented by the total debt to asset and total debt to equity ratios. Firms with bank equity ownership
are defined as the firms with a bank represented in the top ten shareholders. Firms with non-bank equity ownership are defined
as the firms without a bank represented in the top ten shareholders.
Return

Return

to

to

Assets
(%)

Total Debt

Equity

Gross
Profit
Margin

(%)

Total Debt

to

to

Asset

Equity

(%)

(%)

(%)

9.86
8.47

23.65
26.12

54.71
62.5

146.8
119.72

1993
With Banks
Without Banks

8.28

1994
With Banks
Without Banks

8.29
7.25

9.72

6.7

21.66
24.5

50.16
47.25

187.84
114.98

1995
With Banks
Without Banks

9.16
6.54

9.52
6.99

19.98
24.24

53.92
50.46

167.63
171.58

1996
With Banks
Without Banks

6.22
6.14

6.78
6.95

18.52
23.14

52.1
59.02

173.39
163.97

9.9

4.9 S u m m a r y and Conclusions
This study has presented the history of the Thai stock market and the regulation

requirements. The criteria requirements and procedures of the Thai stock market fo

those who wish to register on the listed firms in the Stock Exchange of Thailand h
been illustrated. Also the legal and regulatory framework, including the role and

responsibilities of the board of directors, transparency and disclosure requiremen
minority shareholder protection and creditor protection has been presented.
This chapter has also examined Thai ownership structure. The results are as

follows. First, this study finds that the controlling shareholders (who were holdi
more than 25% of shares in the firm) controlled most Thai firms between 1993-1996.
Secondly, the results show that the types (category) of shareholders who
controlled most of Thailand between 1993-1996 were individual or family
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shareholders. Domestic-corporation shareholders and foreign shareholders were
found to be the second and the third shareholders that controlled most Thai firms
during this period. Other financial institution, bank and government shareholders
controlled not more than 10% of firms in the sample. It has also been found that, on
average, individual or family shareholders owned around 33% of shares in the firm
they controlled. Domestic-corporation shareholders and foreign shareholders owned
approximately 25% and 30% of shares in the firm they controlled respectively.
Thirdly, the analysis shows that the number of firms with managerial
shareholders was around 65% of firms in the sample, and it was around 35% for
firms with non-managerial shareholders. Surprisingly, this study finds that
ownership concentration of managerial ownership was not significantly different
from that of non-managerial ownership. It was around 30% for managerial
shareholding, and 25% for non-managerial shareholding. Moreover, this study finds
that firms with managerial-family shareholders were around 40% while those with
managerial-nonfamily shareholders were approximately 25 % of firms in the sample.
Interestingly, ownership shareholding between them was significantly different.
That is, managerial-family shareholding was around 35%, while managerialnonfamily shareholding was approximately 16% of shares in the firm.
Fourthly, the results show that firms with controlling shareholders who
owned >25%-50% had a higher profitability compared to firms with controlling
shareholders who owned more than 50% or firms with non-controlling shareholders.
The leverage of firms in the sample, however, was not significantly different.
Regarding the performance of firms with managerial shareholders and those with
non-managerial shareholders, the results show that financial performance between
firms with these two categories was not significantly different. Indeed the leverage
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ratios of firms with managerial-family shareholders were found to be higher than
those of firms with managerial-nonfamily shareholders.
Finally, this study examined the characteristics of firms with bank ownership
and firms with non-bank ownership. The results show that the number of firms with
bank ownership was around 30% of firms in the sample, and that of firms with nonbank ownership were found to be around 70% of firms in the sample. The results
also show that there was no difference in profitability between firms with bank
shareholder and firms without bank shareholder. However, firms with bank
shareholders had higher leverage, based on the total debt to equity, compared to
those with non-bank shareholders.

Chapter 5

Data and Methodology

5.1 Introduction
As has been stated earlier, this study aims to investigate the relationship
between ownership structure and firms performance between 1993-1996 in the case
of Thai non-financial firms. In Chapter 3, a review was carried out of the previous
studies that have examined the relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance. The findings, however, are still inconclusive. To step forward to
examine this relationship, it is necessary to discuss the data and methodology for an
analysis. This chapter therefore is organized in a sequential order to illustrate these
aspects. First, the sample data for an analysis and the statistical methods are
presented. Secondly, there is an elaboration on the characteristics of firms'
performance measures, which are applicable in the case of Thailand. Thirdly, there
is a discussion on Thai ownership structure variables. The characteristics of selected
control variables associated with firm performance are discussed in the fourth
section, and then the hypotheses to be tested are presented in the fifth section.
Finally, a summary and conclusions are shown.
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5.2 Data and Statistical Methods
This study selects 243 non-financial firms7 listed on the Stock Exchange of
Thailand from each year between 1993-1996. The shareholders, financial
statements, stock prices monthly data, and dividend data, were obtained from
database of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). Other secondary information

such as the lists of the board of directors was gathered through field investigatio
from the Stock Exchange of Thailand Library.
Regarding the statistical methods, this study adopts the univariate and the
multivariate regression for analysis. Univariate analysis is used to examine the
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Multivariate

regression is also applied to test the relationship between ownership structure and

firm performance, while other firm characteristics (such as risk, debt, size and ag
firm) are controlled. The dependent variables in this study are firm performance,
including market-based and accounting-based measures. The independent variables

are ownership variables and the control variables. These variables will be illustra
in the following sections.

5.3 Firm Performance Measurement
In general, firm performance measures can be considered mainly in two ways:
(i) market measures (such as stock returns) and (ii) accounting measures (for

example, profitability) (Oswald and Jahera, 1991). In the past, most previous studies
have adopted the accounting measures (or Tobin's Q which mixes market values
with accounting values) as an indicator of firm performance, whilst not much
attention is paid to the market measures. Recently, a number of academic
7

This study excludes firms in the financial sectors as such firms have some factors such as high
leverage, which does not normally have the same meaning as for non-financialfirms(see more F a m a
and French, 1992).
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researchers (cf.,Chakravarthy, 1986; Oswald and Jahera,1991) debated the efficiency
of firm performance measures by arguing that accounting measures seem to be
inadequate to indicate the true performance of the firm. Chakravarthy (1986)

mentions that one of the problems of using accounting data is that they can be eas
manipulated by the management. As well, Oswald and Jahera (1991) note that it is
possible that two firms may use different accounting practices (such as measuring
depreciation) and release two different accounting reports. Moreover, Fisher and
McGowan (1983), Brealy and Myers (1996) and Oswald and Jahara (1991) suggest,

based on the financial viewpoint, that a firm's stock market prices can provide the
best measure of the firm performance. Gitman and Madura (2001) also mention that
shareholders mostly use stock price performance to point to whether managers'

interests are consistent with them or not. That is, if the stock price is entirely
relative to the market, shareholders may have a question about the ability and
efficiency of managers to be able to maximize shareholders' wealth.
In contrast, Boardman et al. (1997) indicate that even though there exists some
controversy over the use of accounting measures, as for example in terms of the

differences of accounting practices, the accounting measures are still widely used
because they are reasonable empirical proxies to measure the firm's economic rate
returns (Martin, 1993; and Boardman et al., 1997). Gitman and Madura (2001) note
that many large firms (for example, General Motors and IBM in the US) are

intensely concerned with their major improvement in efficiency of both profitabili
and stock returns. This study therefore will utilize both market returns and
accounting measures (profitability) as alternative proxies for firm performance.
These two measures will be discussed in the following section.
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5.3.1 Stock Market Returns
Fisher and McGowan (1983); Oswald and Jahara (1991) suggest that the stock

return can reflect firm performance as in what the market is willing to pay for it.
Shareholders normally use stock prices as an initial indicator of firm performance
(Gitman and Madura, 2001). Also Fama and Jensen (1983b) suggest that stock

prices are visible signals of the effectiveness and implications of internal contro

decisions for current and future net cash flows of the firms to the market. Moreover
the stock return applied as firm performance is related to ownership structure in

several previous studies such as Kesner (1987), Kim et al. (1988), Oswald and Jahera
(1991), Wong and Yek (1991), Yeboah-Duah (1993) and Han and Suk, 1998. The

key outcome of these studies reports that there is a relationship between stock ret
and ownership (for example, concentrated ownership and managerial ownership). In
the case of Thailand, so far, no previous studies have adopted a stock return in
measuring firm performance as to whether or not it is affected by ownership
structure. From the discussion, it is a reason for the inclusion of a stock return
variable in this study. Thai non-financial firms whose prices were quoted
continuously on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) between 1993 and 1996 were

selected for this analysis. A market return, which is represented by an average rate
return (AR) in this study, is measured as follows:
N

I

(P +D )-P
i,t/

* i.t

'

i,t-l

P
U-l

Where:
NRit = an average return of security / in period t.
= a monthly closing price of security / in period t.
Pu
Pu-i
= a monthly closing price of security i in period t-1.
Diit
= a dividend of security i in period t.
N
= a number of months in a year (12).
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It should be mentioned that there are a number of models to explain h o w
stock returns can be determined. A market-adjusted return8 is suggested as one of
the approaches besides determining the market returns (Fama, 1977; Kabir, 1990).
This study therefore adopts a market-adjusted return as another market measure
proxy. The market-adjusted return (MR) is calculated as follows:
N

(R. - R )
AMR,,

=

Y-i-i^
^LL
,=i
N

Where:
AMR,,, = an average market-adjusted return on securities i in period t.
Ru
= a return of security i in period t.
Rm,t
= a market return on the S E T in period t. It is based on the
weighted average of all monthly returns.
N
= a number of months in a year (12).

5.3.2 Profitability
Shapiro (1980) suggests that even though there is some argument against using
accounting measures (such as profitability), there is no dispute about the role of

profitability as still being the determinant of efficiency of firms. Profitability i
widely used in measuring economics and the business performance of the firm in
market economics. Shapiro (1980) notes that profits are generally perceived as a

source of funds for a firm to reinvest and they are the benefits, which are ultimate
distributed to shareholders (dividends). In addition, Nivatpumin (2001) notes that
the more profitable a firm is, the more attractive it will become to the investors.
There are several possible profitability measures, which can be derived from

financial reports. This study obtains the return on assets (ROA), and sales-asset (S

from the firms' financial reports. The return on assets ratio (ROA) is calculated by

8 8

Using this model, p and a are assumed to be equal to 1 and 0, respectively. There are two-idea
behind the assumption of using p = 1 and = 0: (i) one can mistrust the accuracy of p and a estimates,
(ii) security under consideration is one of m a n y available in the market, and therefore could be
regarded as the average of all firms (see more Kabir, 1990, p.35).

Chapter 5: Data and Methodology

114

dividing earnings before interests and income taxes (EBIT) by average total assets.

The sales-asset ratio is measured from the total sales divided by the average tota
assets.

5.4 Measurement of Ownership Variables
There has been a crucial debate in the context of the relationship between
ownership structure and firm performance since the separation of ownership and
control was introduced by Berle and Means (1932). Several studies have intensively
examined such the relationship, but the results are still inconclusive (Monsen et
1968; Radice, 1971; Boudreaux, 1973; Steer and Cable, 1978; Kesner, 1987; Alba et
al., 1998; and Xu and Wang, 1999; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Kim et al., 1988;
Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Wong and Yek, 1991; YeboahDuah, 1993; Mat-Nor et al., 1997; Han and Suk, 1998; and Short and Keasy, 1999;
Kim et al., 2001; Wiwattanakantung, 2001) This study will therefore examine the
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance with evidence from

Thailand. The ownership structure will be categorized as (i) controlling ownership
(ii) controlling ownership categories (family, domestic-corporations and foreign
investors) and (iii) managerial ownership.

5.4.1 Controlling Ownership
There are a number of empirical researches, which have investigated the

relationship between controlling ownership and firm performance (as illustrated in

Chapter 3). Some studies suggest that firms with controlling ownership tend to hav

higher performance as, for example profitability and stock returns, than those wit
non-controlling ownership (Radice, 1971; Boudreaux, 1973; Stano, 1976; Steer and
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Cable, 1978; Kesner, 1987; X u and W o n g , 1999).

That is, controlling owners-

controlled firms have a high tendency to maximize firm performance, while
managers may prefer various self-interested or non-profit-maximization strategies.
Wiwattanakantung (2001) suggests that outside investors perceive that the
controlling ownership will not divert corporate assets from a firm. On the contrary
they will attempt to maximize firm performance. This will be perceived as a good

sign about the firms by those investors in the evaluating the efficiency of firms (
as stock prices). Demsetz and Lehn (1985), however, argue that there is no
relationship between controlling ownership and firm performance.
This study therefore will examine in the case of Thailand the relationship
between controlling ownership and firm performance, and whether or not firms with
controlling ownership have a higher performance than those with non-controlling
ownership. To measure the controlling ownership, this study adopts the definition
from the Stock Exchange of Thailand, which has also been used in
Wiwattanakantung' s (1999, 2000) study. That is, the controlling ownership is the
shareholder who holds more than 25% of outstanding shares in the firm. A variable
of controlling ownership (Controlown) is defined as the percentage of shares (more
than 25%), held by the largest shareholder in the firm. A dummy variable of

Controlown is set to be one for firms controlled by controlling shareholders and ze
for those controlled by non-controlling shareholders (holding < 25% of outstanding
shares in the firms).

5.4.2 Types of Controlling Ownership
Regarding the effect of controlling ownership on firm performance, there are a
number of studies that have ongoing debates regarding the impact of different types
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of controlling ownership on firm performance. This study will examine the influence

of the different types of controlling ownership over firm performance. Therefore, t

study categorizes the controlling ownership into four major types as: (1) individua
or family, (2) domestic-corporation, (3) foreign investor and (4) bank

Individual or Family-Controlling Ownership
Individual or family shareholders are widely perceived as the owners and
residual claimants who have very strong incentives to monitor firm's management.
DeAngelo and DeAngleo (1985) argue that family shareholders tend to have more
interest in controlling firm's management than nonfamily shareholders. This is
because family shareholders generally control firms that belong to their family,
especially in Thailand. These family shareholders perceive the firms as their

property and also firm's performance will affect their families' reputation and sta
in society (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985; and Fama and Jensen 1983a,b). In
addition, Casson (1999) supports the conclusion that family shareholders run the
firms as an asset to pass on to descendents rather than wealth to consume only for
their generation.
In Thailand, most family shareholders mostly control firms that belong to their
family or were established by their ancestors. Some of them use their family name
as the name of the firms, for example, Shinawatara Computer and Commumcation
Public Company Ltd., (Shinawatara Computer and Communication Public Company
Ltd., "belongs" to the Shinawatara family). Some corporations are named differently
to the owners' family name but these firms are still well known as "belonging" to a
family. For example, it is well known that Central Group "owned" by the Chiratiwat
family. In addition, Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) mention that Thai family-
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controlling shareholders have better information and knowledge associated with their
businesses. This is because they have had lengthy experience in the operation of
their businesses and they also have a close relationship with people in the top
management positions of the firm. In addition, Casson (1999) suggests that firms
controlled by family-ownership can invest more efficiently than those controlled by
nonfamily ownership. Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that family-controlled firms
should be more efficient than manager controlled firms because the costs of
monitoring are less in family-controlled firms. Wiwattakantung (2001), however,
argues that family ownership sometimes pays more attention to non-pecuniary
returns (such as social status of the family) than pecuniary returns. Also agency

costs possibly exist between family-controlling ownership and minority shareholders,

because family shareholders have the right to establish rules or policies to benefit
only themselves and their family members.
This study therefore attempts to examine the relationship between familycontrolling ownership and firm performance, and also whether firms with familycontrolling ownership have a higher performance than firms with non-controlling
ownership. A variable of individual or family-controlling ownership (FAMILY)

is defined as the percentage of shares (more than 25%), held by individual or family
shareholders. A dummy variable of FAMILY is set to be one for firms controlled by

individual or family-controlling shareholders, and zero for those controlled by noncontrolling shareholders. The percentage of shares held by the remaining top five

shareholders (having the same family name as the largest family shareholder) will be
combined as a single unit.
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Domestic-Corporation-Controlling Ownership
Domestic-corporation shareholders are the second largest type of shareholders
that control most Thai firms (between 1993-1996). With high concentrated
ownership in the firm, the domestic-corporation shareholders have a high incentive
for controlling management to maximize shareholders' wealth and firm performance.
However, it is possible that the interests of such controlling shareholders may
conflict with those of minority shareholders because they may run the business for
their own benefit. This study therefore, will examine the impact of domesticcorporation controlling ownership on firm performance, and also whether or not
firms with domestic-corporation controlling ownership have a higher performance
than those with non-controlling ownership. A variable of domestic-corporationscontrolling ownership (CORP) is defined as the percentage of shares (more than
25%> of outstanding shares), held by domestic-corporation shareholders. A dummy
variable of CORP is set to be one for firms controlled by domestic-corporationcontrolling shareholders, and zero for those controlled by non-controlling
shareholders.

Foreign-Controlling Ownership
Caves (1996) suggests that foreign firms usually possess specific advantages
such as advanced technologies and reputation. They can have a higher profit and
productivity than firms, which operate in a single domestic market. Shapiro (1980),
Gedajlovic (1998) and Fukao (1995) suggest that foreign firms in Canada have a
higher profit than those of their domestic counterparts. On the other hand,

Boardman et al. (1997) argue that it is difficult for foreign shareholders (who ope
their business from a distant geographic location) to control the behaviour of
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managers (who mostly o w n no stake in the firms). A s such, managers will have an
opportunity to pursue firm's resources for their own benefit and will result in
declining performance. The results of this relationship from previous studies,
however, are still unclear.
This study therefore will examine the relationship between foreign-controlling
ownership and firm performance, and also whether firms with foreign-controlling
ownership have a higher performance than firms with non-controlling ownership. A
variable of foreign-controlling ownership (FOREIGN) is defined as the percentage
of shares (more than 25%) held by foreign shareholders. A dummy variable of
FOREIGN is set to be one for firms controlled by foreign-controlling shareholders,
and zero for those controlled by non-controlling shareholders.

Bank Equity Ownership
In Thailand, banks provide a substantial proportion of capital for firms. There
exists a regulation that restricts banks from holding more than 10% of outstanding
shares in non-financial firms. Banks, however, still have the right to oversee the
firm's management, as they are funds providers. A number of studies (cf, Hoshi,
1990, 1991; Prowse, 1990, 1992, 1994; Aoki, 1994; Lichtenberg and Pushner, 1994;
Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Kang, 1997) suggest that firms with a bank relationship
have a higher investment than those without a bank relationship. Also, firms with a

bank relationship can renegotiate with the bank (their creditors) in a financial cr
more easily than firms without a bank relationship. On the other hand, Weinstein
and Yafeh (1998) argue that it is possible that firms with a bank relationship are
charged a higher rate of interest than what they are supposed to pay. Consequently
firms with a bank relationship may have lower profitability than firms with a non-
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bank relationship. Most studies regarding the relationship between bank ownership
and firm performance have been conducted in the case of Japanese firms. There has
been little concerned in the case of Thailand. This study therefore will examine
whether firms with bank equity ownership have a higher performance than those
with non-bank ownership. A dummy variable of bank equity ownership (BANK)
is set to be one for firms where bank equity shareholders are represented in the
ten shareholders, and zero for those with non-bank equity shareholders. (The
definition of bank equity ownership is adopted from Limpaphayom's 2001 study).
Additionally, Limpaphayom (2001) suggests that, in Thailand, shareholders are
mostly involved with the firm's management (managerial ownership). Such
shareholders attempt to shelter the firms' management from the influence of bank

ownership so that they can allocate funds (provided by the bank) to their prefere
(Limphapayom, 2001). As such, in this study, firms with bank equity ownership are
classified as (i) firms with bank-managerial ownership and (ii) firms with bank-

nonmanagerial ownership. This study therefore will investigate whether or not fir
with bank-managerial ownership or firms with bank-nonmanagerial ownership have

a higher performance than firms with non-bank equity ownership. In doing so, ther
is a need to set two dummy variables: (1) a dummy variable of bank-managerial
ownership (BANK*DIR) is set to be one for firms with bank-managerial ownership,
and zero for those with non-bank equity ownership and (2) a dummy variable of
bank-nonmanagerial ownership (BANK*NONDIR) is set to be one for firms with
bank-nonmanagerial ownership, and zero for those with non-bank equity ownership.
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5.4.3 Managerial Ownership
A number of studies have investigated the relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance. Some studies (cf, Jensen and Meckling, 1976;

Kesner, 1987; Kim et al., 1988) suggest that a high level of managerial ownership i
associated with high performance. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), however, argue that

there is no evidence to support such a relationship. The results from previous stud
are still inconclusive in this regard.
This study attempts to examine the relationship between managerial ownership
and firm performance, and whether or not firms with managerial ownership have a
higher performance than those with non-managerial ownership in the case of
Thailand. A variable of managerial ownership (DIR) is defined as the percentage
of shares held by members of the board of directors in a firm (this definition is
adopted from Morck et al's (1988) and Short and Keasy's (1999) studies. A dummy
variable DIR is set to be one for firms with managerial shareholders, and zero for
firms with non-managerial shareholders.
In addition, most of the previous studies (as discussed in Chapter 2 and 3)
have examined the relationship between managerial ownership and performance
using data from developed countries. This study, however, is attempting to look at
this relationship by using samples from Thailand where ownership structure is

different from those in the case of previous studies. That is, in Thailand, there e

a high level of family ownership, and the investigation in terms of the influence o
family shareholders (who involved with managerial ownership) on firm performance
is rare. Managerial ownership therefore is divided into two categories (i)
managerial-family ownership and (ii) managerial-non-managerial ownership. This
study aims to examine the relationship between managerial-family ownership,
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managerial-nonfamily ownership and firm performance. This study relies on its o w n
judgment in defining the managerial-family ownership and managerial-nonfamily
ownership (because little research has been done in this regard). A variable of
DIR*FAMILY is defined as the percentage of shares held by managerial
shareholders with at least two of them having the same family name. A dummy
variable of managerial-family ownership (DER*FAMILY) is set to be one for
firms with managerial-family ownership, and zero for firms with non-managerial
ownership. A variable of DIR*NONFAMILY is defined as the percentage of shares
held by managerial shareholders with none of them having the same family name. A
dummy variable of managerial-nonfamily ownership (DIR*NONFAMILY) is set
to be one for firms with managerial-nonfamily ownership, and zero for firms with
non-managerial ownership.

5.4.4 Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm
Performance
Recently, Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Short (1994)
and Short and Keasy (1999) suggest that the relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance is non-linear. That is, an opposite relationship
between managerial ownership and performance may exist at a certain level of
managerial ownership within the linear relationship (as discussed in chapter two
three). To examine the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and
firm performance, this study adopts the Short and Keasy's (1999) cubic model. By
using this model, the coefficients of the managerial ownership variables will be
allowed to determine their own turning points (these are the maximum and the
minimum points of managerial performance).
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The Short and Keasy's model is as follows:
Performance = a +p\ DIR + p2 DIR2 + 03 DIR3 + y Control Variables9
A variable DIR is defined as the percentage of shares held by members of the
board of directors, a variable DIR2 and DIR3 are defined as the square and the cube,
respectively, of the percentage of shares held by the members of the board of
directors.
In addition, managerial-family ownership (DER*FAMILY) and managerialnonfamily ownership (DIR*NONFAMILY) will also be examined for the nonlinear relationship. A variable of DIR*FAMILY is defined as the percentage of
shares held by managerial-family shareholders. A variable of DIR*FAMILY2 and a
DIR*FAMILY are defined as the square and the cube, respectively, of the
percentage of shares held by managerial-family shareholders. A variable of
DIR*NONFAMILY is defined as the percentage of shares held by managerialnonfamily shareholders. A variable of DIR*NONFAMILY2 and
DIR*NONFAMILY are defined as the square and the cube, respectively, of the
percentage of shares held by managerial-nonfamily shareholders. In order to test
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, control variables

that possibly can explain firm performance, particularly in the case of Thailand,
be adopted and presented in the following section.

5.5 Measurement of Control Variables
It is not only ownership structure, but also other factors, for example, firm

characteristics, that have been selected as control variables in this study. Seve

9

The control variables in Short and Keasy' (1999) model includes firm's sales, growth in sales, debt,
and research and development expenditure. A s this study examines the relationship in the case of
Thailand, some control variables will be adjusted based on the situation and the data of Thai firms.
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prior empirical and theoretical studies (e.g., Shapiro 1980; Sareewiwatthana and
Malone 1985; Kim et al. 1988; Chan et al., 1991; Leech and Leahy 1991; Fama and
French 1992; and Chui and Wei 1998; Short and Keasy 1999; Wiwattanakantung

1999, 2000) suggest that total risk, earnings-price, debt financing, a firm's size a
well as the age of the firm may have power to explain firm performance including

stock returns and profitability. In addition, relating the cross-sectional behaviour

firm performance to these variables (risk, earnings-price, debt, firm's size, and ag

firm), in the case of Thai market is limited. This study therefore adopts these cont
variables in order to examine whether they could explain firm performance (as

measured by the stock returns, the return on assets and the sales-to-asset) in the c
of Thailand. In doing so, a discussion on the characteristics and measurements of

these variables (1) total risk, (2) earnings-price ratio, (3) debt, (4) a firm's size
(5) the age of the firm are drawn in the following section.

5.5.1 Total Risk (RISK)
In general, total risk consists of systematic risk and unsystematic risk.

Systematic risk, which is generally measured by P (beta), is risk attributable to th
common macroeconomic factors, as for example, the business cycle, and the
inflation rate or exchange rate; and it cannot be diversified. In contrast, the

unsystematic risk is risk attributable to particular aspects, such as, firm-specific
unexpected news (e.g., industrial accident or approval of a patent, and it can be
eliminated by diversification (Sharpe et al., 1995, Bodie et al., 1999).
Sareewiwatthana and Malone (1985) have examined the relationship between
beta and average stock returns in the case of the Thai capital market between-19781982. They suggest that beta (systematic risk) is positively related to Thai stock
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returns within the period. W h e n beta is replaced by total risk (systematic and

unsystematic risk), it appears that total risk is more closely and significantly rela
to the average stock returns than the beta. In this regard, Sareewiwatthana and

Malone (1985) argue that it is possible that this is because of the Thai market is sm

and the investors may not hold diversified portfolios. In regard to profitability, it

widely known that risky firms (that have a high probability to default) may have less
profitability. Total risk (RISK) is measured as the standard deviation of return
(estimated three years prior to the study period).

5.5.2 Earnings-Price Ratio (E/P)
Several studies have discussed the relationship between the earnings-price ratio
and stock returns. Basu (1977), for example, concludes that the relationship between

E/P ratio and market returns is valid. That is, a high E/P is positively correlated t
risk-adjusted returns. Moreover, Kim et al. (1988) investigate such a relationship

and suggest that there is a positive relationship between market returns and earnings

price. Similarly, Jaffe et al. (1989) indicate that the E/P ratio is positively relat
average returns for both January and non-January effects between 1951-1986. In the

case of Thailand, little attention has been paid to E/P ratio as an explanatory varia
to predict a firm's performance. This study therefore employs E/P ratio to predict a

firm's performance. The E/P ratio is calculated by dividing the earnings per share at
the end of the year by the outstanding share prices.

5.5.3 Debt Financing (DEBT)
Debt has been included as a control variable to explain firm performance in
several previous studies (cf, Xu and Wong, 1999; Short and Keasy, 1999; and
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Wiwattanakantung, 2001). This study employs debt financing as one of the control
variables for the following reasons. First, according to Grossman and Hart (1982)
and Jensen (1986), debt is viewed as a positive signal of a firm's value and
management. That is, firms with debt are perceived that they have bound themselves

to achieve the level of adequate cash flows in order to meet the interest and princ

payments. Ross (1977) also suggests that debt is positively related to a firm's mar
value.
Secondly, outside investors in the market perceive that firms with debt
financing are the firms that had been evaluated closely on their management and
investment projects by banks. That is, the management and the projects of these

firms must be qualified (for example, their management is effective and their proje
have a high possibility of success), otherwise banks may not approve borrowing to
such firms. Even though banks have already provided the capital to these firms,

banks still need to investigate their clients' operations regularly (Grossman and H
1982). Stiglitz (1985) suggests that debt-holders, especially banks, can control
management behaviours more effectively than shareholders. In addition, Jensen

(1986) suggests that debt-holders, who play an important role in the borrowing firm
management, are conducive to increasing shares prices. Firms with debt, however,

may have low profits because of a high interest rate they have to pay for (Weinstein

and Yafeh, 1998). In this study, debt is defined as total liabilities over total ass
which is consistent with that used in Short and Keasy's (1999) study.

5.5.4 Size of Firm (SIZE)
A number of studies (such as Mueller, 1972; Basu, 1977; Leech and Leahy,
1991; and Short and Keasy, 1999) suggest that a firm's size is associated with
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performance. According to Short and Keasy (1999), large firms seem to have more
capacity to generate internal funds. As a result, they can avoid the financing

constraint situation and have greater opportunities in profitable projects. Narayan

(1988) argues that when firms' internal funds increase, the average quality of firm
to enter the market increases, and firms are able to extend production (Narayana
1988 and Leech and Leahy, 1991). Large firms also have more capacity to access
funds from external sources, as for example bank loans. That is, lenders normally
demand that the borrowers provide them with information. In this regard it appears

that large firms can provide greater information than small firms because large fir
tend to have better flow of information (Mueller, 1972 and Rajan and Zingales,
1995), and the cost of providing information in large firms is lower than in small
firms (Basu, 1977).
Mueller (1972), however, argues that if is possible that information that flows
within large firms may undergo and lose some content before it is transmitted to
management people, who are decision-makers and/or to people who have authority
in determining the policies of the firms. This aspect could affect those people in
decision-making such as in introducing new products and techniques of production.
According to Banz (1981), there is a strong negative relationship between

average returns and firm size. He notes that, on average, the common stocks of smal

firms have higher returns than large firms. In addition, Chui and Wei (1998) sugges

that the size effect is negative and significant to the expected returns in the eme
markets of five countries: Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand
between 1977-1993. Majumdar (1997) argues that, in the case of India, there is a

positive relationship between the size of a firm and profitability. Keim (1983), an

Han and Suk (1998), however, find no significant relationship between firm size and
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stock returns. To be consistent with Short and Keasy (1999), this study defines
firm's size as a logarithm of sales.

5.5.5 Age of Firm (AGE)
There is a view that a firm's age is intensively associated with firm
performance. Majumdar (1997), for example, argues that older firms in contrast to
younger firms will enjoy a superior performance resulting from long experience in
operating their businesses. In addition, Diamond (1991) suggests that older firms
normally have a long relationship with lenders. These older firms will take into the
consideration that their present actions as for example, behaviour in investment or
repayment, will affect their reputation and their repeated borrowing for higher

profitable projects in the future. As such, the lenders or banks will ensure that ol

firms will not allocate funds to unprofitable projects. This not only makes it easie
for the older firms to access the external funds, but also eliminates the need for
monitoring a firm's management from the lenders. This can mitigate agency costs
incurring from the divergence of interests of lenders and a firm's management. On
the other hand, Diamond (1991) suggests that the lenders may perceive young firms
or new borrowers as 'low rating borrowers' because these firms have less to lose if
they convey bad news to outsiders about, for example, their default in achieving
repayment.
Mueller (1972) argues that in the life cycle of a firm, the great degree of

uncertainty surrounding the early years of young firms makes it difficult for them t

raise capital from outside. At this stage, the interests between parties (e.g. owner
and managers) in_the young firms will coincide because they will have the same
objective in raising sufficient funds for supplying for their available investments
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innovation opportunities.

Consequently, agency costs decline and, hence, firm

performance increases. The age of a firm is defined as the logarithm of the number
of years the firms have been listed on the stock market. The summary description
and statistic of all variables are presented in Table 5.1 (A) and (B) respectively.
Table 5.1 (A)
T h e S u m m a r y of Description and Measurement of Variables
Variables

Description

Firm Performance Variables
ARi,t = A variable of the average rate of return of security i in
period t. It is defined as the average monthly return adjusted
for stock dividends.
AMRj,t = A variable of the average market-adjusted return on security
i in period t. It is defined as the average monthly rate of
return (Ri>t) adjusted for stock market index.
ROAiit = A variable of the return on assets of securities i in period t.
It is defined as earnings before interest and income taxes
expense (EBIT) divided by the average total asset.
S/A;,t = A variable of the sales-to-asset of security i in period t. It is
defined as total sales divided by the average total asset.
Ownership Variables
Controlown,-,, = A variable of controlling ownership of security / in period t.
It is defined as the percentage of shares (more than 25%) of
outstanding shares) held by the largest shareholder, and a
d u m m y variable of the controlling ownership. It is set to be
one for firms controlled by controlling shareholders, and
zero for those controlled by non-controlling shareholders.
FAMILY,,, = A variable of individual or family-controlling ownership of
security i in period t. It is defined as the percentage of
shares ( > 2 5 % of outstanding shares) held by individual or
family shareholders, and a d u m m y variable of individual or
family-controlling ownership. It is set to be one for firms
controlled by individual or family-controlling shareholders,
and zero for those controlled by non-controlling
shareholders.
(Table Continues)
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Table 5.1 (A)
T h e S u m m a r y of Description and Measurement of Variables (Continued)
Variables

Description

Ownership Variables
CORP,-,, = A variable of domestic-corporations-controlling ownership
of security i in period t. It is defined as the percentage of
shares (more than 2 5 % of outstanding shares) held by the
domestic-corporation shareholder, and a d u m m y variable of
domestic-corporation-controlling ownership. It is set to be
one for firms controlled by domestic-corporationcontrolling shareholders, and zero for those controlled by
non-controlling shareholders.
FOREIGN,,, = A variable of foreign-controlling ownership of security i in
period t. It is defined as the percentage of shares (more than
2 5 % of outstanding shares) held by the foreign shareholder,
and a d u m m y variable of foreign-controlling ownership. It
is set to be one for firms controlled by foreign-controlling
shareholders, and zero for those controlled by noncontrolling shareholders.
BANK,-,, = A dummy variable of bank equity ownership of security i in
period t. It is set to be one for the firms where bank equity
shareholders are represented in the top ten shareholders, and
zero for those with non-bank equity shareholders.
BANK*DIRjr, = A dummy variable of bank-managerial ownership of
security i in period t. It is set to be one for the firms with
bank-managerial ownership, and zero for those with nonbank equity ownership.
BANK*NONDIR,,, = A dummy variable of bank-non-managerial ownership of
security i in period t. It is set to be one for the firms with
bank-non-managerial ownership, and zero for those with
non-bank ownership.
DIR,,, = A variable of managerial ownership of security i in period t.
It is defined as the percentage of shares held by the
members of the board of directors, and a d u m m y variable of
managerial ownership of securities i in period t. It is set to
be one for the firms with managerial shareholders, and zero
for thefirmswith non-managerial shareholders.
(Table Continues)
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Table 5.1 (A)
T h e S u m m a r y of Description and Measurement of Variables (Continued)
Variables

Description

Ownership Variables
DIR2,.(

A variable of managerial ownership square of security
i in period t. It is defined as the square of the
percentage of shares held by the members of the board
of directors.

DIR3,,

A variable of managerial ownership cube of security i
in period t. It is defined as the cube of the percentage
of shares held by the members of the board of
directors.

DIR*FAMILY;,,

A variable of managerial-family ownership of security
i in period t. It is defined as the percentage of shares
held by managerial shareholders with at least two of
them having the same family name, and a d u m m y
variable of managerial-family ownership of securities
i in period t. It is set to be one for the firms with
managerial-family ownership, and zero for the firms
with non-managerial ownership.

DJR*FAMJLY2,-,

A variable of managerial-family ownership square of
security /* in period t. It is defined as the square of the
percentage of shares held by managerial shareholders
with at least two of them having the same family
name.

DIR*FAMILY3U

A variable of managerial-family ownership cube of
security i in period t. It is defined as the cube of the
percentage of shares held by managerial shareholders
with at least two of them having the same family
name.

DIR*NONFAMILY / ,,

A variable of managerial-nonfamily ownership of
security i in period t. It is defined as the percentage of
shares held by managerial shareholders with none of
them having the same family name, and a d u m m y
variable of managerial-nonfamily ownership of
security i in period t. It is set to be one for the firms
that have managerial-nonfamily ownership, and zero
for thefirmsthat have non-managerial ownership.
(Table Continues)
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Table 5.1 (A)
T h e S u m m a r y of Description and Measurement of Variables (Continued)
Variables

Description

Ownership Variable
DIR*NONFAMILY2,,

DIR*NONFAMILY 3 ,,,

A variable of managerial-nonfamily ownership square of
security i in period t. It is defined as the square of the
percentage of shares held by managerial shareholders with
none of them having the same family name.
=

A variable of managerial-nonfamily ownership cube of
security i in period t. It is defined as the cube of the
percentage of shares held by managerial shareholders with
none of them having the same family name.

Control Variables
RISK,,,

Total risk of securities i in period t. It is defined as the
standard deviation of stock returns.

Earnings-price of security i in period t. It is defined as
earnings per share at the end of the year divided by
outstanding share prices.
SIZE;,,

Size of securities i in period t. It is defined as the log
of sales.

AGEU

Age of securities i in period t. It is defined as the numb
years sincefirmswere set up.

S;,r

=

a random error of security i in period t.
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Table 5.1 (B)
The S u m m a r y Statistics for Variables (1993-1996)
Mean

Median

Standard

Maximum

Minimum

Deviation

Performance Measure (%)
AR

3.3

2

8.1

59

-58

AMR

5.5

4

7.6

59

-14

ROA

8.2

9

11.1

73

-16

S/A

75

61

63.8

47

15.5

Controlling Ownership

37.2

33

10.9

70

25

Family

33.8

33

10

70

25

Domestic-Corporation

30.68

30

9.14

65

25

Foreign

30

37

10

65

25

Bank

5.8

6

2.5

10

1

Non-Controlling Ownership

15.33

16

5

24

4

DIR

18.4

16.5

13

61

5

DIR*FAM

35.7

36

13

65

11

DIR*NONFAM

18.4

16.5

13

60

5

Risk

13.8

11

12.1

59

1.5

E/P

5.4

5

11.3

60

-81

Debt

53.9

54

22.3

55

12

Size (sale/ million baht)

2,136.7

1,110.1

3,071.3

2,0992

3.6

Age (years)

20.5

18

11.4

67

10

Ownership (%)

Control Variables (%)
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5.6 Development of Hypotheses
Discussion of the relationship between ownership structure, including
selected characteristics of firms, and firm performance that has been reviewed from
the findings and contentious of previous research contributes to this study in
developing the hypotheses as follows:

Controlling Ownership Hypotheses
H01 There is no relationship between controlling ownership and firm
performance.
Hi There is a significant relationship between controlling ownership and
firm performance.
HIA Firms with controlling ownership perform significantly higher than
those with non-controlling ownership.
HIB There is a significant relationship between family-controlling
ownership and firm performance.
Hie There is a significant relationship between domestic-corporationcontrolling ownership and firm performance.
HID There is a significant relationship between foreign-controlling
ownership and firm performance.
HIE Firms with family-controlling ownership perform significantly higher
than those with non- controlling ownership.
HIF Firms with domestic-corporation-controlling ownership perform
significantly higher than those with non-controlling ownership.
HIG Firms with foreign-controlling ownership perform significantly
higher than those with non-controlling ownership.

B a n k equity Ownership Hypotheses
H02 Firms with bank equity ownership do not perform higher than those
with non-bank equity ownership.
H2 Firms with bank equity ownership perform significantly higher than
those with non-bank equity ownership.
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Firms with bank-managerial ownership perform significantly higher
than those with non-bank equity ownership.

H2B Firms with bank-non-managerial ownership perform significantly
higher than those with non-bank equity ownership.

Managerial Ownership Hypotheses
H03 There is no relationship between managerial ownership and firm
performance.
H3 There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership and
firm performance.
H3A Firms with managerial ownership perform significantly higher than
those with non-managerial ownership.
H3B There is a significant relationship between managerial-family
ownership and firm performance.
H3C There is a significant relationship between managerial-nonfamily
ownership and firm performance.
H3D Firms with managerial-family ownership perform significantly higher
than those with non-managerial ownership.
H3E Firms with managerial-nonfamily ownership perform significantly
higher than non-managerial ownership.

Non-Linear Relationship Hypotheses
H04 There is no non-linear relationship between managerial ownership
and firm performance.
H4 There is a significant non-linear relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance.
H4A There is a significant non-linear relationship between managerialfamily ownership and firm performance.

H4B

There is a significant non-linear relationship between managerialnonfamily ownership and firm performance.
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To test these hypotheses, the multivariate regression models to be tested are
shown as follows.

5.6.1 Controlling Ownership Hypotheses Testing
Controlling Ownership and Firm Performance Testing: (Hi and HIA)
= Pocont+

YCOnt

PicontControlown,-,, + p2comRISK,-,, + p3co„tE/Pu + p4contDEBTu

(Performance)

+ p5contsrZE„ + p6comAGE,, + s,,

(1)

Controlling Ownership Categories and Firm Performance Testing:(HlB- HIG)
Yfam

=

Pofam + PlfiunFAMILY,,, + p2faroRISK,-,, + P3famE/PU + p4famDEBT,,, +

(Performance)

YCorp

=

P»««P

+

=

(2)

PlcorpCORP,-,, + p2cotpRISK,-,, + PfcorpE/P;,, + P4corpDEBT,, +

(Performance)

Yfor

p5famSIZE,, + p 6fem AGE,, + e,,

p5corpSIZE„ + p6coipAGE,r + eu

(3)

Pofa + PlforFOREIGN,,, + p2forRISK;,, + P3forE/P,-, + P4forDEBT,-,, +

(Performance)

Ytype

=

p5forSIZE,,, + p6forAGE,, + su

(4)

Po^pe + P,typeFAMILY,, + p2typeCORP,,, +p3typeFOREIGN,-,, +

(Performance)

p 4type RISK u + p5tyPeE/Pu + p 6 t y p e DEBT u + p7typeSIZEu + P g ^ C E , ,

5.6.2 Bank equity Ownership Hypotheses Testing
Bank equity Ownership, Non-Bank equity Ownership and Firm Performance
Testing: (Hj)
Ybnk

=

Pobnk + PibnkBANK,-., + p2bnkRISK,-,, + PabnkE/P,,, + p4bnkDEBT,-,, +
(Performance)

P^SIZE,, + p 6 b n k AGE„ + s,,

(6)

Bank-Managerial Ownership, Bank-Non-Managerial Ownership and Firm
Performance Testing (H2A and H2B)
Ybnkd = Pobnkd+ p,bnkdBANK*DIR,-,, + p2bnkdBANK*NONDIR,, +
(Performance)

p3bnkdRISK,-,, + p4bnkdE/P,-,, + p5bnkdDEBT,-., + p^dSIZE,-,, +
P ^ d A G E ^ + e,-,,

O)
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5.6.3 Managerial Ownership Hypotheses Testing
Managerial Ownership, Managerial-Family Ownership, Managerial-Nonfamily
Ownership and Firm Performance Testing (H3,

p od + PidDIR,-., + p2dRISK,.,, + p3dE/P,,, + P^DEBT,, + p 5d SrZE u +

Yd
(Performance)

Y df

H3A-H3E)

p 6d AGE,, + e u

=

(Performance)

(8)

Podf + pidPIR*FAMILY,,, + p2diRISK,, + p3dfE/Pu + p4dfDEBT,,, +
p5dfSIZE,-,, + pedfAGE;,, + Eu

(9)

Podnf + pIdnfDIR*NONFAMILY,-,, + p2dnfRISK,, + p3dnfE/P,, +

Ydnf
(Performance)

P.dnfDEBT;, + PsdnfSIZE,-., + PsdnfAGE;,, + s,,,

(10)

Podir+ pi d i r DIR*FAMILY u + p 2dir DIR*NONFAMILY,, + f33dirRISK,,

Ydir
(Performance)

+ p4dirE/Pu+ p5dirDEBT,, + PsdirSIZE,, + p 7 d i r AGE u + s ,,

(11)

5.6.4 The Non-Linear Relationship Hypotheses Testing
The

Non-Linear

Relationship Between

Managerial

Ownership

and

Firm

Performance (H4)
p0n, + P,„,DIR,, + p2nl DIR2,, + p3n,DIR3„ + p4nlRISK„ + p5niE/P,-,,+

Y nl
(Performance)

p 6nl DEBT,, + p7nlSIZE,-,, + p 8 n iAGE u + eu

(12)

The Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial-Family Ownership and Firm
Performance (H4A)

Y n lf
(Performance)

=

Ponif

+

Pi„ifDIR*FAMILY!-,,

+

p 2nlf DIR*FAMILY 2 ,,

+

3

p 3nlf DIR*FAMILY ,, + p4nifRISK„ + p5nifE/P,, + P6„ifDEBT„ +
p7nl{SIZE,£ + p8nlfAGE;,( + eu

(13)
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Non-Linear

Relationship between Managerial-Nonfamily

Ownership

and

Firm

Performance (H4B)
Yrfnf = Pomnf + P,nln^>IR*NONFAMILYu + |W)IR*NON*FAMILY2,,, +
(Performance)

p 3nlnf DIR*NONFAMILY 3 ,,, + p 4nlnf RISK u + p5nlnfE/P,-,, + p6nlnfDEBT,-,, +
P7nlnfSIZE,, + p8nlnfAGE,-,, + e,,

C

The results of an analysis examining the relationship between ownership
structures, control variables associated with firm performance (1993-1996) based on
these models will be presented in the next chapter.

5.7 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has presented the data and methodology used to examine the
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the case of

Thailand. It begins with, first, a discussion of sample data and the statistical met
for an analysis. Secondly, firm performance, including the market-based and the
accounting-based measures is presented. The market-based measures are represented
by the stock returns, including the average stock returns and the market-adjusted
returns. The accounting-based measures are represented by profitability, including
the return on assets ratio and the sales-to-asset ratio.
Thirdly, the characteristics of controlling ownership are discussed. The

controlling ownership in this study is defined as the percentage of shares (more tha
25%>) held by the largest shareholder in the firm. This definition was also used in
Wiwattanakantung's (2001) study, in the case of Thailand. Moreover, the
controlling ownership in Thailand was classified, based on the major types of
ownership as (1) individual or family, (2) domestic-corporation and (3) foreign
investor. The effect of controlling ownership, including its categories, on firm
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performance will be examined. A s well, the performance of firms they control will
be compared with those with non-controlling ownership.
The definition of bank equity ownership and its measurement are illustrated.
The effect of bank ownership on firm performance, and comparison of performance
between firms with bank ownership and those with non-bank equity ownership is
focused on. In order to examine whether or not managerial shareholders in the firm

make it difficult for banks to use their influence on a firm's management, firms wit
bank equity ownership were categorized as (i) firms with bank-managerial ownership
and (ii) firms with bank-nonmanagerial ownership. The difference of performance
between these two categorizes and firms with non-bank equity ownership will be
examined.
Fourthly, there is a discussion on the definition of managerial ownership. Its
measurement is also presented. The effect of managerial ownership on firm
performance, and whether or not firms with managerial ownership have a superior
performance than firms with non-managerial ownership is discussed. To capture the
influence of family shareholders (who are involved in the firm's management) on
firm performance, the managerial ownership was categorized into (i) managerialfamily ownership, and (ii) managerial-nonfamily ownership. Their firm performance
is compared with that of non-managerial ownership.
Finally, the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership, including
managerial-family ownership and managerial-nonfamily ownership, and firm
performance is discussed. In order to examine this relationship, Short and Keasy's
(1999) model is adopted in this study. However, some control variables are adjusted
to order to suit the case of Thailand. Such control variables have been drawn from
the literature suggesting that they have an explanatory power to determine firm
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performance. The control variables in this study are totalrisk,earnings-price, debt, a
firm's size, and a firm's age. The results of the relationship between ownership
structure, and control variables associated with firm performance (between 19931996) will be presented in the following chapters.

Chapter 6

Empirical Findings I

6.1. Introduction
As stated earlier, this study aims to examine the relationship between
ownership structure and firm performance in the case of Thailand between 19931996. In Chapter 5, data and the methodology of the analysis, including variables,
development of hypotheses and regression models to be tested have been presented.
The results of the analysis regarding the effect of ownership structure and firm

performance are then presented in this chapter. The organization of this chapter is a
follows. First, the results of the univariate analysis are presented. Secondly, there

an elaboration of the results of the multivariate analysis in terms of (i) the effect
controlling ownership on firm performance, (ii) the relationship between different

categories of controlling ownership and firm performance, (iii) the influence of bank
ownership on firm performance, and (iv) the association of managerial ownership
and firm performance. Thirdly, the results of a non-linear relationship between
managerial ownership, including managerial-family ownership, managerialnonfamily ownership, and firm performance are presented. Finally, a summary and
conclusions are shown.
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6.2 Univariate Analysis
This section presents the results of the univariate analysis of the relationship
between ownership structure and firm performance. This analysis is conducted by
comparing the performance between (i) firms with controlling ownership (including
controlling ownership categories) and firms with non-controlling ownership, (ii)
firms with bank ownership and firms with non-bank ownership, (iii) firms with
managerial ownership and firms with non-managerial ownership.

6.2.1 The Comparison between Performance of Firms with Controlling
Ownership and Non-Controlling Ownership
The results of the comparison of performance between firms with controlling
ownership, including controlling ownership categories, and firms with noncontrolling ownership are presented. The significant levels of the comparison refer
to difference of mean values of performance (tested by t-test) between firms with
controlling ownership, controlling ownership categories, and firms with noncontrolling ownership. Table 6.1 shows that the mean value of performance
(average returns, market-adjusted returns, ROA and S/A), of firms with controlling
ownership is higher than those of firms with non-controlling ownership. They are
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Moreover, Table 6.1
illustrates the results of comparison between the performance of firms with each of
the controlling ownership categories (family, domestic-corporation and foreign
ownership) and firms with non-controlling ownership. It is found that firms with

family-controlling ownership have a higher performance (in terms of average returns,
ROA and S/A) than firms with non-controlling ownership. They are significant at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Firms with domestic-corporation-controlling
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ownership have greater profitability (both R O A and S/A) than firms with noncontrolling ownership. They are significant at the 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Firms with foreign-controlling ownership perform significantly higher than firms

with non-controlling ownership. It is significant at the 10% level for the average

returns, at the 5% level for the market-adjusted returns, and at the 1% level of th

profitability (ROA and S/A). Regarding the performance of firms with bank equity

ownership and firms without bank equity ownership, the results in Table 6.1 show
that firms with bank ownership perform significantly lower for market-adjusted
returns than firms without bank ownership at the 10% level.
Table 6.1
The Comparison of Performance between Firms with Controlling Ownership
and Non-Controlling Ownership between 1993-1996
Ownership Variables
Average Returns
(AR)

Performance Measures
Market-Adjusted
Return on
Returns
Assets
(AMR)
(ROA)

Sales-to-Asset
(S/A)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

0.033
(0.079)

0.054
(0.074)

0.093
(0.092)

0.75
(0.64)

Firms with Controlling Ownership

0.039*
(0.078)

0.058
(0.073)

0.091**
(0.086)

0.84***
(0.72)

Individual or Family
Controlling Ownership

0.04*
(0.083)

0.055
(0.083)

0.096**
(0.092)

0.80***
(0.70)

Domestic-Corporation
Controlling Ownership

0.032
(0.088)

0.061
(0.07)

0.093**
(0.059)

0.96***
(0.83)

Foreign Controlling
Ownership

0.046*
(0.071)

0.068**
(0.071)

0.10***
(0.H)

0.88***
(0.49)

Non-Controlling Ownership

0.028
(0.08)

0.05
(0.074)

0.067
(0.067)

0.62
(0.47)

Bank Equity Ownership

0.050
(0.12)

0.069***
(0.12)

0.090
(0.095)

0.72
(0.53)

Non-Bank Equity Ownership

0.032
(0.084)

0.17
(0.22)

0.074
(0.19)

0.67
(0.66)

All Firm

Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
* Indicate statistically significance at the 1 0 % level.
** Indicate statistically significance at the 5 % level.
*** Indicate statistically significance at the 1 % level.
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Overall, the results from univariate analysis confirm that firms with
controlling ownership, especially family-controlling ownership and foreigncontrolling ownership, perform greater than firms with non-controlling ownership.
Firms with bank ownership, however, do not perform differently to those with nonbank ownership. In fact, they have lower market-adjusted returns than firms with
non-bank ownership.

6.2.2 The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Performance
Table 6.2 presents the results of comparison between the performance of
firms with managerial ownership and firms with non-managerial ownership. The
performance of firms with managerial-family ownership and managerial-nonfamily
ownership is also compared to those with non-managerial ownership. The
significant levels of the comparison refer to the difference of mean values of
performance between managerial ownership (including managerial-family ownership
and managerial nonfamily ownership) and firms with non-managerial ownership.
Table 6.2 shows that firms with managerial ownership perform significantly lower
(in terms of the ROA) than those with non-managerial ownership at the 10% level.
Table 6.2 also shows that firms with managerial-nonfamily ownership have a lower
performance regarding market-adjusted returns, ROA and S/A than firms with nonmanagerial ownership, and they are significant at the 10% level. The difference
between the performance of firms with managerial-family ownership and firms with
non-managerial ownership however, is not significant. In sum, this study suggests
that firms with managerial ownership, particularly managerial-nonfamily ownership
have a lower performance than firms with non-managerial ownership, while the
performance of firms with managerial-family ownership and those with nonmanagerial ownership is not significantly different.
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Table 6.2
The Comparison of Performance between Firms with Managerial Ownership
and Non-Managerial Ownership between 1993-1996
Performance Measures
Ownership Variables

Managerial Ownership

-Managerial*Family Ownership

-Managerial *Nonfamily
Ownership

Non-Managerial Ownership

Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-toAsset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

0.030
(0.076)

0.051
(0.071)

0.075*
(0.12)

0.74
(0.63)

0.033
(0.077)

0.054
(0.073)

0.085
(0.094)

0.72
(0.62)

0.024

0.046**

0.061**

0.66**

(0.074)

(0.067)

(0.15)

(0.51)

0.035
(0.081)

0.058
(0.072)

0.089
(0.78)

0.79
(0.67)

Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
* Indicate statistically significance at the 1 0 % level.
** Indicate statistically significance at the 5 % level.
*** Indicate statistically significance at the 1 % level.

6.3 Multivariate Analyses Results
Multivariate analysis is applied in this study to examine the relationship
between ownership structure and firm performance by controlling the other firm's
characteristics, such as total risk, earnings-price, debt, size and age. Before

conducting the multivariate analyses, the multicollinearity condition is tested. It
well known that the multicollinearity is an intercorrelation of the independent

variables or a condition that exists when the independent variables are significant

correlated with one another. If the multicollinearity condition exists, the variance
some of the estimated regression coefficients may become large. This can crucially
create an unstable and mislead estimation of the regression model. The preferred

method of assessing multicollinearity is to regress each independent on all the oth
independent variables in the model (Ramanathan, 1992 ;Yu, 2002). This study
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therefore operates the multicollinearity assumption in order to ensure that the
independent variables included in this study (ownership structure, total risk,

earnings-price, debt, the firm's size and age) do not have a significant correlation th
could affect the estimation of the analysis. The correlation coefficients and the
significant levels of the independent variables are illustrated in Appendix H-l. The

correlation coefficients of the independent variables are not found to be significantly
correlated with each other. Even though some of them are significant, the correlation
coefficients are very small. In addition, this study tests for the homoscadasticity
assumption, which is a necessary condition for regression. Homoscadasticity is a
condition that the variances of the residual of regression are constant. When the
residuals are homoscedastic, the data points will spread constantly to the regression

line. In contrast, if the data points spread far away from the line, the error terms are
not constant, or so-called heterscedastic. The presence of heterscedasticity means the
errors are drawn from different distributions for different values of the independent
variables. This causes any significant value of regressions to be invalid. The results
(in Appendix H-2) show that the variances of the residual terms are constant. This

study therefore certainly applies those selected independent variables in the analysis.
This section therefore is set out as follows: first, the effect of controlling
ownership, including controlling ownership categories, on firm performance is
presented. Secondly, there is an elaboration of the impact of bank ownership on firm
performance. Thirdly, there is an illustration of the association between managerial
ownership and corporate performance. Finally, a non-linear relationship of
managerial ownership and firm performance is presented.
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6.3.1 T h e Relationship between Controlling Ownership and Firm Performance
This section is divided into two parts: first part presents the effect of
controlling ownership and firm performance, and second part shows the impact of
three controlling ownership categories (family, domestic-corporation and foreign
ownership) on corporate performance.

6.3.1.1 The Effect of Controlling Ownership on Firm Performance
This section presents the effect of controlling ownership on firm performance
and the comparison between performance of firms with controlling ownership and
those with non-controlling ownership. The effect of controlling ownership on firm
performance is captured by the controlling ownership variable [indicating the
percentage of shares (> 25%) held by the largest shareholder]. After controlling for
other effects by control variables, Table 6.3, columns (a) and (b), show that the
estimated coefficients of controlling ownership (Controlown) are positive and
significant at the 10% level to the average returns and the market-adjusted returns.
Moreover, columns (c) and (d) illustrate that the coefficients of controlling
ownership are positively related to ROA at the 1% level and to S/A at the 10% level.
Furthermore, the difference between the performance of firms with
controlling ownership and firms with non-controlling ownership is reported in Table
6.4. It is captured by the dummy variable of controlling ownership (indicating

whether or not firms are controlled by controlling shareholders). The results in Tabl
6.4, columns (a) and (b) indicate that the coefficients of controlling ownership are
positive and significant to the market-based and accounting-based measures at the
5% and 1% levels respectively.
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The results of this study regarding the effect of controlling ownership on firm
performance and the comparison of performance between firms with controlling
ownership and firms with non-controlling ownership are consistent with those found
in the univariate analysis. This study accepts the hypotheses Hi and HiA because the
controlling ownership has a positive relationship to the market returns and the
profitability in Thailand during 1993-1996. The results show that a percentage point

increases in controlling ownership is associated with about 0.06% in average returns,
0.064% in the market-adjusted returns, 0.07% in ROA and 0.28% in S/A. As well,
firms with controlling ownership perform 1.1% (for average returns), 1.4% (for
market-adjusted returns), 1.8% (for ROA) and 1.9% (for S/A) greater than firms with

non-controlling ownership. The results of this study are consistent with those of, fo
example, Xu and Wong (1999) and Wiwattanakantung (2001), who suggest that the

controlling shareholders are associated with a higher firm's profitability and a fir
market value (as measured by Tobin's Q).

6.3.1.2 The Influence of Controlling Ownership Categories on Firm
Performance
This section presents the empirical results of the influence of controlling
ownership categories (family, domestic-corporation, and foreign ownership) on firm
performance. The influence of these controlling ownership categories on firm
performance is captured by the variables of FAMILY, COPR and FOREIGN
[indicating the percentage of shares (>25%) held by family, domestic-corporation or
foreign shareholders respectively].

149

Chapter 6: Empirical Findings I

Table 6.3
The Effect of Controlling Ownership on Firm Performance (1993-1996)
This table presents the results of the effect of controlling ownership and firm performance. Firm performance in columns (a)
and (b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) show the
profitability ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). T h e effect of controlling ownership on firm performance is
captured by the controlling ownership variable (Controlown) indicating the percentage of shares (>25%) held by the largest
shareholders. The Mest is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(d)

RISK

0.002***
(5.7)

0.002***
(6.5)

0.004
(0.13)

-0.005***
(-2-9)

E/P

0.05***
(2.35)

0.05***
(3.32)

0.07***
(4.15)

-0.24
(-1.65)

DEBT

-0.03*
(-2.0)

-0.033*
(-1.94)

-0 13***
(-6.46)

-0.62***
(-3.78)

SIZE

0.03***
(4.48)

0.028***
(4.43)

0.05***
(6.15)

0.68***
(10.9)

AGE

0.002
(0-2)

0.019**
(2.1)

-0.03
(-0.25)

0.13***
(2.58)

Controlown

0.06**
(2.14)

0.064**
(2-4)

0.070***
(2.84)

0.28*
(2.10)

Intercept

-0.08***
(-3.53)

-0.07***
(-3.3)

-0.0057
(-0.25)

-0.91***
(-7.47)

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

0.16
13.04***

0.18
18.21***

0.21
21.84***

0.20
44.92***

(S/A)

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Table 6.4
The Comparison of Performance between Firms with Controlling Ownership
and Firms with Non-Controlling Ownership (1993-1996)
This table presents the results of the comparison between performance of firms with controlling ownership and firms with noncontrolling ownership. Firm performance in columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R =
market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) are the profitability ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The
comparison between the performance offirmswith controlling ownership andfirmswith non-controlling ownership is captured
by the d u m m y variable of controlling ownership (Controlown) indicating whether firms are controlled by controlling
shareholders. The Mest is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)

(S/A)

(b)

(ROA)
(c)

RISK

0.002***
(9.3)

0.002***
(10.33

-0.004
(-0.15)

-0.004**
(-2.8)

E/P

0.01***
(2.38)

0.013***
(2.43

0.014**
(2.4)

-0.03
(-0.87)

DEBT

-0.02***
(-2.03)

-0.04***
(-2.43

-0.16***
(-9.95)

-0.25***
(-2.82)

SIZE

0.025***
(4.76)

0.024***
(5.0)

0.049***
(7.28)

0.50***
(13.47)

AGE

0.0041
(0.11)

0.022***
(3.22)

0.0055
(0.50)

0.15**
(2.43)

Controlown

0.011**
(2-4)

0.014**
(2.5)

0.018***
(2.58)

0.19***
(4.84)

Intercept

-0.06***
(-4.38)

-0.053***
(-4.04)

0.0031
(0.15)

-0.85***
(-7.2)

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

0.15
23.72***

0.14
30.54***

0.18
27.42***

0.20
46.04***

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.

(d)
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Table 6.5 reports that the coefficient of F A M I L Y

(family controlling-

ownership) is positive and significant to the average returns at the 10% level. It is,
however, insignificant to the market-adjusted returns. Moreover, the results show
that the coefficients of CORP (domestic-corporation-controlling ownership) are
positive and insignificant, while those of FOREIGN (foreign controlling-ownership)
are negative and insignificant to both average returns and market-adjusted returns.
Based on the profitability measures, Table 6.6 shows that the coefficients of
FAMILY are positively related to the ROA and the S/A, and they are significant at
the 5% level. The coefficients of CORP and those of FOREIGN, however, are
insignificantly related to the profitability.
From the results presented, this study accepts the hypothesis HIB as family-

controlling ownership has a strong positive relationship to the market returns and th

profitability. That is, with an additional family-controlling ownership of 1% average
returns, ROA and S/A will increase by 0.07%, 0.11% and 1.32% respectively. The
hypotheses Hie and HID, however, are rejected. This is because the relationship
between domestic-corporation-controlling ownership or foreign-controlling
ownership and firm performance are not statistically significant.
The results of this study are consistent with those of DeAngelo and DeAngelo
(1985); Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) who suggest that family shareholders tend to
have a high incentive to maximize firm performance because most family
shareholders will control firms that belong to their own family (which commonly
were established by their ancestors). Family shareholders also have information
advantages on firm performance compared to the other types of shareholders because

of their large stakes and close relationship with those in senior managerial positions
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Table 6.5
The Effect of Controlling Ownership Categories on Stock Returns (1993-1996)

This table presents the results of the effect of controlling ownership categories on the market returns (AR= average returns and
A M R = market-adjusted returns). T h e controlling ownership categories include individual or family, domestic-corporations
and foreign ownership. The effect of controlling ownership categories on firm performance is captured by the F A M I L Y , C O R P
and F O R E I G N variables. These variables indicate the percentage of shares (>25%) held by family, domestic-corporation or
foreign shareholders categories respectively. The Mest is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Average
Returns

(AR)
(a)

MarketAdjusted
Returns
(AMR)
(b)

0.003***
(8.92)

Average
Returns

(AR)
(c)

MarketAdjusted
Returns
(AMR)
(d)

(AR)
(e)

MarketAdjusted
Returns
(AMR)
(f)

0.003***
(10.75)

0.003***
(8.56)

0.003***
(9.04)

0.003***
(7.1)

0.003***
(7.4)

0.021*
(1.95)

0.022*
(2.22)

0.01*
(1.88)

0.01
(1.96

0.07
(1.62)

0.072*
(1.74)

DEBT

-0.024**
(-1.12)

-0.04*
(-1.17)

-0.02
(-0.85)

-0.025
(-1.02

-0.07
(-1.46)

-0.11**
(-2.3)

SIZE

0.023**
(2.44)

0.024***
(2.7)

0.012
(1.50)

0.017
(1.68

0.03*
(1.97)

0.033**
(2.21)

AGE

-0.024
(-1.57)

0.02
(1.61)

-0.01
(-0.8)

0.028
(2.2

0.01
(0.58)

0.03*
(1.72)

FAMILY

0.07*
(1.50)

0.058
(1.30)
0.036
(1.10)

0.018
(1.11)
-0.03
(-.064)

-0.028
(-0.6)

RISK

E/P

CORP

FOREIGN

Intercept

-0.055*
(-1.72)

-0.060**
(-2.08)

-0.043
-1.47

-0.04
(-1.54)

-0.064
(-1.50)

-0.053
(-1.33)

Adjusted R-Squaxed
F-statistic

0.36
27.28***

0.44
38.27***

0.53
23.15***

0.58
28.11***

0.42
11.88***

0.47
14 24***

* Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Table 6.6
The Effect of Controlling Ownership Categories on Profitability (1993-1996)

This table presents the results of the effect of controlling ownership categories on the profitability (ROA= return on assets an
S/A= sales-to-asset). T h e controlling ownership categories include individual or family, domestic-corporation and foreign
ownership. T h e effect of controlling ownership categories on firm performance is captured by the F A M I L Y , C O R P and
F O R E I G N variables. These variables indicate the percentage of shares (>25%) held by family, domestic-corporations or
foreign shareholders. The r-test is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Return on
Assets

Sales-toAsset

Return on
Assets

Sales-toAsset

Return on
Assets

Sales-toAsset

(ROA)
(a)

(S/A)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

(ROA)
(e)

(S/A)
(f>

RISK

-0.001
(-0.58)

-0.006**
(-2.61)

-0.003
(-0.14

0.02
(0.45)

0.04
(0.56)

0.003
(1.10)

E/P

0.03*
(1.94)

-0.19
(-1.62)

0.24***
(3.89)

1.17
(1.2)

0.23**
(2.72)

0.45
(1.47)

DEBT

-0 2***
(-6.52)

-0.66***
(-3.32)

-0.06**
(-2.36)

0.65
(1.43)

-0.03
(-0.4)

0.15
(0.46)

SIZE

0.061***
(4.22)

0.62***
(7.52)

0 Q2***
(1.56)

-0.27
(-1.46)

0.026*
(1.0)

0.55***
(4.97)

AGE

-0.041**
(-2.38)

-0.17
(-1.20)

0.015
(1.01)

0.56**
(2.4)

-0.016
(-0.45)

0.056
(0.44)

0.11**
(2.10)

1.32**
(2.3)
-0.012
(-0.25)

-0.005
(-0.12)
0.001
(0.80)

0.45
(1.2)

FAMILY

CORP

FOREIGN

Intercept

-0.0053
(-0.15)

-0.97**
(-3.33)

0.03
(0.73

1.04
(1.68)

0.03
(0.37)

-1.22***
(-4.26)

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

0.26
13.5***

0.15
12.60***

0.18
5 44***

0.25
8.85***

0.10
2.16***

0.39
10.59***

* Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * *Indicate significance at the 1 % level.

Moreover, the difference in performance between firms with controlling
ownership categories and those with non-controlling ownership is reported. The
differences in performance between them are captured by the dummy variables of
FAMILY, CORP and FOREIGN (indicating whether firms are controlled by family-
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controlling shareholders, domestic-corporation-controlling shareholders or foreigncontrolling shareholders respectively). Table 6.7, column (a), shows that the
coefficients of FAMILY, COPR and FOREIGN are positive and significant to the
average returns at the 5% level. Regarding the market-adjusted returns regressions,
the results in column (b) report that the coefficients of FAMILY and CORP are
positive and significant at the 10% level, while the coefficient of FOREIGN variable

is positive and significant at the 5% level. In profitability regressions, columns (c
and (d) indicate that the coefficients of FAMILY are positively related to the ROA
and the S/A, and they are significant at the 1% level. The coefficients of CORP are
positive and significant to the ROA and the S/A at the 10% and 1% levels
respectively. The coefficients of FOREIGN are positively related to the ROA and
the S/A, and they are significant at the 10% and 5% levels.
Based on the results found, this study supports the hypotheses HIE, HIF and
HIG- The results suggest that firms with family-controlling, domestic-corporationcontrolling or foreign-controlling ownership have 1%-1.4% in average returns, 1.2%2.5% in market-adjusted returns, 0.9%-1.2% in ROA and 15% to 27% in S/A are
greater than those with non-controlling ownership in the case of Thailand.
Regarding the family-controlling ownership, the results of this study are consistent
with the results of Wiwattanakantung (2001) who confirms that family-controlled
firms have a superior performance (ROA, S/A and firm's value) than firms with noncontrolling ownership.
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Table 6.7
The Comparison of Performance between Firms with Controlling Ownership
Categories and Non-Controlling Ownership (1993-1996)
This table presents the results of the comparison between performance of firms with controlling ownership categories and firms
with non-controlling ownership. The controlling ownership categories include individual or family, domestic-corporations and
foreign ownership. Firm performance in columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R =
market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) show the profitability ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The
comparison between performance of firms with controlling ownership categories and firms with non-controlling ownership is
captured by the d u m m y variable of family-controlling ownership ( F A M I L Y ) , domestic-corporation-controlling ownership
( C O R P ) or foreign-controlling ownership ( F O R E I G N ) indicating whether firms are controlled by family, domestic-corporation
or foreign shareholders. The Mest is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sal es-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(13.31)

0.003***
(15.23)

-0.006
(-0.28)

-0.003**
(-2.46)

E/P

0.015***
(4.36)

0.012***
(4.0)

0.014**
(2.45)

-0.022
(-0.73)

DEBT

-0.05***
(-3.12)

-0.047***
(-5.02)

-0.14***
(-7.95)

-0.25***
(-2.54)

SIZE

0.022***
(5.25)

0.023***
(5.93)

0.044***
(6.31)

0.51***
(13.40)

-0.002
(-0.27)

0.025***
(3.97)

o.oi •
(0.81)

0.15**
(2.38)

FAMILY

0.011**
(2.00)

0.0088*
(2.01)

0.025***
(3.10)

0.18***
(3.93)

CORP

0.012**
(1.9)

0.010*
(1.40)

0.015*
(1.38)

0.27***
(4.55)

FOREIGN

0.014**
(2.1)

0.012**
(1.81)

0.019*
(1.56)

0.15**
(2.27)

Intercept

-0.051***
(-3.90)

-0.051***
(-4.38)

0.0015
(0.69)

-0.82***
(-7.08)

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

0.40
49.21***

0.47
67.30***

0.14
18.32***

0.20
30.40***

AGE

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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6.3.2 The Influence of B a n k Equity Ownership on Firm Performance
Table 6.8 reports on the differences between the performance of firms with
bank ownership and firms without bank equity ownership. The dummy variable of
bank equity ownership (BANK), which indicates whether firms have bank ownership

in the top ten shareholders, is used to indicate such differences. Based on the mar
returns the results in Table 6.8, columns (a) and (b) show that the coefficients of
BANK are insignificantly associated with the average returns and the market-

adjusted returns. In the profitability regressions, the results (in column (c) show
the coefficient of BANK is insignificantly related to the ROA. It is, however,

negative and significant to the S/A at the 5% level (in column (d)). From the resul
presented, this study rejects the hypotheses H2 as firms with bank ownership do not
perform higher than those with non-bank ownership. In fact, they perform 10% in
S/A lower than firms with non-bank ownership. These results are consistent with
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) who suggest that Japanese firms with a close
relationship to a bank have a lower profitability than firms with a non-bank
relationship. Also Gorton and Schmind (1996) study suggest that bank equity
ownership does not improve firm performance in the case of Germany. However,
the results in this study seem to be inconsistent with Limpaphayom and Polwitoon's

(2001) study, who argue that there is no relationship between bank equity ownership

and firm performance (profitability) in the case of Thailand between 1992 and 1993.
By classifying firms with bank equity ownership into (i) firms with bankmanagerial ownership (BANK*DIR) and (ii) firms with bank-nonmanagerial
ownership (BANK*NONDIR), this study further examines whether firms with bankmanagerial ownership will perform differently to those with banks-nonmanagerial
ownership. The dummy variables of BANK*DIR and BANK*NONDIR (indicating

Chapter 6: Empirical Findings I

157

whether firms have bank-managerial ownership, and firms that have banknonmanagerial ownership respectively) are used to capture the difference.
Table 6.8
The Comparison of Performance between Firms with Bank Ownership and
Firms with Non-Bank Ownership (1993-1996)
This table presents the results of the comparison of performance between finns with bank ownership and firms with non-bank
ownership. Firm performance in columns (a) and 0b) shows the market returns (AR= average returns and A M R = marketadjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) show the profitability ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The
comparison between performance offirmswith bank ownership andfirmswith non-bank ownership is captured by the d u m m y
variable of bank ownership ( B A N K ) indicating whether firms have bank ownership in the top ten shareholders. The Mest is
reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(-6.38)

-0 02***
(-6.80)

0.03**
(2.12)

-0.003**
(-2.5)

E/P

0.015***
(4.8)

0.00022***
(4.2)

0.016***
(3.2)

-0.001
(-0.13)

DEBT

-0.06***
(-5.01)

Q}7***
(25.72)

-0 14***
(-8.58)

-0.3***
(-2.7)

SIZE

0 22***
(5.37)

-0.011
(-1.60)

0.041***
(6.48)

0.5***
(12.27)

AGE

0.0061***
(3.63)

0.010***
(3.91)

0.006**
(2.94)

0.12
(1.89)

-0.008
(-1.51)

0.0006
(0.10)

0.001
(0.15)

-0.1**
(-2.21)

Intercept

-0.03***
(-2.27)

-0.034**
(-1.65)

-0.03*
(-1.86)

-0.63***
(-5.02)

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

0.62
106.46***

0.53
144.52***

0.18
28.6***

0.18
27.89***

BANK

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.

Table 6.9, columns (a) and (b), indicate that the coefficients of B A N K * D I R
and BANK*NONDIR are insignificantly associated with market returns. In terms of

the profitability regressions, columns (c) and (d) illustrate that the coefficien
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B A N K * D I R is insignificantly associated to the R O A but it is negative and
significant to the S/A at the 5% level. The coefficients of BANK*NONDIR are
insignificantly correlated to both ROA and S/A. Interestingly, the results in this

study show that the poor profitability found in firms with bank ownership (see 6.3.2
in fact, it is derived from firms with bank-managerial ownership. Firms with bankmanagerial ownership have 20% in S/A lower than firms with non-bank equity
ownership. This study suggests that firms with bank-managerial ownership have
lower profitability than those with non-bank ownership (while firms with bank-nonmanagerial ownership do not reveal such a relationship) may be because firms with
managerial shareholders obstruct banks from intervening with their power over the
firm's management. Managerial shareholders then are free to allocate funds on their
preferences such as financing funds in risky projects where they will receive high

benefits if the projects succeed, or degenerate firm performance if such projects fa
(Pimpaphayom and Polwitoon, 2001). From the analysis of this study, the
hypotheses H2A and H2B are rejected because firms with bank-managerial ownership
or bank-non-managerial ownership do not perform significantly higher than those
with non-bank equity ownership in Thailand.
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Table 6.9
The Comparison of Performance between Firms with Bank-Managerial
Ownership, Firms with Bank-Nonmanagerial Ownership, and Firms with NonBank Ownership (1993-1996)

This table presents the results of the comparison of performance between firms with bank-managerial ownership
managerial ownership, and firms with non-bank ownership. Firm performance in columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns
(AR= average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) show the profitability ratios (ROA= return
on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The comparison between performance of firms with bank-managerial ownership, bank-nonmanagerial ownership, and firms with non-bank ownership is captured by the dummy variables of bank-managerial ownership
(BANK*DIR) and bank-nonmanagerial ownership (BANK*NONDIR) indicating whether firms have bank-managerial
ownership, bank-non-managerial ownership respectively. The Mest is reported in parentheses
Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average Returns

(AR)

Market-Adjusted
Returns
(AMR)

Return on
Assets

Sal es-to-Asset

(ROA)

(S/A)

_I*L_

(b)

RISK

0.001***
(12.64)

0.001***
(10.6)

-0.005**
(-2.2)

-0.001
(-0.1)

E/P

0.00001
(0.67)

0.0007***
(4.0)

0.0003
(1.11)

-0.0002
(-1.0)

DEBT

-0.08***
(-13.55)

0 j***
(12.84)

-0.016*
(-1.0)

-0.42***
(-8.56)

SIZE

0.04***
(7.03)

-0.006**
(-2.20)

0.052***
(3.27)

0.54***
(10.11)

AGE

0.001***
(2.46)

0.036***
(5.87)

0.02*
(1.67)

0.061*
(1.54)

BANK*DIR

-0.002
(-0.7)

-0.001
(-0.55)

-0.017
(-0.52)

-0.20**
(-2.0)

BANK*NONDIR

0.004
(0.47)

0.003
(0.23)

0.002
(0.10)

-0.053
(-0.66)

-0.07*
(-3.66)

-0.05
(-1.88)

-0.07
(-1.5)

-0.6***
(-3.35)

0.42
49.43***

0.66
136***

0.10
3.22***

0.28
26.29***

Intercept

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

*
Indicate significance at the 10% level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1% level.

6.3.3 The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance

This section presents the results of the effect of managerial ownership on firm

performance. This effect is captured by the managerial ownership variable (DIR),
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which represents the percentage of shares held by members of the board of directors.
Table 6.10 (columns (a) and (b)) report that the coefficient of DIR is significantly

related to the market-adjusted returns at the 10% level. It is, however, insignificant
in regards to the average returns. In terms of the effect of managerial ownership on
the profitability (ROA and S/A), Table 6.10 (columns (c) and (d)) show that the

coefficients of DIR are positive and significant at the 5% level to both profitabilit
measures. From the results, this study accepts the hypotheses H3 because
managerial ownership is positively related to firm performance in the case of
Thailand. The results show that for each additional 1% of managerial ownership, the
market-adjusted returns, ROA, and S/A increase by 0.037%, 0.06% and 0.59%
(respectively). These results are consistent with those of Jensen and Meckling
(1976), Kim et al. (1988) and Oswald and Jahera (1991) who argue that managerial
shareholding can align between the interests of shareholders and managers and as a
result agency costs decline, and thereby firm performance increases.
A comparison between performance of firms with managerial ownership and
those with non-managerial ownership is also examined. The dummy variable of DIR
(indicating whether firms have managerial ownership) is applied. Table 6.11,

columns (a) and (b), indicate that the coefficient of DIR is not significantly relate
the average returns and the market-adjusted returns. In columns (c) and (d), the

results show that coefficients of DIR are also insignificantly related to both ROA an
S/A. This study therefore rejects the hypothesis H3A. This is because there is no
difference between performance of firms with managerial ownership and those with
non-managerial ownership.
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Table 6.10
The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance (1993-1996)

This table presents the results of the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance. Finn performance i
(b) shows the market returns (AR= average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) show the
profitability (ROA= return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The effect of managerial ownership onfirmperformance is
captured by the managerial ownership variable (DIR) indicating the percentage of shares held by members of the board of
directors. The Mest is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sal es-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)

0>)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(12.03)

0.003***
(15.88)

-0.001
(-2.1)

-0.004*
(-1.94)

E/P

0.01*
(1.84)

0.0064*
(1.87)

0.0002
(0.34)

-0.035
(-0.8)

DEBT

-0.04***
(-2.55)

-0.044***
(-3.33)

-0.23***
(-11.43)

-0.5**
(-2.8)

SIZE

0.02***
(2.91)

0.024***
(4.0)

0.056***
(7.23)

0.59***
(7.51)

AGE

-0.033***
(-2.74)

0.015
(1.4)

-0.02
(-1.08)

0.062
(0.41)

DIR

0.0022
(1.06)

0.037*
(1.80)

0.06**
(1.92)

0.59**
(2.07)

Intercept

-0.038***
(-1.64)

-0.06***
(-3.63)

0.012
(0.50)

-0.91
(-3.49)

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

0.44
48.09***

0.44
65.31***

0.35
32.27***

0.15
10.56***

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Table 6.11
The Comparison between Performance of Firms with Managerial Ownership
and Firms with Non-Managerial Ownership (1993-1996)
This table presents the results of the comparison between performance of firms with managerial ownership and
managerial ownership. Firm performance in column (a) and (b) shows the market returns (AR= average returns and A M R =
market-adjusted return), and columns (c) and (d) show the profitability (ROA= return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The
comparison between performance of firms with managerial ownership and firms with non-managerial ownership is captured by
the dummy variable of managerial ownership (DIR) indicating whetherfirmshave managerial ownership. The /-test is reported
in parentheses.
Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

(AR)
_iaj_

(AMR)
ft)

RISK

0.003***
(13.71)

0.003***
(17.16)

E/P

0.016***
(4.59)

0.013***
(4.27)

0.2***
(3.1)

-0.004
(-1.33)

DEBT

-0.058***
(-5.72)

-0.05***
(-5.42)

-0.14***
(-7.42)

-0 27***
(-2.75)

SIZE

0.024***
(5.93)

0.023***
(6.41)

0.046***
(6.35)

0.53***
(13.17)

AGE

-0.006
(-1.07)

0.019**
(3.22)

-0.005
(-0.50)

0.11
(1.56)

DIR

-0.004
(-1.01)

0.0035
(1.05)

-0.003
(-0.35)

0.026
(0.57)

Intercept

-0.041***
(-3.2)

-0.046***
(-3.86)

0.02
(1.0)

-0.76***
(-5.64)

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

0.42
71.76***

0.49
94.25***

0.12
19.94***

0.17
30.58***

Return on
Assets
(ROA)
& _
-0.01
(-0.38)

Sales-to-Asset

(S/A)
_(dj_

-0.003**
(-2.29)

*
Indicate significance at the 10% level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.

This study suggests that a reason w h y firms with managerial ownership do not
perform differently to those with non-managerial ownership may be because most

non-managerial shareholders have concentrated shareholding in the firms (average
25%-30%, see Table 4.3, Panel B). These shareholders (with concentrated cash
flow rights) have a strong incentive as much as managerial shareholders have in
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enhancing firm performance for benefits they would wish to claim. Therefore, the
performance of firms controlled by managerial shareholders is not found to be
significantly different to that of firms controlled by non-managerial shareholders.
By classifying the managerial ownership as (i) managerial-family ownership
(DIR*FAMILY), and (ii) managerial-nonfamily ownership (DIR*NONFAMILY),
the effect of these two groups of ownership on firm performance are examined. The
variables of DIR*FAM1LY and Dffi*NONFAMILY, which represent the percentage
of shares held by managerial-family shareholders, managerial-nonfamily
shareholders respectively, are applied to capture these effects. In terms of
managerial-family ownership, Table 6.12 indicates that the coefficients of
DIR*FAMILY are positive and significant to the market-adjusted returns at the 10%
level, and to the ROA and S/A at the 5% level. Regarding managerial-nonfamily
ownership, Table 6.13 illustrates that the coefficients of DIR*NONFAMILY are not
significant to any performance measures. This study accepts the hypothesis H3B as
managerial-family ownership has a strong positive relationship to firm performance.
Interestingly, this study finds new evidence that indeed the positive relationship
found between managerial ownership and performance measures stems from the
managerial-family ownership. This is, as this study emphasized earlier, because the

effect of managerial ownership on performance might be fundamentally different if it
is examined separately in terms of managerial-family ownership and managerialnonfamily ownership.
The results point that a percentage point increases in managerial-family
ownership is associated with about 0.039% in market-adjusted returns, 0.072% in

ROA, and 0.51% in S/A. In contrast, this study rejects the hypothesis H3C as_there is
no evidence to support such a significant relationship between managerial-nonfamily
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ownership and firm performance.

This study suggests that managerial-family

shareholders are positively related to firm performance whilst it is not found for
managerial-nonfamily shareholders. This could be because of the influence of the
family members, as has been discussed in section 6.3.1.2 where family shareholders
tend to have a special incentive to increase firm performance as most of the firms
they control belong to their family.
Table 6.12
The Effect of Managerial-Family Ownership on Firm Performance (1993-1996)

This table presents the results of the effect of managerial-family ownership and firm performance. Firm perfo
columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns (AR= average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and
(d) show the profitability (ROA= return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The effect of managerial-family ownership on firm
performance is captured by the managerialfamily ownership variable (DIR*FAMILY) indicating the percentage of shares held
by managerial-family shareholders. The f-test is reported in parentheses.
Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sal es-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(11.6)

0.003***
(14.71)

-0.001**
(-2.1)

-0.004*
(-2.01)

E/P

0.007*
(1.9)

0.006*
(1.92)

0.001
(0.34)

-0.031
(-1.07)

DEBT

-0.043***
(-2.73)

-0.047***
(-3.51)

-0 24***
(-11.4)

-0.5***
(-2.5)

SIZE

0 02***
(2.71)

0.022***
(3.7)

0.06***
(6.62)

0.61***
(7.69)

AGE

-0.03**
(-2.36)

0.018*
(1.7)

-0.004
(-1.01)

0.01
(0.46)

DIR*FAM1LY

0.024
(1.05)

0.039*
(1.9)

0.072**
(2.31)

0.51**
(1.80)

Intercept

-0.03
(-1.41)

-0.058**
(-2.89)

0.012
(0.91)

_] 1***
(-3.5)

0.45
36.92***

0.54
71.35***

0.37
26.3***

0.15
10.56***

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

* Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Table 6.13
The Effect of Managerial-Nonfamily Ownership on Firm Performance (19931996)

This table presents the results of the effect of managerial-nonfamily ownership and firm performance. Firm perf
columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns (AR= average returns and A M R = market-adjusted return), and columns (c) and
(d) show the profitability (ROA= return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The effect of managerial-nonfamily ownership on
firm performance is captured by the managerial-family ownership variable (DIR*NONFAMILY) indicating the percentage of
shares held by managerial-nonfamily shareholders. The Mest is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.002***
(9.35)

0.002**
(9.45)

-0.017
(-0.18)

-0.001
(-0.35)

E/P

0.047***
(4.41)

0.046***
(3.45)

0 j***

(2.62)

0.1
(0.88)

DEBT

-0.024
(-1.04)

-0.025
(-1.12)

-0.062
(-0.75)

0.13
(0.57)

SIZE

0.024***
(2.61)

0.024***
(2.65)

0.048
(1.5)

0 4***
(4.26)

AGE

0.003
(0.2)

0.02
(1.51)

0.072
(1.5)

0.068
(0.52)

DIR*NONFAMILY

0.0022
(0.26)

-0.024
(0.32)

0.13
(0.58)

0.83
(1.08)

Intercept

-0.063***
(-2.27)

-0.06**
(-2.19)

-0.12
(-1.12)

-0.71**
(-2.28)

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

0.48
17.00***

0.51
18.95***

0.1
5.31***

0.12
6.88***

*
Indicate significance at the 10% level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.

Moreover, there is an investigation into whether or notfirmswith managerial-

family ownership or firms with managerial-nonfamily ownership perform differentl

from those with non-managerial ownership. This study uses the dummy variables of
DIR*FAMILY (indicating whether firms have managerial-family ownership) and
DIR*NONFAMILY (indicating whether firms have managerial-nonfamily
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ownership) to capture the differences between them. Table 6.14, columns (a) and (b)
reveal that the coefficients of DIR*FAMILY and DIR*NONFAMILY are
insignificantly related to market measures. Using accounting-based measures,
columns (c) and (d) illustrate that the coefficient of DIR*NONFAMILY is negative
and significant at the 10% level to the ROA while those of DIR*FAMILY are
insignificantly associated to the ROA and S/A.
In regard to the results presented above, this study rejects H3D, and H3E. This is
because the results clearly show that firms with managerial-family ownership and
managerial-nonfamily ownership do not perform significantly greater than those with
non-managerial ownership. Indeed, firms with managerial-nonfamily ownership
have 1.8% in ROA lower than firms with non-managerial ownership. Based on these

results, this study suggests that it may be because managerial-nonfamily shareholder
(who have management power in the firms) can pursue their own interests by seeking

private benefits and this will result in a lower firm performance (Jayaraman et al.,
2000). On the other hand, non-managerial shareholders (who mostly control a high

concentration of shares in the firms) can monitor managers closely in their operatio
of a firm's business so as to best maximize the firm's performance for the
shareholders' benefit.
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Table 6.14
The Comparison between Performance of Firms with Managerial-Family
Ownership, Managerial -Nonfamily Ownership, and Firms with NonManagerial Ownership (1993-1996)

This table presents the results of the comparison between performance of firms with managerial-family owner
nonfamily ownership, andfirmswith non-managerial ownership. Firm performance in columns (a) and (b) shows the market
returns (AR= average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) show the profitability (ROA= return
on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The comparison between performance offirmswith managerial-family ownership,
managerial-nonfamily ownership and firms with non-managerial ownership is captured by the dummy variables of managerialfamily ownership (DIR*FAMILY) and managerial-non-managerial ownership (DIR*NONFAMILY) indicating whether firms
have managerial-family ownership, managerial-nonfamily ownership respectively. The f-test is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(15.66)

0.003***
(18.09)

-0.001
(-0.48)

-0.003**
(-2.33)

E/P

0.016***
(4.62)

0.013***
(4.34)

0.021***
(3.29)

-0.005
(-0-2)

DEBT

-0.057***
(-5.73)

-0.05***
(-5.45)

-0.14***
(-7.5)

-0.27***
(-2.67)

SIZE

0.024***
(5.71)

0.022***
(6.3)

0.043***
(6.06)

0.52***
(13.03)

AGE

-0.006
(-1.36)

Q 02***
(3.64)

0.0033
(0.27)

0.13*
(1.82)

DIR*FAMILY

0.0022
(0.41)

0.006
(1.47)

0.0086
(1.02)

0.06
(1.16)

DIR*NONFAMILY

-0.004
(-1.07)

-0.0004
(1.07)

-0.018*
(-1.85)

-0.022
(-1.13)

Intercept

0.045***
(-3.28)

-0.046***
(-3.91)

0.020
(0.93)

-0.76***
(-5.62)

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

0.42
88.29***

0.49
82.91***

0.13
18.53***

0.18
26.94***

* Indicate significance at the 10% level.
* * indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1% level.
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6.3.4 T h e Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm
Performance
This section examines the existence of a non-linear relationship between
managerial ownership and firm performance. The variables of DIR, DIR2, and DIR3,
which represent the percentage of shares, the square and the cube of the percentage
of shares held by members of the board of directors respectively, are indicated in

order to capture this non-linear relationship. Before reporting on the results of th

analysis this study notes that to be consistent with a non-linear relationship propo
based on the previous studies, cf. Short and Keasy (1999) (as has been emphasized in
Chapter two and three), the estimated coefficients of DIR and the DIR should be
positive and those of DIR should be negative.
This study finds that the coefficients of DIR, DIR2, and DIR3, in all the nonlinear regressions between managerial ownership and firm performance in this study,
•a

are as of the expected signs. Table 6.15 reports that the coefficients of D I R and D I R
are positive and those of DIR2 are negative. They, however, are not significantly
associated with both market measures (average returns and market-adjusted returns).
To capture the turning points, which can indicate a maximum and a minimum point
of firm performance associated with managerial shareholding, this study follows the
same method of calculation used in Short and Keasy's (1999) study (calculus). For
example, from Table 6.15, column (a) (based on the average returns measure), all
control variables are assumed to be constant, and denote DIR by x, DIR2 by x2, DIR
by x3, and average returns (AR) by v. The equation therefore is obtained as: v =
0.204* -

0.0089JC2

+ 0.000105x3. Then the turning points occur at x value at which

the partial derivative (of this equation) is equal to zero; then, setting dy/dx = 0 a
solving for x. From this equation, x is obtained as 15.98% and 40.52%. To
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determine whether a turning point is a m a x i m u m or a minimum, this study calculates
the partial second derivative of y with respect to x (tfyldx2). If tfyldx2 < 0, the
turning point is a maximum; if b^yldx2 > 0, the turning point is a minimum. The
result from this partial second derivative reveals that the toning points between
managerial ownership and average returns are found to be 15.98%) as a maximum
point and 40.52% as a minimum point. Based on market-adjusted returns in column
(b), this study suggests that the maximum point of performance is at 19.53%) and the
minimum point is at 40.03%) of managerial shareholding. In the profitability

regressions, Table 6.15, column (c), indicates that the coefficient of DIR is positiv
and significant to ROA at the 10% level. The coefficients of neither DIR2 nor DIR3,
however, are significant to the ROA. In column (d), the results show that the
coefficients of DIR and DIR are insignificant to S/A, but the coefficient of DIR is
positive and significant at the 10% level to S/A. The turning points in the ROA
regression are 26.40% (maximum) and 41.44% (minimum); and those for S/A are
20.05%o (maximum) and 32.25% (minimum) (see also Figure 6.1). From these
results, the hypothesis H4 is rejected. That is, the non-linear relationship between
managerial ownership and firm performance, in terms of the market returns and the
profitability, is not significant in the case of Thailand between 1993-1996.
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Table 6.15
The Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm
Performance (1993-1996)
This table presents the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. Firm performance in
columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and
(d) show the profitability ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The non-linear relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance is captured by the managerial ownership (DIR), managerial ownership square (DIR 2 ), and
managerial ownership cube (DIR 3 ). T h e DIR, DIR 2 and DIR 3 variables indicate the percentage of shares, the square and the
cube of the percentage of shares held by members of the board of directors respectively. The Mest is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.002***
(8.07)

0.002***
(9.38)

-0.004
(-1.04)

-0.004*
(-1.85)

E/P

0.011***
(2.60)

0.01***
(2.35)

0.02
(1.59)

-0.08
(-0.21)

DEBT

-0.068***
(-4.76)

-0.054***
(-4.15)

-0.164***
(-7.26)

-0.22**
(-1.8)

SIZE

0.042***
(6.54)

0.042***
(7.16)

0.054***
(5.42)

0.51***
(9.49)

AGE

-0.01
(-1.13)

0.025
(2.6)

0.0056
(0.34)

0.035
(0.4)

DIR

0.204
(1.06)

0.251
(1.58)

0.558*
(1.75)

2.25
(1.15)

DIR2

-0.0089
(-1.33)

-0.00956
(-1.61)

-0.0173
(-1.45)

-0.091
(-1.30)

DIR3

0.000105
(1.52)

0.000107
(1.7)

0.00017
(1.41)

0.00116*
(1.55)

Turning points (Maximum %)

15.98

19.53

26.40

20.05

Turning points (Minimum %)

40.52

40.03

41.44

32.25

-0.091***
(-3.43)

-0.11***
(-4.56)

-0.062
(-1.46)

-0.86***
(-3.74)

0.21
j 9 39***

0.25
23.87***

0.16
14.00***

0.16
13.6***

Intercept

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Figure 6.1
The Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm
Performance (1993-1996)
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The result of this study is not consistent with that suggested

by

Wiwatantakuntung (2001) which indicates that there is a non-liner relationship
between managerial ownership and firm performance in the case of Thailand in
1996. It is found that the managerial shareholders w h o control between 2 5 % - 5 0 %
perform lower than those w h o control between 0%-25%.

This m a y be because

instead of fixing the level of managerial shareholding at different levels (25%-50%,
5 0 % - 7 5 % and beyond 7 5 % ) , and comparing its performance with managerial
shareholding (0%-25%) as conducted in Wiwatanakantung's study, this study uses
the Short and Keasy's cubic model. Using this model, the coefficients of managerial
ownership are allowed to determine their o w n turning points.
The results of this study are also inconsistent with, for example, K i m et al.,
1998 and Short and Keasy (1999) w h o confirm that the non-linear relationship exists
in the case of the U K and the U S respectively.

In this regard, this study suggests

that (as mentioned earlier) the finding of the insignificant non-linear relationship
between managerial ownership and firm performance in this study m a y b e influenced

70
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by the family shareholders w h o are involved with the firm's management in
Thailand. This structure, however, is not common in the developed countries of the
US and UK. These family shareholders may not attempt to entrench their power and

extract a firm's assets away for their own private accounts but rather have a veste
interest in increasing firm performance. This study therefore further examines the
non-linear relationship between managerial-family ownership, managerial-nonfamily
ownership, and firm performance.

6.3.5 The Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial-Family Ownership,
Managerial-Nonfamily Ownership, and Firm Performance
This section presents the empirical results of the non-linear relationship of
managerial-family ownership (DIR*FAMILY), managerial-nonfamily ownership
(DIR*NONFAMILY) associated with firm performance. The variables of
DIR*FAMILY, DIR*FAMILY2 and DIR*FAMILY3, which indicate the percentage
of shares held by managerial-family shareholders, the square, and the cube of the
percentage of shares held by managerial-family shareholders respectively, are
applied. Table 6.16, columns (a) and (b), show that the coefficients of
DIR*FAMILY and DIR*FAMILY3 are positive while those of DIR*FAMILY2 are
negative, and all of them are insignificantly related to the market measures. Using

the same calculation method as presented in the previous section for turning points,
is found that the turning points between managerial-family ownership and the
average returns are 17.28% (maximum) and 36.10% (minimum). The turning points
between managerial-family ownership and market-adjusted returns are found be
around 26.05% (maximum) and 39.31% (minimum). In terms of profitability,
columns (c) and (d) show that the coefficients of DIR*FAMILY, DIR*FAMILY2

Chapter 6: Empirical Findings I

173

and D I R * F A M I L Y 3 are insignificantly related to the R O A and S/A. The turning
points of managerial-family ownership are 26.23% (maximum) and 38.21%
(minimum) for the ROA and they are 17.23% (maximum) and 33.51% (minimum)
for the S/A (see Figure 6.2).
Based on the results from Table 6.16, this study confirms that managerialfamily shareholders do not tend to entrench their power, which could affect firm
performance. The reason could be that these managerial-family shareholders
commonly are the owners of the firms. They mainly operate their firms as their
assets to pass to their descendants rather than wealth to consume during their
lifetimes (Casson, 1999). This study therefore rejects the hypothesis FUA because
there is no evidence to support that there is a significant non-linear relationship
between managerial-family ownership and firm performance.
Furthermore, the results of the non-linear relationship between managerialnonfamily ownership and firm performance are presented. The variables of
DIR*NONFAMILY, DIR*NONFAMILY2 and DIR*NONFAMILY3, which
represent the percentage of shares held by managerial-nonfamily shareholders, the
square and the cube of the percentage of shares held by managerial-nonfamily
shareholders respectively, are obtained.
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Table 6.16
The Non-Linear Relation between Managerial-Family Ownership and Firm
Performance (1993-1996)
This table presents the non-linear relationship between managerial-family ownership and firm performance. Firm performance
in columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c)
and (d) show the profitability ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The non-linear relationship between
managerial-nonfamily ownership and firm performance is captured by the managerial-family ownership ( D I R * F A M I L Y ) ,
managerial-family ownership square ( D I R * F A M I L Y 2 ) , and managerial-family ownership cube (DIR*FAMILY 3 ). The
D I R * F A M I L Y , D I R * F A M I L Y 2 and D I R * F A M I L Y 3 variables indicate the percentage of shares, the square and the cube of the
percentage of shares held managerial-family shareholders respectively. The Mest is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

0.003***
(14.96)

0.28***
(17.7)

-0.01**
(-2.11)

-0.004*
(-1.94)

0.07
(1.94)

0.06
(1.88)

0.001
(0.27)

-0.025
(-0.57)

DEBT

-0 04***
(-2.47)

-0.045***
(-3.37)

-0.23***
(-12.34)

-0.46***
(-2.56)

SIZE

0.02***
(2.85)

0.024***
(3.94)

0.065***
(7.24)

0.57***
(7.21)

AGE

-0.03**
(-2.67)

0.015
(1.44)

-0.017
(-1.06)

0.088
(0.65)

DIR*FAMILY

0.135
(0.32)

0.47
(1.27)

0.451
(0.83)

2.504
(0.51)

DIR*FAMILY 2

-0.00578
(-0.50)

-0.015
(-1.36)

-0.0145
(-1.49)

-0.11
(-0.77)

DIR*FAMILY 3

0.0000722
(0.64)

0.000153
(1.50)

0.00015
(1.05)

0.001445
(1.06)

Turning points (Maximum % )

17.28

26.05

26.23

17.23

Turning points (Minimum % )

36.10

39.31

38.21

33.51

Intercept

-0.037
(-0.79)

-0.088**
(-2.17)

-0.03
(-0.41)

-1.07
(-1.86)

0.44
36.43***

0.55
54.3***

0.35
24.42***

0.15
8.46***

RISK

E/P

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level;
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Figure 6.2
The Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial-Family Ownership and Firm
Performance (1993-1996)
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DIR*NONFAMILY,

DIR*NONFAMILY2 and DIR*NONFAMILY3 are as of the expected signs for all
regressions. In columns (a) and (b), the results show that the coefficients of
DIR*NONFAMlLY, DIR*NONFAMILY2 and DlR*NONFAMILY3 are

insignificantly related to the average returns. Surprisingly, these coefficients a

significantly associated with the market-adjusted returns at the 5% level. The tur
points are 15.39% (maximum) and 50.61% (minimum). This can be interpreted as

meaning that firm performance, as measured by market-adjusted returns, is positive
related to managerial-nonfamily ownership in the 0% to 15.39% range, negatively
related in the 15.39% to 50.61% range and positively related when its shareholding
exceeds 50.61%.

In the profitability regressions, the results in columns (c) and (d) illustrate th
the coefficient of DIR*NONFAMILY, DIR*NONFAMILY2 and
DIR*NONFAMILY3 are insignificantly related to the ROA and S/A. The maximum
points are 33.08% and 22.86%, and the minimum points are 39.80% and 47.20%

Chapter 6: Empirical Findings I

176

associated with the R O A and S/A respectively (see Figure 6.3). A s expected, this
study finds that in fact the non-linear relationship exists between managerialnonfamily ownership and firm performance (in terms of the market returns). These
result are consistent with the previous studies, for example, Morck et al. (1988) and
Short and Keasy (1999), suggest that at the early stage, managerial shareholders
(equivalent with managerial-nonfamily shareholders in this study) have a greater
incentive to maximize firm performance as their shareholdings are rising. As such,
the conflict of interests between owners and managers decline, which will ultimately
result in increasing firm performance. However, at a certain level of shareholding,
the managerial shareholders can entrench their incumbent management in a firm
(such as lower employment of professional managers and the dominance of insiders
as members board of directors), and this can lead to degeneration in firm
performance. Their incentives to increase firm performance, however, are likely
incurred when the managerial stakes in the firms increase afterwards because at that
stage most of their benefits will be tied up with the firm performance. This study
therefore accepts the hypothesis fLm, as the non-linear relationship between
managerial-nonfamily ownership and market-adjusted returns exists and that it is
statistically significant.
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Table 6.17
The Non-Linear Relation between Managerial-Nonfamily Ownership and Firm
Performance (1993-1996)
This table presents the non-linear relationship between managerial-nonfamily ownership and firm performance. Firm
performance in columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R = market-adjusted return), and
columns (c) and (d) show the profitability ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The non-linear relationship
between managerial-nonfamily ownership and firm performance is captured by the managerial-nonfamily ownership
( D I R * N O N F A M I L Y ) , managerial-family ownership square ( D I R * N O N F A M I L Y 2 ) , and managerial-family ownership cube
( D I R * N O N F A M I L Y 3 ) . D I R * N O N F A M I L Y , D I R * N O N F A M I L Y 2 and D I R * N O N F A M I L Y 3 represent the percentage of
shares, the square and the cube of the percentage of shares held managerial-nonfamily shareholders respectively. The West is
reported in parentheses.

Dependent Variables

Independent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to- Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(9.36)

0.003***
(9.45)

0.001
(0.2)

-0.001
(-0.62)

E/P

0.06***
(5.36)

0.043***
(4.15)

0.83**
(2.88)

0.65
(0.68)

DEBT

-0.073
(-3.65)

-0.042
(-2.26)

-0.03**
(-0.54)

0.14
(0.67)

SIZE

0.032***
(3.62)

0.028***
(3.51)

0.032
(1.46)

0 44***
(5.91)

AGE

0.007
(0.54)

0.018
(1.46)

0.04
(1.21)

-0.025
(-0.23)

DIR*NONFAMILY

0.323
(1.30)

0.41**
(1.85)

0.53
(0.85)

2.421
(1.16)

DIR*NONFAMILY 2

-0.01395
(-1.46)

-0.01748**
(-2.0)

-0.01467
(-0.59)

-0.0786
(-1.07)

DIR*NONFAMILY 3

0.000144
(1.45)

0.0001767**
(1.89)

0.0001342
(0.52)

0.0007476
(1.05)

Turning points (Maximum % )

15.12

15.39

33.08

22.86

Turning points (Minimum % )

49.48

50.61

39.80

47.20

Intercept

-0.072
(-2.28)

-0.084**
(-2.85)

-0.11
(-1.33)

-0.87***
(-3.18)

0.46
23.84***

0.44
22.4***

0.10
2.85***

0.16
6 1***

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* ** Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Figure 6.3
The Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial-Nonfamily
Firm Performance (1993-1996)
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6.4 S u m m a r y and Conclusions
This chapter has empirically examined the relationship between ownership
structure and firm performance in Thailand between 1993-1996. In this study, both

univariate and multivariable analyses have been applied to examine the relationship.

The results from the univarite analysis suggest that firms with controlling ownershi
perform higher than those with non-controlling ownership. The association of
controlling ownership categories, namely, family, domestic-corporation and foreign
ownership, with firm performance has been investigated. The results reveal that
firms with family-controlling and foreign-controlling ownership have a higher
performance (in terms of market returns and profitability), than firms with noncontrolling ownership. Moreover, a comparing of the performance of firms with
bank equity ownership and those with non-bank equity ownership has been
conducted. It has been found that firms with bank ownership have lower market
returns than those without bank ownership. In terms of managerial ownership, the
results show-that firms with managerial ownership have a lower ROA than those
with non-managerial ownership. In addition, the analysis shows that firms with
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managerial-nonfamily ownership have a lower performance (in terms of both market
returns and profitability) than firms with non-managerial ownership.
From the multivariate analysis, the findings of this study have several key
implications. First, this study finds the positive relationship of controlling ownership
on performance (in terms of both market-based and accounting-based measures). As
well, firms with controlling ownership perform higher (in terms of market returns
and profitability) than those with non-controlling ownership in Thailand between
1993-1996. This is consistent with the findings in the univariate analysis.
Interestingly, the analysis shows that only family-controlled firms have a strong
positive relationship to average returns and ROA, while domestic controlled firms or
foreign-controlled firms do not show such a significant relationship to firm
performance. In addition, this study finds that all controlling ownership categories
perform higher, in both market returns and profitability, compared to non-controlling
ownership.
Secondly, this study suggests that firms with bank ownership have a lower S/A
than firms with non-bank ownership in Thailand between 1993-1996. In fact, this
study finds that firms with bank-managerial ownership have a lower profitability
(S/A) compared with those with non-bank ownership, whilst firms with bank-nonmanagerial ownership do not perform significantly different to firms without bank
ownership.
Thirdly, in the case of Thailand, managerial ownership has a strong positive
relationship to performance, in regard to market returns and profitability. Indeed
such a positive relationship seems to be derived from the managerial-family
ownership. That is, it is found that there is a strongjpositive relationship between
managerial-family and firm performance, while managerial-nonfamily ownership is
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insignificantly related to firm performance. Moreover, this study suggests that firms
with managerial-family ownership do not perform with any significant difference to
those with non-managerial ownership. Interestingly, it is found that firms with
managerial-nonfamily ownership have poorer profitability (in terms of the S/A)
compared to those with non-managerial ownership.
Finally, the results show that the non-linear relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance including market returns and profitability is not
significant in the case of Thailand between 1993-1996 (the period prior to the crisis).
In fact, the non-linear relationship is found only between managerial-nonfamily
ownership and market-adjusted returns. The turning points between them are found
to be 15.39% and 50.61%. That is, the managerial-nonfamily ownership firms
perform positively related in the 0% to 15.39% range, and negatively related in the
15.39%-50.61% range, and positively related when managerial-nonfamily ownership
exceeds 50.61%. The non-linear relationship between managerial-family ownership
and firm performance is not significant in the case of Thailand between 1993-1996.
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Chapter 7

Empirical Findings II

7.1 Introduction
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance between
1993-1996 has been presented in the previous chapter. Because of the financial crisis
(that incurred in 1997), this study attempts to examine whether or not the relationship
between Thai ownership structure and firm performance after the financial crisis
differs from that found during the period prior to the crisis (1993-1996). In doing this,
the robustness of the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance
will be confirmed. As well, new findings will be captured if there is any difference
regarding this relationship for these two periods.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, the data and
methodology of this further analysis is presented. The ownership structure in the
period after the crisis (1998-2000) is examined in the second section. In the third
section, the relationship between ownership structure, including (i) controlling
ownership, (ii) controlling ownership categories and (iii) managerial ownership, and
firm performance during the period after the crisis is analyzed. The non-linear
relationship between managerial ownership (including managerial-family ownership,
managerial-nonfamily ownership) and firm performance is investigated in the fourth
section. In the final section, a summary and conclusions are drawn.
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7.2 Sampling and Methodology
For this further analysis, this study adopts the same group of firms in the
sample as used for the analysis in the previous chapter. Firms with incomplete data
will be dropped from the sample. The firms in the sample for this further analysis
during the period after the financial crisis are 238 firms betweenl998-200010. To
examine the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, a
multivariate analysis is carried out. This regression method includes not only the
ownership structure (eg controlling ownership, controlling ownership categories or
managerial ownership) as independent variables, but also other firm's characteristics

(as used in chapter six) namely total risk, earnings-price, debt, size and age that need
to be controlled. The models used in this further analysis are the same as those that
have been used in the analysis presented in chapter six. The summary statistic for
variables for 1998-2000 is shown in Table 7.1

7.3 Thai Ownership Structure between 1998-2000
This chapter illustrates the Thai ownership structure during the period after the
crisis (1998-2000). It is divided into two parts: (i) the concentration of the largest
ownership, including its categories, the top five largest ownership and managerial
ownership, and (ii) the comparison of the Thai ownership structure between the period
prior to the crisis (1993-1996) and after the crisis (1998-2000).

10

The reason for choosing the data between 1998-2000 for this further analysis was because it was the
year after the financial crisis in Thailand (1997) and the data for this analysis was collected in 2001. A s
such the data was limited to between 1998-2000.
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Table 7.1
The S u m m a r y Statistics for Variables (1998-2000)
Mean

Median

Standard

Maximum

Minimum

Deviation

Performance Measure (%)
AR

3.2

2.9

2.2

77

-1.1

AMR

-1.1

-1.2

0.35

1.42

-2.3

ROA

4.5

7

13.6

47

-48

S/A

45

46

26

61

9.2

Controlling Ownership

32

30

13

70

25

Family

42

39

12.3

79

25

Domestic-Corporation

35

30

11.3

68

25

Foreign

40

37

12.5

71

25

Bank

5.8

4

7.5

10

1

Non-Controlling Ownership

16.4

17

5

24

5

DIR

26

24

16

72

41

DIR*FAM

29

27

15

72

3

DIR*NONFAM

27.4

25

13.6

68

5

Risk

30

22

22.2

94

1

E/P

8.5

11

32.8

96

-98

Debt

51.5

51

25.8

98

1

Size (sale/ million baht)

2,735.3

1,294.78

4,065.6

33,073.7

2.82

A g e (years)

22.78

20

10.3

65

10

Ownership (%)

Control Variables (%)
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7.3.1 Ownership Concentration between 1998-2000
This section presents the concentration of the largest ownership and the five
largest ownerships between 1998-2000. The concentration is defined as the mean
value of the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders, and the top five
largest shareholders respectively. Table 7.2 illustrates that the largest ownership
concentration was around 30% of outstanding shares and the top five ownership
concentration was approximately 50%.
Table 7.2
Ownership Concentration of Thai Listed Firms (1998-2000)
This table presents the ownership concentration of Thai firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand between 1998-2000.
Mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and m a x i m u m of shares held by the largest and the top five largest shareholders are
shown in this table. The largest and the top five largest ownership concentrations are measured by the percentage of shares held
by the largest shareholders and the top five largest shareholders respectively.

1998

1999

2000

Largest Ownership
Mean

29.23

30.38

29.57

Median

25.00

26.00

25.00

SD
Min
Max

16.48

16.26

17.60

5.00

7.00

9.00

95.00

98.00

98.00

Mean

53.09

56.15

56.51

Median

53.57

55.50

56.00

SD
Min
Max

17.15

16.97

17.80

Top Five Largest Ownership

15.72

19.50

22.00

99.89

99.80

99.00

In terms of the largest ownership categories (individual or family, domestic-

corporation, foreign investor, other financial institution, bank and government), Tab
7.3 (Panel A) shows that the number of firms controlled by individual or family
shareholders was found to be around 35% to 44% of firms in the sample. There were
approximately around 29% to 33%, and 18% to 24% of firms in the sample controlled
by domestic-corporation shareholders and foreign shareholders respectively. The

number of firms controlled by other financial institution shareholders was around 5%
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of firms in the sample. Banks and government controlled approximately around 1%2% of firms in the sample. Table 7.3 Panel (B) then presents the ownership
concentration of the largest shareholders categories. The results show that the
ownership concentration of family shareholders was around 32% to 37% between
1998-2000. Domestic-corporation ownership concentration was around 31% and that
of foreign ownership was around 30% to 33%. The ownership concentration of
financial institutions, banks and government was around 20%, 9% and 28%
respectively throughout this period. Moreover, the number of firms with bank and
without bank ownership is also examined. The results (in Panel C) show that the
number of firms with bank ownership is around 25% to 30% of firms in the sample
during the period after the crisis (1998-2000), and its ownership concentration is
found to be around 5% to 6% in this period (see Table 7.2, Panel D)
Overall, this further analysis suggests that family shareholders controlled most
Thai firms (around 40% of the sample) between 1998-2000. Domestic-corporation
shareholders and foreign shareholders were found to be the second and the third
categories of shareholders that controlled most Thai firms (30% and 20%,
respectively, of firms in the sample). The ownership concentration of these three
shareholder' categories (family, domestic-corporation and foreign shareholders) was
around 25% of outstanding shares in the firm, which points out that most of these

shareholders were entitled to be controlling shareholders. Moreover, the results show

that the number of firms with bank ownership accounts for less than half of the firms
in the sample (around 30%), and its ownership concentration is maintained at around
5% of outstanding shares between 1998-2000.
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Table 7.3
Ownership Categories of Thai Listed Firms (1998-2000)
Panel A: Firms Controlled by Ownership Categories
This table presents the number and the percentage of firms controlled by the largest shareholders, which are categorized into six
groups: individual or family, domestic-corporation, foreign investor, other financial institution, bank and government.

The Largest Ownership

1998

No.

1999

of (%)

Firms
Individual or Family
Domestic-Corporation
Foreign investor
Other Financial Institution
Bank
Government
Total

107
71
44
11
2
3
238

No.

2000

of (%)

No.

Firms
44.03
29.22
18.11
4.53
0.82
1.23

100

of (%)

Firms

89
81
55
7
2
4
238

86
74
59
9
6
4
238

36.63
33.33
22.63
2.88
0.82
1.65

100

35.39
30.45
24.28
3.70
2.47
1.23

100

Panel B: Ownership Categories Concentration
This table presents the ownership categories concentration. The mean value of the percentage of shares held by each category
(individual or family, domestic-corporations, foreign investors, other financial institutions, banks and government) is calculated
for ownership concentration.

Ownership Categories

Individual or Family
Domestic-Corporation
Foreign investor
Other Financial Institution
Bank
Government

1998

Ownership Concentration
1999
2000

37.14
25.32
33.36
19.61

31.48
30.97
33.8
21.14

8.4

9.4

8.8

25.93

23.54

22.6

32.1
26.2
30.83
20.5

Panel C: Firms with Bank Ownership and Non-Bank Ownership
This table presents the number and the percentage of firms that have bank ownership.

1999
No. of
Firms

30.6

165
Firms with Non-Bank Equity Ownership
243

1998
No.
of
Finns

73

Firms with Bank Equity Ownership

Total

(%)

2000
No. of
Firms

(%)

69

29

60

25.21

69.4

169

71

178

74.79

100

243

100

243

100

(%)

Panel D: Bank Ownership Concentration
This table presents mean, median, standard deviation, m i n i m u m and m a x i m u m of shares held by bank shareholders.

1998
1999
2000

Mean

Median

SD

Minimum

Maximum

4.58
4.93
5.18

3.4
5
5

4.13
3.03

1.7
1
1

10
10
10

3.4
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7.3.2 Managerial Shareholders of Thai Listed Firms between 1998-2000
Table 7.4 (Panel A) reports that the number of firms with managerial
shareholders was found to be around 55% of firms in the sample, while the number of
firms with non-managerial shareholders were approximately 45% of firms in the
sample between 1998-2000. Table 7.4 (Panel B) illustrates that managerial
shareholding concentration was around 28% of shares in the firms while nonmanagerial shareholding concentration was approximately around 30% of shares in
the firms.
Table 7.4
Managerial Shareholders of Thai Listed Firms (1998-2000)
Panel A: Firms with Managerial Shareholders and Non-Managerial Shareholders

This table presents the number and the percentage of firms with managerial shareholders and firms with non-mana
shareholders.
1998 1999 2000
No. of (%) No. of (%) No. of (%)
Firms

Firms

Firms

Firms With Managerial Shareholders 117 49.16 142 59.66 132 55.46
Firms With Non-Managerial Shareholders 121 50.84 96 40.34 106 44.54
Total 238 100 238 100 238 100

Panel B: Managerial Ownership and Non-Managerial Ownership Concentration of Thai Listed Firms

This table presents the managerial ownership and non-managerial ownership concentration. The percentage of sh
members of the board of directors was calculated for managerial ownership concentration. The percentage of shares held by the
largest shareholder was calculated for non-managerial ownership concentration.
Ownership Concentration
1998

1999

2000

Managerial Ownership Concentration

28.8

25.82

26.44

Non-Managerial Ownership Concentration

27.56

31.57

30.09

In regard to managerial-family shareholders and managerial-nonfamily
shareholders, Table 7.5 (Panel A) shows that the number of firms with managerial-
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family ownership was around 2 4 % while those with managerial-nonfamily ownership
were found to be approximately 30% of firms in the sample. Table 7.5 (Panel B)
illustrates that managerial-family ownership concentration was approximately 30%
and that of managerial-nonfamily ownership was around 25% of outstanding shares in
the firms.
Table 7.5
Managerial-Family Shareholders and Managerial-Nonfamily Shareholders of
Thai Listed Firms (1998-2000)
Panel A: Firms with Managerial-Family Shareholders and Managerial-Nonfamily Shareholders
This table presents the number and the percentage of firms with managerial-family shareholders and firms with managerialnonfamily shareholders

1998

1999

2000

No. of
Firms

(%)

No. of
Firms

(%)

No. of
Firms

(%)

Firms with Managerial-Family Shareholders

57

23.9

41

17.23

58

24.37

Firms with Managerial-Nonfamily Shareholders

60

25.21

101

42.44

74

31.09

Panel B: Managerial-Family Ownership and Managerial-Nonfamily Ownership Concentration of Thai
Listed Firms
This table presents the managerial-family ownership and managerial-nonfamily ownership concentration. The percentage of
shares held by managerial shareholders where at least two of them have the same family name was calculated for managerialfamily ownership concentration. The percentage of shares held by managerial shareholders where none of them have the same
family name was calculated for managerial-nonfamily ownership concentration.

Ownership Concentration
1998

1999

2000

Managerial- Family Ownership

30.55

26.19

27.87

Managerial-Nonfamily Ownership

25.50

19.70

24.46

hi sum, this study suggests that the number of firms with managerial
ownership and those with non-managerial ownership were very similar during the

period after the crisis (1998-2000). Also the number of firms with managerial-family
ownership was not significantly different from those with managerial-nonfamily
ownership. Moreover, this study confirms that the concentration of managerial
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ownership

and

non-managerial

ownership

was

not

significantly different.

Interestingly, this study finds that the concentration of managerial-family ownershi
was higher, on average, than that of managerial-nonfamily ownership between 19982000.

7.3.3 The Comparison of Ownership Structure between 1993-1996 and 1998-2000
This section illustrates the comparison of ownership concentration between the
period prior to the crisis (1993-1996) and after the crisis (1998-2000). Table 7.6
(Panel A) shows that the largest ownership concentration was on average around
28.17% between 1993-1996 and around 29.28% between 1998-2000. The top five
ownership concentration is found to be around 51.55% between 1993-1996 and
54.46% between 1998-2000. Moreover, Table 7.6 (Panel B) shows that family
ownership concentration was around 32.7% between 1993-1996 and 32.1% between
1998-2000. Domestic-corporation ownership concentration was around 24.84% and
26.44%, while that of foreign ownership was around 30.33% and 33.14% respectively

between these two periods. The concentration of other financial institutions is found
to be around 15.65% to 20.28% while that of government ownership was 21.86% to
24.33% during these two periods. Bank ownership concentration was consistent at
9% of outstanding shares though the period. Panel (C) shows that the number of
firms with bank ownership in the period before and after the crisis was very similar.
Also bank ownership concentration in these firms between these two periods seems

not to be different (this is because of the Thai regulation, which allows banks to ho
shares in non-financial firms at not more than 10%, see chapter/oar).
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Table 7.6
The Comparison of Ownership Concentration between 1993-1996 and 1998-2000
Panel A: The Largest and the Top Five Largest Ownership Concentration

This table presents the results of the comparison of the largest and the top five largest ownership concentrati
1996) and (1998-2000).
Ownership Concentration
(1993-1996) (1998-2000)
The Largest Ownership Concentration 28.17 29.28
The Top Five Largest Ownership Concentration 51.55 54.46

Panel B : Ownership Categories Concentration

This table presents the results of the comparison of the ownership categories concentration between (1993-1996)
2000).
Ownership Concentration
1993-1996 1998-2000
32.70
24.84
30.33
15.65
9.32
21.86

Individual or Family
Domestic-Corporation
Foreign Investor
Other Financial Institution
Bank
Government

32.10
26.44
33.14
20.28
9.20
29.08

Panel C: T h e N u m b e r of Firms with B a n k Ownership and B a n k Ownership Concentration

This table presents the comparison of the number of firms with bank ownership and its concentration between (1
(1998-2000).
No. of Firms Bank Ownership Concentration
(%)
1993-1996

1998-2000

1993-1996

1998-2000

Firms with Bank Ownership 60 67 6.8 5

In addition, Table 7.7 reports that the concentration of managerial ownership
and non-managerial ownership during theperiod prior to the crisis (1993-1996) and
after the crisis (1998-2000) is not significantly different. That is, managerial
concentration was 29.01% (between 1993-1996) and 26% (between 1998-2000),
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while that of non-managerial ownership was around 27.52% to 28.58% during these
two periods. Surprisingly, this study finds that managerial-family ownership
concentration significantly decreased from 35.71% to 27.55%, while that of
managerial-nonfamily ownership increased from 17.64% to 21.14% of outstanding
shares.
Overall, this analysis suggests that the Thai ownership structure between the
period before and after the crisis was not significantly different. This, however,
excludes the concentration of managerial-family ownership concentrations that was

found to be lower (around 9%) during the period after the crisis compared to that prior

to the crisis. This may be because after the crisis, managerial-family shareholders had

less incentive to control firms and attempted to decrease their cash-flow rights in th
firms. However, these managerial-family shareholders still had adequate controlling
power to control the firm's management because they were holding averagely more
than 25% of shares in the firm.
Table 7.7
T h e Comparison of Managerial Shareholding between 1993-1996 and 1998-2000
This table presents the results of the comparison of managerial ownership, including managerial-family ownership, managerialnonfamily ownership, and non-managerial ownership between (1993-1996) and (1998-2000).

Managerial Ownership
Concentration
1993-1996
1998-2000

Managerial Ownership 29.01 26.00
Managerial with Family Ownership 35.71 27.55
Managerial with Nonfamily Ownership
17.64
Non-Managerial Ownership 27.52 28.58

21.14
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IA T h e Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm Performance
between 1998-2000
This section presents the relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance between 1998-2000. Before moving on to investigate of this
relationship, this section examines for the multicolinearity condition to test whether
the independent variables (ownership variables and other control variables) are

significantly correlated to each other. The correlation coefficients and the significant
levels of the independent variables are shown in Appendix 1-1. The correlation

coefficients of the independent variables (included in this further study) are found no
to be significantly correlated each other. Some of them are significantly correlated to
each other, but the coefficients are very small. Moreover, the homoscedasticity

testing is conducted. The results show that the variables of the residual of regression
are constant (see Appendix 1-2).
This section is divided into four parts. First, the effect of controlling
ownership on firm performance and the comparison of performance between firms
with controlling ownership and those with non-controlling ownership is analyzed.
Secondly, there is an investigation on the impact of controlling ownership categories
(family, domestic-corporation and foreign ownership), on firm performance, and also
the comparison of performance between firms with these controlling ownership
categories and firms with non-controlling ownership. Thirdly, the influence of
managerial ownership on firm performance is investigated, and the comparison
between performance of firms with managerial ownership and firms with nonmanagerial ownership is also examined. Finally, there is an investigation into the
non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance.

Chapter 7: Empirical Finding II

193

7.4.1 T h e Effect of Controlling Ownership on Firm Performance
This section presents the effect of controlling ownership on firm performance,
and a comparison between the performance of firms with controlling ownership and
firms with non-controlling ownership. Similar to the previous chapter, the effect of
controlling ownership on firm performance is captured by the controlling ownership
variables (Controlown) defined as the percentage of shares (>25%) held by the largest
shareholder. Table 7.8, in columns (a) and (b), show that the coefficients of
controlling ownership (Controlown) are insignificantly related to both average returns
and market-adjusted returns. In the profitability regressions, columns (c) and (d),
however, report that the coefficients of controlling ownership are positive and
significant at the 5% and the 10% levels to the ROA and the S/A respectively.
Table 7.9 presents the comparison between the performance of firms with
controlling ownership and firms with non-controlling ownership. The difference in
their performance is captured by the dummy variables of Controlown (indicating
whether or not firms are controlled by controlling shareholders). The results report

that the coefficients of Controlown are insignificantly related to the market measures.
However, it is found to be positive and significant to the ROA and the S/A at the 10%
level.
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Table 7.8
The Effect of Controlling Ownership on Firm Performance (1998-2000)

This table presents the results of the effect of controlling ownership and firm performance. Firm performance in columns (a) an
(b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) show the
profitability ratios ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The effect of controlling ownership on firm performance is
captured by the controlling ownership variable (Controlown) indicating the percentage of shares (>25%) held by the largest
shareholder. The Mest is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables

Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(10.55)

0.003***
(9.33)

-0.001***
(-2.51)

-0.002**
(-2.16)

E/P

0.009**
(2.75)

0.0092**
(2.21)

0.043
(12.05)

0.074***
(3.04)

DEBT

-0.001
(-0.74)

-0.004
(-0.27)

-0 92***
(-4.88)

-0.37***
(-2.93)

SIZE

-0.024**
(-2.14)

-0.028**
(-2.23)

0.042***
(4.78)

0.48***
(7.9)

AGE

-0.048
(-1.47)

0.023
(0.61)

-0.053**
(-2.1)

-0.13
(-0.78)

Controlown

0.014
(0.53)

-0.005
(-0.06)

0.1**
(2.23)

0.29*
(1.57)

Intercept

-0.097
(1.5)

_j 3***

(6.07)

0.042
(1.19)

-0.36
(-1.45)

0.41
29 04***

0.53
30.72***

0.43
50.86***

0.21
18.58***

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Table 7.9
The Comparison of Performance between Firms with Controlling Ownership
and Firms with Non-Controlling Ownership (1998-2000)
This table presents the results of the comparison between performance of firms with controlling ownership and
with non-controlling ownership. Firm performance in columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns (AR= average returns and
A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) show the profitability (ROA= return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset).
The comparison between performance offirmswith controlling ownership andfirmswith non-controlling ownership is captured
by the dummy variable of controlling ownership (Controlown) indicating whether or notfirmsare controlled by controlling
shareholders. The Mest is reported in parentheses.
Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)

(ROA)
(b)

(°)

Sales-to-Asset

(S/A)

RISK

0.003***
(15.08)

0.003***
(10.32)

-0.001***
(-2.46)

-0.001
(-1.45)

E/P

0.008**
(2.5)

0.0065*
(1.72)

0.043***
(11.98)

0.078***
(3.2)

DEBT

-0.017
(-1.07)

-0.012
(-0.55)

-0.1***
(-4.87)

-0.37**
(-2.88)

SIZE

-0.026
(-1.61)

-0.033***
(-3.28)

0.043***
(4.77)

0.48***
(7.97)

AGE

0.033
(1.46)

0.039
(1.35)

-0.054**
(-2.1)

-0.14
(-0.78)

Controlown

-0.002
(-0.24)

-0.023
(-0.1)

0.02*
(1.73)

0.11*
(1.85)

0.022
(0.75)

-1.27
(-4.76)

0.022
(0.55)

-0.34**
(-1.41)

0.43
58.42***

0.40
34.8***

0.20
23.50***

0.21
18.86***

Intercept

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.

From the results presented in Table 7.8 and 7.9, this study accepts the hypotheses
Hi and HiA. This study suggests that with an increase by 1% of controlling

ownership, the ROA and the S/A will increase by 0.1% and 0.29% respectively in th

case of Thailand between 1998-2000. This study also finds evidence to support the
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fact that firms with controlling ownership have a higher profitability ( 2 % for R O A
and 11% for S/A) than firms with non-controlling ownership. Overall, this study
suggests that the relationship between controlling ownership and firm performance
during the period after the crisis (1998-2000) seems to be similar to those found prior
to the crisis (1993-1996) (as presented in chapter six). However, less significant
relationship is found between controlling ownership and the market returns in
Thailand during the period after the crisis. Also firms with controlling ownership do
not perform differently (in terms of market returns) from firms with non-controlling

ownership. In this regard, it is possible that after the financial crisis, some effect,
as noise trader risk, or asymmetric information may have greater influence on market
returns than controlling ownership. Moreover, it may be because after the crisis,
controlling shareholders raised the funds for their firm's projects by issuing shares
rather than borrowing as after the crisis access to bonowing was typically limited.
This may have conveyed bad news about the firms to the market and this would have
affected firm's share prices.

7.4.2 The Impact of Controlling Ownership Categories on Firm Performance
This section reports on the impact of controlling ownership categories (namely
family, domestic-corporation and foreign investors) on firm performance. This impact
is captured by the FAMILY, CORP and FOREIGN variables [indicating the
percentage of shares (>25%) held by family, domestic-corporation, or foreigncontrolling ownership respectively]. Table 7.10 illustrates that the coefficients of
FAMILY and CORP are positive and insignificant while those of FOREIGN are
negative and insignificant to the average returns and the market-adjusted returns.
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Table 7.10
The Effect of Controlling Ownership Categories on Stock Returns (1998-2000)
This table presents the results of the effect of controlling ownership categories on the stock returns (AR = average returns and
A M R = market-adjusted returns). The controlling ownership categories include individual or family, domestic-corporation and
foreign ownership. T h e effect of controlling ownership categories on firm performance is captured by the F A M I L Y , C O R P and
F O R E I G N variables. These variables indicate the percentage of shares (>25%) family, domestic-corporation or foreign
shareholders. T h e f-test is reported in parentheses.

Dependent Variables

Independent Variables
Average
Returns

Average
Returns

(AR)
(c)

MarketAdjusted
Returns
(AMR)
(d)

(AR)
(e)

MarketAdjusted
Returns
(AMR)
(f)

0.003***
(9.71)

0.002***
(4.6)

0.002***
(3.74)

0.001*
(1.88)

0.001*
(1.0)

0.008
(1.33)

0.006
(1.04)

0.007
(1.07)

0.006
(0.86)

0.0022
(0.21)

0.0027
(0.57)

DEBT

-0.07**
(-2.08)

-0.067**
(-1.62)

0.0068
(0.2)

0.021
(0.43)

0.037
(0.54)

0.13**
(1.17)

SIZE

-0.03
(-1.6)

-0.034
(-1.46)

-0.014
(-0.82)

-0.022
(-1.03)

0.007
(0.22)

-0.041
(-0.75)

AGE

0.07**
(1.07)

0.87***
(1.13)

-0.082
(-1.42)

-0.082
(-1.12)

0.075*
(1.38)

0.89**
(1.15)

FAMILY

0.057
(1.07)

0.079
(1.05)
0.17
(1.7)

0.18
(1.44)
-0.14
(-1.7)

-0.09
(-0.66)

RISK

E/P

Average
Returns

(AR)
(a)

MarketAdjusted
Returns
(AMR)
(b)

0.003***
(9.42)

CORP

FOREIGN

Intercept

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

-0.014
(-1.63)

-1.33***
(-2.85)

0.055
(0.7)

-1.25***
(-3.32)

-0.02
(-0.22)

.1 29***
(-3.07)

0.56
26.76***

0.53
17 40***

0.28
5 o***

0.24
2 52***

0.15

0.11

Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.

In terms of profitability regressions, Table 7.11 shows that the coefficients of
FAMILY are positive and significant to the ROA and the S/A at the 10% level. The
coefficients of CORP and FOREIGN, however, are positive but not significant to
these profitability measures.
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Table 7.11
The Effect of Controlling Ownership Categories on Profitability (1998-2000)
This table presents the results of the effect of controlling ownership categories on the profitability (RO A= return on assets and
S/A= sales-to-asset). T h e controlling ownership categories include individual or family, domestic-corporation and foreign
ownership. T h e effect of controlling ownership categories on firm performance is captured by the F A M I L Y , C O R P and
F O R E I G N variables. These variables indicate the percentage of shares (>25%) held by family, domestic-corporation or foreign
shareholders. T h e Mest is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Return on
Assets

Sales-toAsset

Return on
Assets

Sales-toAsset

Return on
Assets

Sales-toAsset

(ROA)
(a)

(S/A)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

(ROA)
(e)

(S/A)
(f)

0.001
(0.5)

-0.002
(-1.02)

-0.004
(-0.71)

0.003
(0.77)

-0.001***
(-3.9)

0.002
(1.28)

E/P

0.044***
(7.97)

0 ]***
(2.68)

0.036***
(8.01)

-0.004
(-0.72)

0.007***
(2.55)

0.009
(0.5)

DEBT

-0.16***
(-5.68)

-0.37*
(-1.9)

-0.086*
(-1.86)

-1.06***
(-2.97)

-0.11
(-1.62)

-0.07
(-1.76)

SIZE

0.033**
(2.3)

0.57***
(5.8)

0.06**
(2.86)

0.53***
(3.3)

0.094***
(2.87)

0.83***
(3.98)

AGE

0.067
(1.24)

0.82**
(2.2)

-0.22**
(-2.98)

0.07
(0.13)

-0.098
(-1.58)

-0.51**
(-1.27)

FAMILY

0.34*
(1.65)

1.4*
(1.54)
0.094
(0.75)

1.15
(1.18)
0.13
(1.15)

0.38
(0.66)

RISK

CORP

FOREIGN

Intercept

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

-0.013
(-0.2)

-1.47***
(-3.1)

0.13
(1.28)

0.01
(0.14)

-0.06
(-0.53)

-1.34*
(-1.8)

0.47
26.35***

0.28
11.72***

0.42
8.28***

0.20
3.75***

0.36
7 §***

0.3

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Based on these results presented in Table 7.10 and 7.11, this study accepts the
hypothesis HJB, and suggests that with an addition of 1% of family ownership, ROA
and S/A increase by 0.34% and 1.4% respectively in the case of Thailand during the
period after the crisis (1998-2000). This study, however, rejects the hypotheses Hie,
and HID. This is because domestic-corporation-controlling ownership and foreign-

controlling ownership are not significantly related to firm performance. These results

are consistent with those found in the period prior to the crisis (as presented in cha
six), which confirm that only family-controlling shareholders have a strong positive
relationship with firm performance.
Moreover, this further study has also carried out a comparison on the
performance of these controlling ownership categories with non-controlling
ownership. The dummy variables of FAMILY, CORP and FOREIGN (that indicate
whether or not firms controlled by family-controlling ownership, domesticcorporation-controlling ownership, or foreign-controlling ownership respectively) are
applied to capture the differences. Table 7.12 shows that the coefficients of FAMILY
are positive but not significant to the market measures. They, however, are positive
and significant to profitability in terms of both ROA and S/A at the 10% and 1%
levels respectively. The coefficients of CORP and FOREIGN are also positive and
significant to the S/A at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. The coefficients of
CORP and FOREIGN, however, are not significant to the market measures and ROA.
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Table 7.12
The Comparison of Performance between Firms with Controlling Ownership
Categories and Non-Controlling Ownership (1998-2000)
This table presents the results of the comparison between performance of firms with controlling ownership categories and firms
with non-controlling ownership. The controlling ownership categories include individual or family, domestic-corporation and
foreign ownership. Firm performance in columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R = marketadjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) show the profitability ratios ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). A
comparison between performances of firms with controlling ownership categories and firms with non-controlling ownership is
captured by the d u m m y variable of family-controlling ownership ( F A M I L Y ) , domestic-corporation-controlling ownership
( C O R P ) or foreign-controlling ownership ( F O R E I G N ) indicating whether or not firms are controlled by family, domesticcorporations or foreign shareholders. The Mest is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(14.15)

0.003***
(9.17)

-0.003***
(-2.5)

-0.002*
(-1.95)

E/P

0.0078**
(2.46)

0.006
(1.54)

0.042***
(12.18)

0.066***
(2.87)

DEBT

-0.035**
(-2.02)

-0.028
(-1.25)

_0 j***
(-5.68)

-0.4***
(-3.24)

SIZE

-0.026***
(-3.2)

-0.033***
(-3.13)

0.042***
(4.75)

0.52***
(8.93)

AGE

0.051**
(2.05)

0.065**
(2.07)

-0.024
(-0.88)

0.17
(1.0)

FAMILY

0.008
(0.86)

0.03
(1.53)

0.034*
(1.8)

0.2***
(2.87)

CORP

0.003
(0.32)

0.086
(1.16)

0.02
(0.81)

0.13*
(1.45)

FOREIGN

-0.012
(-1.03)

0.06
(1.0)

-0.004
(-0.21)

0.16**
(1.96)

Intercept

1.61
(0.47)

.] 3***
(-2.93)

0.022
(0.61)

-0.76***
(-3.1)

0.43
42.77***

0.40
26.97***

0.41
40.52***

0.22
17.21***

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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In regard to the results presented in Table 7.12, this study accepts the hypotheses
HIE, HIF and HIG, and suggests that firms with controlling shareholders (no matter
what types they are) perform higher than those with non-controlling shareholders.
That is, firms with family-controlling ownership have ROA (3.4 %) and S/A (20%)
higher than firms with non-controlling ownership. Also firms with domesticcorporation-controlling ownership or foreign-controlling ownership have S/A (13%
and 16% respectively) higher than firms without controlling ownership.

7.4.3 The Influence of Bank equity Ownership on Firm Performance
This section presents a comparison between performance of firms with bank
equity ownership and those with non-bank equity ownership. Performance of firms
with bank ownership and firms without bank ownership is differentiated by the
dummy variable of bank equity ownership (BANK) (indicating whether or not firms
have bank ownership in the top ten shareholders). Table 7.13 illustrates that the
coefficients of BANK are insignificantly related to the average returns, the marketadjusted returns and the ROA. However, it is negative and significant at the 1% level
to the S/A. This implies that firms with bank ownership have a lower S/A (35%) than
firms with non-bank equity ownership. Based on these results, this study rejects the

hypothesis H2. In sum, these results are consistent with that found in the period pri
to the financial crisis (1993-1996), suggest that firms with bank ownership do not
have a higher performance than firms with non-bank ownership. In fact, firms with
bank ownership perform lower in terms of sales-to-asset ratio than firms with nonbank ownership.
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Table 7.13
The Comparison of Performance between Firms with Bank Ownership and
Firms with Non-Bank Ownership (1998-2000)
This table presents the results of the comparison of performance between firms with bank ownership and firms with non-bank
ownership. Firm performance in columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R = market-adjusted
returns), and columns (c) and (d) show the profitability ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The comparison
between performance of firms with bank ownership and firms with non-bank ownership is captured by the d u m m y variable of
bank ownership ( B A N K ) indicating whether or not firms have bank ownership in the top ten shareholders. T h e West is reported
in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(15.24)

0.003***
(10.44)

-0.004**
(-2.12)

-0.002*
(-1,67)

E/P

0.008**
(2.52)

0.007*
(1.72)

0.042***
(12.33)

0.07***
(3.11)

DEBT

-0.026
(-1.54)

0.014
(0.53)

(-5-41)

-0 33***
(-2.85)

SIZE

-0.028***
(-3.36)

-0.038***
(-3.47)

0.042***
(4.7)

0.6***
(10.40)

AGE

0.033
(1.4)

0.035
(1.18)

-0.04*
(-1.51)

-0.10
(-0.62)

BANK

0.003
(0.27)

0.0078
(0.67)

-0.007
(-0.8)

-0.35***
(-5.48)

Intercept

0.033
(1-0)

-1.26***
(-2.01)

0.044
(1.25)

-0.67***
(-2.86)

0.42
57.73***

0.39
33.8***

0.4
52.32***

0.25
29.50***

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.

This study also examines the difference between performance of firms with
bank-managerial ownership, bank-non-managerial ownership, and firms with nonbank ownership. The dummy variables of bank-managerial ownership (BANK*DIR)
and bank-non-managerial ownership (BANK*NONDIR) are used to capture the
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difference of firm performance. The variable B A N K * D I R indicates whether or not
firms have bank-managerial ownership, while BANK*NONDIR indicates whether or
not firms have bank-non-managerial ownership in the top ten shareholders. Table
7.14 presents that neither BANK*DIR nor BANK*NONDIR are significant to the
market-based measures or the ROA. The coefficients of BANK*DIR and
BANK*NONDIR, however, are negative and significant to S/A at the 1% level.
From these results presented, this study rejects the hypotheses H2A and H2B
because firms with bank-managerial ownership or firms with bank-non-managerial
ownership do not perform higher than those with non-bank ownership. In fact, it is
found that firms with bank-managerial or with bank-non-managerial ownership
perform lower in terms of sales-to-asset ratio (40% and 30%) than firms with nonbank ownership. These results seem to be consistent with the results found between
1993-1996 in respect of there being a negative relationship between firms with bankmanagerial ownership and S/A. However, in the period after the crisis, this study
finds that firms with bank-non-managerial ownership are also negatively related to

profitability. In this regard, it is possible that after the crisis, the quality of ba
affected the process of financial intermediation and banks could no longer afford to
provide intensive monitoring to the firms.
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Table 7.14
The Comparison of Performance between Firms with Bank-Managerial
Ownership, Firms with Bank-Non-Managerial Ownership, and Firms with NonBank Ownership (1998-2000)

This table presents the results of the comparison of performance between firms with bank-managerial ownersh
managerial ownership, andfirmswith non-bank ownership. Firm performance in columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns
(AR= average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) show the profitability (ROA= return on
assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The comparison between performance offirmswith bank-managerial ownership, bank-nonmanagerial ownership, andfirmswith non-bank ownership are captured by the dummy variables of bank-managerial ownership
(BANK*DIR) and managerial-non-managerial ownership (BANK*NONDIR) indicating whether or notfirmshave bankmanagerial ownership, bank-non-managerial ownership respectively. The Mest is reported in parentheses
Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average Returns

MarketAdjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sal es-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(16.73)

0.003***
(13.33)

-0.001**
(-2.14)

-0.002
(-1.64)

E/P

0.008**
(2.52)

0.007
(1.72)

0.042***
(12.32)

0.07***
(3.1)

DEBT

-0.026
(-1.53)

-0.014
(-0.64)

_0 ]***
(-5.42)

-0 33***
(-2.81)

SIZE

-0.028***
(-3.36)

-0.04***
(-3.46)

0.042***
(4.71)

0.6***
(10.17)

AGE

0.033
(1.37)

0.037
(1.21)

-0.037
(-1.43)

-0.2
(-0.12)

BANK*DIR

0.0018
(0.15)

0.011
(0.68)

-0.003
(-0.24)

-0.4***
(-4.8)

BANK*NONDIR

0.003
(0.26)

0.005
(0.37)

-0.12
(-0.95)

-0.3***
(-3.75)

Intercept

0.03
(1.0)

-1.27
(-1.56)

0.043
(1.19)

-0.67***
(-3.2)

0.42
47.67***

0.39
29 o***

0.40
44.82***

0.23
27.84***

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

* Indicate significance at the 10% level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
** * Indicate significance at the 1% level.
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1AA T h e Effect of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance
The effect of managerial ownership on firm performance is presented in this
section. The managerial variable (DIR), which is defined as the percentage of shares
held by members of the board of directors, is adopted to examine the effect. Table

7.15 illustrates that the coefficients of DIR are positive and insignificant to the mark
performance measures. Similarly, they are positively and insignificantly associated
with the profitability measures. This study also compares the performance between
firms with managerial ownership and firms with non-managerial ownership. To
capture the difference, the dummy variable of DIR (indicating whether or not firms
have managerial ownership) is used. Table 7.16 presents that the coefficients of DIR
are positive but not significant to market-based and accounting-based measures.
From the results presented above, this study rejects the hypothesis H3 because
managerial shareholders are not significantly related to firm performance in Thailand
during the period after the crisis (1998-2000). These results are inconsistent with
those found in the period prior to the financial crisis (1993-1996), which confirm that
managerial ownership is positively related to firm performance. In particular, this
study suggests that a less significant relationship between managerial ownership and
firm performance may be because managerial shareholders divert resources for their
personal use or for their private benefits. Another possibility for lesser significance
this relationship is the absence of strong legal protection of minority shareholders as
well as other external factors (for example, takeovers) in countries (such as Thailand)
affected by crisis. This can increase the agency cost between managerial shareholders
and outside shareholders and in turn affects firm performance (La Porta et al., 1998).
Moreover, regarding the results of the comparison between performance of firms with
managerial ownership and those with non-managerial ownership, this study rejects the
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hypothesis H3A.

This is because the results show that firms with managerial

ownership and firms with non-managerial ownership do not perform differently in the

case of Thailand during the post-crisis (1998-2000). This result is consistent with t
finds during the pre-crisis period (1993-1996).
Table 7.15
The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance (1998-2000)
This table presents the results of the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance. Firm performance in columns (a) and
(b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) show the
profitability { R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The effects of managerial ownership on firm performance are
captured by the managerial ownership variable (DIR) indicating the percentage of shares held by members of the board of
directors. The /-test is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables

Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(14.08)

0.003***
(17.57)

-0.001
(-0.73)

-0.003
(-1.62)

E/P

0.007***
(2.43)

0.0075***
(2.5)

0.03***
(8.19)

0.062***
(2.45)

DEBT

-0.084***
(-4.75)

-0.09***
(-4.48)

-0.14***
(-5.84)

-0.41**
(-2.51)

SIZE

-0.013
(-1.31)

-0.019
(-1.55)

0.057***
(4.H)

0.72***
(7.64)

AGE

0.05
(1.42)

0.08**
(2.07)

-0.039
(-0.82)

0.17
(0.54)

DIR

0.07
(1.22)

0.06
(1.41)

0.071
(0.59)

0.047
(0.01)

Intercept

-0.01
(-0.22)

_1 34***
(-3.46)

0.025
(0.4)

-0.14**
(-3.18)

0.69
66.97***

0.71
52.98***

0.53
35.73***

0.33
16.30***

Adjusted R-Squared

F-statistic

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Table 7.16
The Comparison between Performance of Firms with Managerial Ownership
and Firms with Non-Managerial Ownership (1998-2000)
This table presents the results of the comparison between performance of firms with managerial ownership and firms with nonmanagerial ownership. Firm performance in columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R =
market-adjusted returns), and in columns (c) and (d) show the profitability ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The
comparison between performance of firms with managerial ownership and firms with non-managerial ownership is captured by
the d u m m y variable of managerial ownership (DIR) indicating whether or not firms have managerial ownership. The Mest is
reported in parentheses

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables

Average Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(13.6)

0.003***
(12.1)

-0.001***
(-2.87)

-0.003**
(-2.49)

E/P

0.01***
(3.83)

0.01***
(3.0)

0.035***
(8.01)

0.055***
(3.0)

DEBT

-0.03
(-2.04)

-0.021
(-1.0)

_Q 1***

(-5.64)

-0.3***
(-2.8)

SIZE

-0.022***
(-2.9)

-0.031***
(-3.1)

0.046***
(5.18)

0.46***
(8.75)

AGE

0.044*
(1.92)

0.057*
(1.9)

-0.022
(-1.1)

-0.002
(-0.15)

DIR

0.01
(1.06)

0.052
(1.13)

0.013
(1.0)

0.03
(0.56)

Intercept

-0.0013
(-0.4)

-1.33***
(-3.38)

-0.025
(-0.53)

-0.43*
(-1.84)

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

0.39
50.46***

0.40
29.09***

0.40
52.23***

0.21
21.43***

Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.

This section further examines the effect of managerial-family ownership, and
managerial-nonfamily ownership on firm performance. The variables of managerialfamily ownership (DIR*FAMILY) (indicating the percentage of shares held by the
managerial-family shareholders) and managerial-nonfamily ownership
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( D I R * N O N F A M I L Y ) (indicating the percentage of shares held by the managerial-

nonfamily shareholders) are used to examine the effect of them on firm performance.
Table 7.17 shows that the coefficients of DIR*FAMILY are insignificant to both
market-based and accounting-based measures.
Table 7.17
The Effect of Managerial-Family Ownership on Firm Performance (1998-2000)
This table presents the results of me effect of managerial-family ownership and firm performance. Firm performance in columns
(a) and (b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) show
the profitability ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). T h e effect of managerial-family ownership on firm
performance is captured by the managerial-family ownership variable ( D I R * F A M I L Y ) indicating the percentage of shares held
by managerial-family shareholders. The Ntest is reported in parentheses.

Dependent Variables

Independent Variables

Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

0.003***
(14.76)

0.003***
(14.71)

-0.001*
(-1.73)

-0.002*
(-1.93)

0.004
(1.6)

0.004
(1.58)

0.023***
(7.94)

0.037***
(2.54)

DEBT

.0.044**
(-2.3)

-0.046**
(-2.37)

-0.13***
(-5.85)

-0.27***
(-2.63)

SIZE

-0.027***
(-2.68)

-0.026***
(-2.6)

0.056***
(4.86)

0.48***
(9.01)

AGE

0.057*
(1.86)

0.056*
(1.84)

-0.03
(-1.0)

0.04
(0-24)

DIR*FAMILY

-0.071
(-1.54)

0.26
(1.55)

0.08
(0.65)

1.25
(0.96)

Intercept

0.019
(0.47)

-1.32
(-1.55)

0.006
(0.13)

-0.53**
(-2.32)

0.41
40.02***

0.40
39.77***

0.40
37.47***

0.21
21.72***

RISK

FTP

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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In terms of managerial-nonfamily ownership, Table 7.18 illustrates that the
coefficients of DIR*NONFAMILY are also insignificant to both market returns and
profitability measures.
Table 7.18
The Effect of Managerial-Nonfamily Ownership on Firm Performance
(1998-2000)
This table presents the results of the effect of managerial-nonfamily ownership and firm performance. Firm performance in
columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns (AR= average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d)
show the profitability (ROA= return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The effect of managerial-nonfamily ownership on firm
performance is captured by the managerial-family ownership variable (DIR*NONFAMILY) indicating the percentage of shares
held by managerial-nonfamily shareholders. The t-test is reported in parentheses.
Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.004***
(13.06)

0.004***
(10.56)

-0.001
(-0.57)

-0.002
(-0.63)

E/P

0.0051
(1.15)

0.01
(1.48)

0.032***
(6.11)

0.068
(1.55)

DEBT

-0 09***
(-3-5)

_Q J***
(-3.24)

-0 13***
(-4.39)

-0.11
(-0.43)

SIZE

-0.047***
(-2.77)

-0.05**
(-2.28)

0.035*
(1.73)

0.63***
(3.72)

AGE

0.14**
(2-3)

0.12*
(1.8)

0.069
(1.02)

0.75
(1.31)

DIR*NONFAMILY

0.016
(0.32)

-0.2
(-1.34)

0.05
(0.58)

0.96
(1.03)

Intercept

-0.003
(-0.41)

_j 3***
(2.76)

-0.06
(-0.83)

_2 19***
(-3.61)

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

0.70
11.03***

0.67
21.18***

0.65
25.10***

0.35
8.0***

* Indicate significance at the 10% level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Based on these results, this study rejects the hypotheses H3B and H3C as firms
with managerial-family ownership or firms with managerial-nonfamily ownership do
not significantly related to firm performance. The results, regarding the relationship
between managerial-nonfamily ownership and firm performance in the period after the

crisis, are consistent with that found in the period prior to the crisis (1993-1996) (a
presented in chapter six). In contrast, the relationship between managerial-family
ownership and firm performance during the period after the crisis (1998-2000) is
different to that found during the period prior to the crisis (1993-1996). That is, a
significant relationship between managerial-family ownership and firm performance

in the period after the crisis is less than that in the period prior to the crisis. The
significant relationship between them can possibly be because of declining
managerial-family ownership concentration between 1998-2000, which was lower
compared to that between 1993-1996 (see Table 7.7).
The comparison of performance between firms with managerial-family
ownership, managerial-nonfamily ownership, and those with non-managerial
ownership are also examined. The dummy variables of DIR*FAMILY (indicating
whether or not firms have managerial-family ownership) and DIR*NONFAMILY
(indicating whether or not firms have managerial-nonfamily ownership) are adopted
for this analysis. Table 7.19 shows that the coefficients of DIR*FAMILY are positive
and significant to the market-adjusted returns at the 1% level and to the ROA at the
5% level. They are, however, insignificant to the average returns or the S/A. The
results also report that the estimated coefficients of DIR*NONFAMILY are not
significantly associated to market returns and profitability.
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Table 7.19
The Comparison between Performance of Firms with Managerial-Family
Ownership, Managerial-Nonfamily Ownership, and Firms with Non-Managerial
Ownership (1998-2000)
This table presents the results of the comparison between performance of firms with managerial-family ownership, managerialnonfamily ownership, and firms with non-managerial ownership. Firm performance in columns (a) and (b) shows the market
returns ( A R = average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d) show the profitability ratios ( R O A =
return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The comparisons between performance of firms with managerial-family ownership,
managerial-nonfamily ownership andfirmswith non-managerial ownership are captured by the d u m m y variables of managerialfamily ownership ( D I R * F A M I L Y ) and managerial-non-managerial ownership ( D I R * N O N F A M I L Y ) indicating whether or not
firms have managerial-family ownership, and whether or not managerial-nonfamily ownership respectively. T h e Mest is reported
in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(13.62)

0.003***
(8.93)

-0.001***
(-2.71)

-0.003***
(-2.37)

E/P

0.01***
(3.83)

0.01***
(3.02)

0.035***
(11.43)

0.056***
(3.03)

DEBT

-0.031**
(-2.05)

-0.022
(-1.08)

_0 j***
(-5.73)

-0.31***
(-2.9)

SIZE

-0.022***
(-2-9)

-0.032***
(-3.05)

0.046***
(5.22)

0.48***
(8.77)

AGE

0.046*
(1.95)

0.061**
(2.03)

-0.015
(-0.56)

0.026
(0.15)

DIR*FAMILY

0.015
(1.45)

0 j j***
(3.26)

0.083**
(2.02)

0.16
(0.96)

DIR*NONFAMILY

0.005
(0.53)

0.019
(0.66)

-0.02
(-0.56)

0.093
(0.63)

Intercept

-0.003
(-0.48)

_j 31***
(-3.37)

-0.0003
(-0.07)

-0.47**
(-1.97)

0.38
43.21***

0.34
24.84***

0.40
46.32***

0.21
18.91***

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.

From these results, this study accepts the hypotheses H3D and rejects H 3 E- This

is because between 1998-2000, firms with managerial-family ownership have higher
market-adjusted returns (11%) and ROA (8.3%) than those with non-managerial
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ownership. However, it is found that there is no difference between performance of
firms with managerial-nonfamily ownership and those with non-managerial
ownership. These relationships are inconsistent with those found between 1993-1996,
which confirm that there is no difference between performance of firms with
managerial-family ownership and firms with non-managerial ownership. Also firms
with managerial-nonfamily ownership have lower ROA than firms with nonmanagerial ownership between 1993-1996. Based on these results, this study suggests
that firms with managerial-family ownership perform better than those with non-

managerial ownership in Thailand in the period after the crisis. In this regard, it is

possible that after the crisis, the managerial-family shareholders (who mostly are the
owners of the firm) have a higher incentive to restore their firm's condition and
increase their firm's performance compared to those who are non-managerial
shareholders.

7.5 The Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm
Performance
This section examines the existence of a non-linear relationship between
managerial ownership and firm performance. To capture this relationship, DIR, DIR
and DIR3 variables (defining the percentage of shares, the square and the cube of the
percentage of shares held by the managerial shareholders respectively) are used. To
be consistent with the previous studies in the literature (cf, Morck et al., 1988;
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasy, 1999), the signs of coefficients DIR,
DIR3 should be positive and those of DIR2 should be negative.
Unexpectedly, the results in Table 7.20 show that the coefficients of DIR, DIR2,
and DIR3 are not as of expected signs. The coefficients of DIR and DIR3 are negative
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and those of D I R 2 are positive. In column (a), the results show that the coefficients of
DIR, DIR2, and DIR3 are significant to the average returns at the 5% level. Using the

same method of calculation to obtain the turning points (as presented in chapter six)
this study finds that the turning points of managerial performance are 12.12%
(minimum) and 40.08% (maximum) in regard to the average returns. It can be

implied that average returns are negatively related to managerial ownership in the 0%
to 12.12% range and positively related in the 12.12% to 40.08% range and negatively
related when managerial ownership exceeds 40.08%. The results in Table 7.20
(column b) show that the coefficients of DIR are not significantly related to the

market-adjusted returns. The turning points of market-adjusted returns regression are
found to be 10.60% (minimum) and 46.26% (maximum). Regarding the profitability
measures, Table 7.20 (columns c and d) report that the coefficients of DIR, DIR and
DIR3 are not significant to the ROA and the S/A. The turning points are 19.34%
(minimum) and 54.74% (maximum) for the ROA regression, but there are no turning
points for the S/A regression (see Figure 7.1).
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Table 7.20
The Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm
Performance (1998-2000)
This table presents the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. Firm performance in
columns (a) and fb) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d)
show the profitability ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). T h e non-linear relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance is captured by the managerial ownership (DIR), managerial ownership square (DIR 2 ), and
managerial ownership cube (DIR 3 ). The DIR, DIR 2 and DIR 3 variables indicate the percentage of shares, the square and the cube
of the percentage of shares held by members of the board of directors respectively. The Mest is reported in parentheses.

Dependent Variables

Independent Variables
Average Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

RISK

0.003***
(19.92)

0.003***
(14.43)

-0.001
(-0.65)

-0.002
(-1.43)

E/P

0.0067***
(2.4)

0.0078***
(2.56)

0.031***
(8.17)

0.066***
(2.66)

DEBT

-0.08***
(-4.46)

-0.091***
(-4.45)

-0 14***
(-5.66)

_0 4***
(-2.45)

SIZE

-0.014
(-1.35)

-0.019
(-1.56)

0.056***
(4-07)

0.71 ***
(7.74)

AGE

0.049
(1.38)

0.087**
(2.18)

-0.034
(-0.71)

(1.0)

DIR

-0.255**
(-2.6)

-0.5
(-0.93)

-0.4
(-1.35)

-1.95
(1.6)

DIR2

0.0137**
(2.67)

0.029
(1.71)

0.014
(1.46)

0.039
(-1.0)

DIR3

-0.000175**
(-2.71)

-0.00034
(-2.0)

-0.000126
(-1.44)

-0.0003
(0.83)

Turning points (Maximum%)

40.08

46.26

54.74

-

Turning points (Minimum%)

12.12

10.60

19.34

-

-0.04
(-0.85)

-1.57***
(-9.15)

0.063
(0.73)

-1.48***
(-4-14)

0.68
50.23***

0.71
39.84***

0.53
26.71***

0.38
13.88***

Intercept

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
** * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Figure 7.1
T h e Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm
Performance between 1998-2000
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This study therefore accepts the hypothesis H 4 as the results confirm that there
is a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance (in
terms of the average returns) in Thailand during the post crisis (1998-2000). These
results are different to those found between 1993-1996 and suggest that there is no
existence of the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm

performance. From the difference in the results (regarding the non-linear relationship
between managerial ownership and firm performance) between these two periods, it is

possible that after the crisis, the early stage of managerial shareholding cannot enti
align the interests between owners and managers. As such it is negatively related to
firm performance. After this, managerial shareholding increases and the alignment of
the interests of shareholders and managers arises and thereby increases firm
performance. When managerial shareholding reaches to a certain higher level,
managerial shareholders may perceive that it is worth entrenching the power and thus
deriving benefits from control of firm other than those associated with the firm's
performance maximization.
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7.6 The Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial-Family

Ownership,

Managerial-Nonfamily Ownership and Firm Performance
This section presents the results of the non-linear relationship between
managerial-family ownership, managerial-nonfamily ownership, and firm
performance. The dummy variables of DIR*FAMILY, DIR*FAMILY2 and
DIR*FAMILY (indicating the percentage of shares, the square and the cube of the
percentage of shares held by the managerial-family shareholders respectively) are
used to capture the non-linear relationship between managerial-family ownership and
firm performance. Moreover the DIR*NONFAMILY, DIR*NONFAMILY2 and
DIR*NONFAMILY3 (indicating the percentage of shares, the square and the cube of

the percentage of shares held by the managerial-nonfamily shareholders respectively)
are adopted to capture the non-linear relationship between managerial-nonfamily
ownership and firm performance. The signs of coefficients of DIR*FAMILY,
DIR*FAMILY2 and DIR*FAMILY3 are consistent with those suggested in the
literature and in the previous findings presented in chapter six. That is, the
coefficients of DIR*FAMILY and DIR*FAMILY3 are positive and those of
DIR*FAMILY2 are negative.
The results in Table 7.21 show that the coefficients of DIR*FAMILY,
DIR*FAMILY2 and DIR*FAMILY3 are insignificant to the average returns, market-

adjusted returns, and the ROA. In contrast, they are significant to the S/A at the 1
level. The turning points of managerial-family shareholding associated with S/A are
17.35% (maximum) and 50.51% (minimum) (see Figure 7.2). From the results
presented here, this study accepts the hypothesis H4A, as there is a non-linear
relationship between managerial-family ownership and firm performance (based on

the S/A).
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Table 7.21
The Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial-Family Ownership and Firm
Performance (1998-2000)
This table presents the non-linear relationship between managerial-family ownership and firm performance. Firm performance in
columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and columns (c) and (d)
show the profitability ratios ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The non-linear relationship between managerialnonfamily ownership and firm performance is captured by the managerial-family ownership ( D I R * F A M I L Y ) , managerial-family
ownership square ( D I R * F A M I L Y 2 ) , and managerial-family ownership cube (DIR*FAMILY 3 ).
The DrR*FAMILY,
D I R * F A M I L Y 2 and D I R * F A M I L Y 3 variables indicate the percentage of shares, the square and the cube of the percentage of
shares held by managerial-family shareholders respectively. The Mest is reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

0.003***
(10.40)

0.003***
(8.54)

-0.001
(-0.19)

-0.002
(-0.84)

0.01**
(2.66)

0.008**
(2.28)

0.031***
(6.2)

0.08***
(2.63)

DEBT

-0.063***
(-2.45)

-0.07**
(-2.4)

-0.13***
(-3.24)

-0.58***
(-2.69)

SIZE

0.0006
(0.21)

-0.0023
(-0.15)

0.06***
(3.02)

0.66***
(5.72)

AGE

0.042
(0.86)

0.11*
(2.02)

-0.083
(-1.2)

0.096
(0.24)

DIR*FAMILY

0.083
(0.15)

1.54
(1.22)

0.29
(0.28)

14.72*
(1.52)

DIR*FAMILY 2

-0.0052
(-0.46)

-0.05
(-1.26)

-0.0147
(-0.46)

-0.57*
(-1.9)

DIR*FAMILY 3

0.000065
(0.62)

0.00051
(1.39)

0.000164
(-0.55)

0.0056*
(2.01)

Turning points (Maximum % )

9.67

24.15

12.46

17.35

Turning points (Minimum % )

43.67

40.51

47.28

50.51

Intercept

-0.046
(-0.6)

-1.66
(-6.12)

-0.19
(0.83)

-1.0
(-0.47)

0.68
29.56***

0.75
25.50***

0.45
12.19***

0.38
6.17***

RISK

E/P

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Figure 7.2
T h e Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial-Family Ownership and Firm
Performance between 1998-2000
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The results of the non-linear relationship between managerial-family ownership
and firm performance in Thailand between 1998-2000 are consistent with those found
in the literature (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasy,
1999 for example). However, they are inconsistent with those found between 19931996 (as presented in chapter six). That is, the non-linearity of managerial-family

ownership is not significantly related to firm performance in the period prior to the

crisis (1993-1996), while it is significantly associated with the S/A in the period af

the crisis. In this regard, this study suggests that it is possible that after the cri
managerial-family shareholders (at a certain level of shareholding) may have

perceived that the residual claim only is not large enough so rather pursue the firm'

assets in their interests in order to provide them with more benefits. They therefore

attempt to extract the firm's assets to their accounts or allocate them for their pri
benefits and that can affect firm performance.
In terms of managerial-nonfamily ownership, the signs of coefficients of
DIR*NONFAMILY, DIR*NONFAMILY2 and DIR*NONFAMILY3 .are found to be
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the same of those of DIR, DIR 2 and DIR 3 (presented in Table 7.20). That is, the signs
of DIR*NONFAMILY and DIR*NONFAMILY3 are negative and those of
DIR*NONFAMILY2 are positive. Table 7.22, columns (a) and (b), report that the
coefficients of DIR*NONFAMILY, DIR*NONFAMILY2 and DIR*NONFAMILY3

are significant to the average returns and the market-adjusted returns at the 5% a

10% levels respectively. The turning points of average returns regression are foun
be 9.39% (minimum), 37.27% (maximum) and those of market-adjusted returns
regression are 16.66% (minimum) and 40% (maximum) (see Figure 7.3). From these

results (presented in Table 7.22), it can be interpreted that the average returns a
negatively related to the managerial-nonfamily ownership in the 0% to 9.39% range,
positively related in the 9.39% to 37.27% range, and negatively related when
managerial-nonfamily shareholding goes beyond 31.21%. Similarly, in terms of
market-adjusted returns, they are negatively associated with managerial-nonfamily
ownership in the 0% to 16.66% range, positively in the 16.66% to 40% range, and
negatively related when it exceeds 40%.
In terms of the profitability measures, Table 7.22, columns (c) and (d), show that
the coefficients of DIR*NONFAMILY, DIR*NONFAMILY2 and
DIR*NONFAMILY3 are insignificantly associated to the ROA and the S/A. The
turning points of the ROA and the S/A regressions are 27.10% and 8.59% (minimum),
and 64.55%) and 71.41% (maximum) respectively (see Figure 7.3).
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Table 7.22
The Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial-Nonfamily Ownership and
Firm Performance (1998-2000)
This table presents the non-linear relationship between managerial-nonfamily ownership and firm performance. Firm
performance in columns (a) and (b) shows the market returns ( A R = average returns and A M R = market-adjusted returns), and
columns (c) and (d) show the profitability ( R O A = return on assets and S/A= sales-to-asset). The non-linear relationship between
managerial-nonfamily ownership and firm performance is captured by the managerial-nonfamily ownership
( D I R * N O N F A M I L Y ) , managerial-family ownership square ( D I R * N O N F A M I L Y 2 ) , and managerial-family ownership cube
( D I R * N O N F A M I L Y 3 ) . D E R * N O N F A M I L Y , D I R * N O N F A M I L Y 2 and D I R * N O N F A M I L Y 3 represent the percentage of shares,
the square and the cube of the percentage of shares held by managerial-nonfamily shareholders respectively. T h e i-test is
reported in parentheses.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables
Average
Returns

Market-Adjusted
Returns

Return on
Assets

Sales-to-Asset

(AR)
(a)

(AMR)
(b)

(ROA)
(c)

(S/A)
(d)

0.004***
(13.13)

0.004***
(9.95)

-0.001
(-0.55)

-0.001
(-0.52)

0.0034
(0.75)

0.0076
(1.22)

0.031***
(5.65)

0.082*
(1.78)

-0.09***
(-3.7)

_0 j***

(-3.54)

-0 13***
(-4.04)

-0.13
(-0.51)

SIZE

-0.05***
(-2.92)

-0.055***
(-2.56)

0.034
(1.64)

0.59***
(3.44)

AGE

0.18***
(2.81)

0.18***
(2.47)

0.01
(0.11)

1.11
(1.66)

DIR*NONFAMILY

-0.21**
(-2.2)

-0.8*
(-1.51)

-0.42
(-1.14)

-0.92
(-0.69)

DIR*NONFAMILY 2

0.014**
(2.25)

0.034*
(1.73)

0.011
(0.96)

0.06
(1.41)

DIR*NONFAMILY 3

-0.0002**
(-3.5)

-0.0004*
(-2.25)

-0.00008
(-0.76)

-0.0005
(-1.32)

Turning points (Maximum % )

37.27

40

64.55

71.41

Turning points (Minimum % )

9.39

16.66

27.10

8.59

-0.06
(-1.01)

-1.6
(-8.52)

0.038
(0.33)

-1.55
(-3.8)

0.72
25.44***

0.69
17.96***

0.65
18.80***

0.35
6.17***

RISK

E/P
DEBT

Intercept

Adjusted R-Squared
F-statistic

Indicate significance at the 1 0 % level.
Indicate significance at the 5 % level.
Indicate significance at the 1 % level.
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Figure 7.3
T h e Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial-Nonfamily Ownership and
Firm Performance between 1998-2000

The Non-Linear Relationship between
Managerial-Non-Family Ownership and Stock
Returns

The Non-Linear Relationship between
Managerial-Non-Family Ownership and
Profitability
60.00

5 10.00

£

o.oo

. . . .1

-30
Shareholding (•/•)

Average Returns '

- Market- Adjusted Returns [

48

SO

-•

60

W

80

Shareholding (%)

• - - 'Return on Assets '

Based on these results, this study accepts the hypothesis H4B. That is, a nonlinear relationship exists between managerial-nonfamily ownership and firm
performance (in terms of average returns and market-adjusted returns) in Thailand
between 1998-2000. These results are consistent with those find between 1993-1996.
However, the non-linear relationship between managerial-nonfamily ownership and
firm performance for these two periods moves in opposite ways.

7.7 S u m m a r y and Conclusions
This chapter has examined the Thai ownership structure and its relationship to
firm performance between 1998-2000. In terms of the Thai ownership structure, the
results show that the ownership structure between 1998-2000 is very similar to that

found in the period prior to the financial crisis (1993-1996). That is, on average, t

study finds that the largest shareholders still controlled most Thai firms between 19
2000. They controlled around 30% of outstanding shares in the firm. This study
finds that more than 50% of shares in most firms were in the hands of the top five
shareholders. Regarding controlling ownership categories, the results show that
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individual or family-controlling shareholders controlled most Thai firms, followed by
domestic-corporation shareholders and foreign shareholders between 1998-2000. The
results show that concentration of managerial ownership, including managerialnonfamily ownership between 1998-2000, was not significantly different from those
found between 1993-1996. Managerial-family ownership in the period after the crisis,
however, seems to be lower than that found in the period prior to the crisis
(approximately 9%)
In terms of the relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance, the results can be concluded as follows. First, the results show that there
is a strong positive relationship between controlling ownership and profitability
measures (in terms of ROA and S/A). However, the relationship is less significant for
the average returns and the market-adjusted returns. The results also illustrate that
firms with controlling ownership perform higher (in terms of profitability) than those
with non-controlling ownership. From the results, it seems to be that the significant
relationship between controlling ownership and market returns between 1998-2000 is
lower than that found in the period prior to the crisis (1993-1996).
Secondly, there is a significant relationship between family-controlling
ownership and profitability in Thailand between 1998-2000. In contrast, this study
does not find any evidence to support the existence of a significant relationship
between domestic-corporation-controlling ownership or foreign-controlling ownership
and firm performance in this post crisis period. In comparing the performance of
firms with each category of controlling ownership and firms with non-controlling
ownership, this study suggests that firms with all categories of controlling ownership

have a higher performance (in terms of profitability, but not market returns) than firms
with non-controlling ownership.
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Thirdly, the results show that the difference between the performance of firms
with bank equity ownership and firms with non-bank equity ownership is not found in
Thailand between 1998-2000. In fact, firms with bank ownership have lower

profitability (sales to asset ratio) than firms with non-bank ownership. Interestingly
the results confirm that this poor profitability (compared to firms with non-bank
ownership) seems to be derived from both firms with bank-managerial ownership and
those with bank-nonmanagerial ownership.
Fourthly, the results show that the relationship between managerial ownership
(including managerial-family ownership) and firm performance in the period after the

crisis (1998-2000) is not as significant as that found in the period prior to the cris
(1993-1996). In particular, the results show that firms with managerial-family
ownership have a higher performance (for both market returns and profitability
measures) than firms with non-managerial ownership. This relationship, however, is
not found to be significant in the period prior to the crisis.
Finally, this analysis finds that a non-linear relationship exists between
managerial ownership and the average returns, which is not detected between 19931996. The turning points are 12.12% (minimum) and 40.08% (maximum). The nonlinear relationship is also found between managerial-family ownership and sales-toasset ratio. Its maximum point is found at 17.35% of shareholding and the minimum
point is 50.51% of shareholding. As well there is existence of a non-linear
relationship between managerial-nonfamily and market returns (average returns and
market-adjusted returns). The turning points are 9.39% (minimum) and 37.27%
(maximum) for the average returns; and 16.66% (minimum) and 40% (maximum) for
the market-adjusted returns.

Chapter 8

Summary and Conclusions

This thesis examined the relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance in the case of Thailand in the period prior to the financial crisis (19931996) and after the crisis (1998-2000). The ownership structures investigated are
controlling ownership, controlling ownership categories, managerial ownership,
including managerial-family ownership and managerial-nonfamily ownership. Firm
performance is regarded as having both financial (market returns) and non-financial
measures (profitability).
This study began, in chapter one, with a literature background on the
separation of ownership and management in general. It then was narrowed to the
issue of the link between ownership structure and firm performance. The problems
of this study, motivation and research questions were presented. Then the
contributions for this thesis were indicated.
Chapter two presented a theoretical framework of the separation of ownership
and control that was first introduced by Berle and Means in 1932. There was also a
discussion of the theoretical and empirical literature dealing with the agency and the
asymmetric information problems, which have been attributed to the separation of
ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama
and Jensen, 1983a,b; Myer and Majuf, 1984). After this there was a discussion of the
definition of corporate governance, which is mainly defined as the rules and
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incentives by which the management of a firm is directed and controlled so as to

maximize the profitability and long-term value of the firm to the shareholders, while
taking into account the interests of other stakeholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997;
Vives, 2000; Price Waterhouse, 1997; the Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2001). The
corporate governance systems were then presented. These are a market-based
system and a bank-based system. The market-based system represents a pattern of
firms with dispersed ownership, as for example, those in the UK and the US, while
the bank-based system represents a form of firms that have concentrated ownership,
as for example in Japan and Germany. There then was a discussion of corporate
governance mechanisms. These mechanisms included (i) ownership structure, (ii)

debt financing, (iii) shareholder protection, and (iv) market for corporate control a
the market securities regulations. The summary and conclusions were drawn in the
final section.
Chapter three presented the outcomes from the previous studies associated
with the effect of ownership structure on firm performance across the countries. The
main outcomes of these studies were mainly discussed as follows. First, several
studies (cf, Monsen et al., 1968; Radice, 1971; Boudreaux, 1973; Stano, 1976; Steer
and Cable, 1978; Kesner, 1987; Alba et al., 1997; Xu and Wang, 1999;
Wiwattanakantung, 2001) suggested that a high concentrated ownership (controlling
ownership) was positively related to performance. Some studies (Holderness and
Sheedan, 1988; Mulari and Welch, 1989; and Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), however,
argued that there is no difference in performance (such as accounting rate of return
and firm's value) between firms with and without ownership concentration.
Secondly, there was an argument that when_management personnel hold a

proportion of shares in the firms (managerial ownership), they had vested interests t
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run the firms' business. This is because their m o n e y and the benefits which they
would claim were linked with the firm's performance. A number of studies (for
example, Pfeffer, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Kim et al., 1988) undertook this
issue and suggested that there was a positive relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance. Alternatively, several recent studies (Morck et al.,
1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Wong and Yek, 1991; Short and Keasy, 1999;
Yeboah-Duah, 1993; Mat-Nor et al., 1997; Han and Suk, 1998; and
Wiwattanakuntung, 2000) further investigated the relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance. They found that there is an opposite relationship
behind the assumption of the linear relationship between managerial ownership and
firm performance. That is, managerial shareholders performed well in the early stage
of shareholding. At a certain level(s) of shareholding, however, managerial
shareholders can entrench their power in firms, and their influence on firm
performances becomes negative.
Finally, the literature based on the relationship between bank equity ownership
and firm performance was discussed. It was found that most studies on this
relationship were conducted mainly in the case of Japan and a few in Germany. The
main findings of the relationship between bank ownership and firm performance
were that firms with a bank relationship had a higher rate of investment and had

more ability to avoid a financial distress situation compared to firms with a non-ban
relationship (Hoshi, 1990,1991; Prowse, 1992; Aoki, 1994; Lichtenberg and Pusher,
1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; and Kang, 1997). On the other hand, some
studies (such as Nakatani, 1984; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998) argued that firms with a
bank relationship had lower profit and a slower growth rate than those with a nonbank relationship. In this regard, they suggested that it could be because banks

Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusions

227

called for a higher interest rate from those firms to compensate for the risk that the
bank had to take. In Germany, there were some documents showing a positive
relationship between bank ownership and firm performance but such a relationship
became insignificant in recent times (Edward and Fischer, 1994; Gorton and Schimd,
2000; and Frank and Mayer, 2001).
Chapter four began with the history of the Thai stock market and the Stock
Exchange of Thailand (SET) listing requirements. The shareholder legal
environment of the SET was also presented, and comprised (i) roles and

responsibility of the board of directors, (ii) transparency and disclosure requirement
and (iii) minority shareholder and creditor protection.
The Thai ownership structure of firms in the period prior to the crisis (19931996) was illustrated. The number of firms in the sample of this study selected was
243 firms (out of around 300 non-financial firms in Thailand) each year between
1993-1996. Before presenting the Thai ownership structure, the definition of the
controlling (or concentrated) ownership was discussed. That is, in Thailand, the
shareholder, who own more than 25% of shares in the firm, is regarded as the
controlling shareholder. The controlling shareholder in Thai firms will have
adequate power in many aspects; for example, he/she is able to nullify any

management decision, is able to call extraordinary meetings at any time, has the right
to request an inspection into the conduct of the board, and has the right to submit a
motion to the court where he/she suspects the management's operations.
The ownership structure was then presented and the outcomes can be

highlighted as follows. First, this study found that the largest shareholders controll
around 25%-27% of outstanding shares, while the top five shareholders controlled
more than half of the outstanding shares in most Thai firms. Moreover, it was found
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that there were approximately 4 5 % of firms in the sample controlled by the largest
shareholders, who owned around >25%-50% of shares in these firms. There were
around 10% of firms controlled by the largest shareholders holding more than 50%
of shares in the firms.
Secondly, the Thai largest ownership was mainly classified into 6 categories:
(1) individual or family, (2) domestic-corporations, (3) foreign investors, (4) banks
(5) other financial institutions and (6) government. The number of firms they
controlled as well as the concentration ownership was examined. The results shown
that individuals or family shareholders controlled most Thai firms (around 45% of
firms in the sample), and their ownership concentration was around 30% of
outstanding shares. Domestic-corporation shareholders and foreign shareholders
were found to be the second and the third largest shareholders controlling most Thai
firms. That is, domestic-corporation shareholders controlled around 30%) while
foreign shareholders controlled around 18% of firms in the sample. Their ownership
concentration was found to be around 24% and 26%, respectively. Other financial
institutions, banks, and government shareholders controlled not more than 5% of
firms in the sample.
Thirdly, the number of firms with managerial shareholders, non-managerial
shareholders and the ownership concentration were examined. The number of firms
with managerial shareholders was found to be around 60% of firms in the sample.
Their ownership concentration was approximately 30% of outstanding shares. This
study also found that the number of firms with non-managerial shareholders was
around 40% of firms in the sample, and their ownership concentration was found to
be around 25% of outstanding shares. By classifying managerial shareholders as (i)
managerial-family shareholders, and (ii) managerial-nonfamily shareholders, this
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study found that the number offirmswith managerial-family shareholders accounted
for 40%o, while those with managerial-nonfamily shareholders was around 20%o of
firms in the sample. Interestingly, the results showed that ownership concentration
of managerial-family shareholders was around 35%, while that of managerialnonfamily shareholders was not more than 16% of outstanding shares.
Fourthly, the financial performance of firms in the sample was examined.

Such performance included the profitability and the leverage ratios. The profitabilit
ratios were represented as the return on assets (ROA), the return on equity (ROE),

and the gross profit margin. The leverage ratios were represented as the debt to asse
(D/A) and the debt to equity (D/E). The results illustrated that, between 1993-1996,
the ROA of Thai firms dropped from 9.5% to 6.9%. Similarly, ROE declined sharply
from 11.3% to 4.1 %, and also the gross profit margin decreased from 27% to 18.8%
through the period. In contrast, the D/A of these firms continuously increased from
48% to 54.8%, and the D/E rose from 129% to 148.5%. Following on from this, the
financial performance of firms with controlling ownership and those with noncontrolling ownership were examined. The results showed that firms with
controlling ownership (holding between >25%-50% and at more than 50% of
outstanding shares) had higher profitability ratios than those of firms with noncontrolling ownership (ownership concentration between 0%-25%). In terms of
leverage, firms with ownership concentration at more than 50% had the highest
leverage ratios, followed by those with non-controlling ownership (0%-25%). Firms
with controlling ownership between>25%-50%, however, revealed the lowest
leverage ratios.
Finally, firms with bank ownership were examined. The results show that the
number of firms with bank equity ownership accounted for 26% while those with

Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusions

230

non-bank equity ownership was found to be around 7 4 % of firms in the sample. The
results also showed that the profitability ratios between firms with bank equity
ownership and firms with non-bank equity ownership were not significantly
different. However, it was found that firms with bank ownership had higher
leverage ratios than those with non-bank ownership.
Chapter five dealt with the data and methodology of the analysis. The first
section presented the data sample and the statistical methods for the analysis. The
data for this analysis was obtained from the database provided by the Stock
Exchange of Thailand. Firms in the sample accounted for 243 non-financial firms)
from each year during the period prior to the crisis (1993-1996). In terms of
statistical methods, this study used both univariate and multivariate regression. The
univariate method included dependent variables (represented by firm performance)
and independent variables (represented by ownership structure). The multivariate
method, however, comprised not only the ownership structure (e.g. controlling
ownership or managerial ownership) as independent variables, but also the other

control variables such as the firms' risk, earnings-price, size, debt and the age of the
firm.
In the second section, there was a discussion on firm performance measures.
That is, according to Chakravarthy (1986) and Oswald and Jahara (1999), they
suggested that market measures could provide a better accurate measure of firm
performance than accounting measures. This is because market returns can reflect
firm performance according to what the market is willing to pay for it. Shapiro
(1980) however, argued that profitability is still widely used in measuring economics
and performance of the firm in market economics. It is also regarded as a source of
funds for firms to reinvest. This study therefore used both market returns (average
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returns and market-adjusted returns) and profitability (return on assets and sales-toasset ratios) as firm performance measures.
In the third section, ownership variables measures were presented. The
ownership structure was focused on controlling ownership, controlling ownership
categories (family, domestic-corporations, and foreign ownership), bank ownership,
and managerial ownership. In terms of managerial ownership, this study also
classified it as managerial-family ownership and managerial-nonfamily ownership.
In the fourth section, measurement of the non-linear relationship between
managerial ownership (including managerial-family ownership and managerialnonfamily ownership) and firm performance was illustrated. Short and Keasy's
(1999) cubic model was applied to examine this relationship. Following this,
selected control variables (which were drawn from the literature) and their
measurement were presented. These variables selected were total risk, earningsprice, debt, the firm's size and the age of the firm. The hypotheses and the models
for the analysis were then illustrated. In the final section, a summary and
conclusions were drawn.

8.1 Summary of Findings I
Chapter six presented the empirical results regarding the relationship between
ownership structure and firm performance in the period prior to the crisis (19931996). In regard to the univariate analysis, the results showed that firms with
controlling ownership performed higher (based on both market returns and
profitability) than those with non-controlling ownership. The results also reported
that firms with family-controlling ownership and firms with foreign^controlling
ownership had significantly higher performance than firms with non-controlling
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ownership. Firms with domestic-corporation-controlling ownership, however, had a
higher performance only in terms of profitability than those with non-controlling
ownership. As well, this study found that firms with bank equity ownership had
lower market-adjusted returns compared to firms with non-bank equity ownership.
In terms of managerial ownership, the results show that firms with managerial
ownership performed lower (in terms of ROA) than firms with non-managerial
ownership. Interestingly, it was found that firms with managerial-nonfamily
ownership had significantly lower performance (market-adjusted returns, ROA and
S/A) than firms with non-managerial ownership. Firms with managerial-family
ownership did not perform differently to those with non-managerial ownership.
Regarding the multivariate regressions, the results of the relationship between
ownership structure and firm performance can be concluded as follows.

8.1.1 The Relationship between Controlling Ownership and Firm Performance
between 1993-1996
The results regarding the relationship between controlling ownership and firm
performance show that there was a significant relationship between controlling
ownership and firm performance (based on both market returns and profitability) in
the case of Thailand between 1993-1996. As well, firms with controlling ownership
had a higher performance compared with those with non-controlling ownership.
This study therefore accepts the hypotheses Hi and HIAHf. There is a significant relationship between controlling ownership and
firm performance.
HIA: Firms with controlling ownership perform significantly higher than
those with non-controlling ownership.
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8.1.2 T h e Relationship between Controlling Ownership Categories and Firm
Performance between 1993-1996
The relationship between controlling ownership categories (family, domesticcorporations and foreign ownership) and firm performance was then investigated.
The results illustrated that family-controlling ownership had a strong and positive
relationship to the average returns and the ROA. Neither domestic-corporationscontrolling ownership nor foreign-controlling ownership was found to have a
significant relationship to firm performance. This study also found that firms with
any category of controlling ownership had a higher performance compared to firms
with non-controlling ownership. This study therefore accepts the hypotheses HIB,
HIE, HIF, HIG and rejects the hypotheses Hie and HID.
HIB There is a significant relationship between family-controlling
ownership and firm performance.
Hie There is a significant relationship between domestic-corporationcontrolling ownership and firm performance.
HID There is a significant relationship between foreign-controlling
ownership and firm performance.
HIE Firms with family-controlling ownership perform significantly
higher than those with non- controlling ownership.
H]F Firms with domestic-corporations-controlling ownership perform
significantly higher than those with non-controlling ownership.
HIG Firms with foreign-controlling ownership perform significantly
higher than those with non-controlling ownership.

8.1.3 Bank equity Ownership and Firm Performance between 1993-1996
In comparing the performance of firms with bank ownership and those with
non-bank ownership, the results show that firms with bank equity ownership did not
perform differently from those with non-bank equity ownership. Indeed, it was
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found that firms with bank-managerial ownership performed significantly lower (in
terms of sales-to-asset ratios) than firms with non-bank equity ownership. On the
other hand, performance of firms with bank-non-managerial ownership was not
significantly different to those with non-bank ownership. Based on these results, this
study rejects the hypotheses H2, H2A and H2B.
H2 Firms with bank equity ownership perform significantly higher than
those with non-bank equity ownership.
H2A Firms with bank-managerial ownership perform significantly higher
than those with non-bank equity ownership.
H2B Firms with bank-non-managerial ownership perform significantly
higher than those with non-bank equity ownership.

8.1.4 The Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance
between 1993-1996
The results show that managerial ownership was positively related to firm
performance in Thailand between 1993-1996. Interestingly, this study found that
managerial-family ownership was positively related to firm performance. The
relationship between managerial-nonfamily ownership and firm performance,
however, was insignificant. The results also reported that firms with managerial
ownership did not perform significantly greater than those with non-managerial
ownership. In fact, firms with managerial-nonfamily ownership had a poorer
profitability (S/A) than those with non-managerial ownership. Based on the results,
this study accepts the hypotheses H3 and H3B and rejects H3A, H3C, H3D and H3E.
Hi There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership
and firm performance.
HIA Firms with managerial ownership perform significantly higher than
those with non-managerial ownership.
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There is a significant relationship between managerial-family
ownership and firm performance.

Hie There is a significant relationship between managerial-nonfamily
ownership and firm performance.
HID Firms with managerial-family ownership perform significantly higher
than those with non-managerial ownership.
HIE Firms with managerial-nonfamily ownership perform significantly
higher than non-managerial ownership.

8.1.5 The Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm
Performance between 1993-1996
The non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm
performance in the case of Thailand between 1993-1996 was found to be
insignificant. The results also show that the non-linearity was not significant
between managerial-family ownership and corporate performance. Surprisingly, this
study found that a non-linear relationship existed between managerial-nonfamily
ownership and market-adjusted returns in this period. The turning points of
managerial-nonfamily ownership related to market-adjusted return were 15.39%)
(maximum) and 50.61% (minimum). This implied that market-adjusted returns were
positively related to managerial-nonfamily shareholdings at the 0% to 15.39% range
and negatively related at the 15.39%) to 50.61%) range and then positively related
when managerial-nonfamily holdings exceeded 50.61%. Based on these results, this
study therefore accepts the hypotheses H4B, and rejects H4 and H4A.
H4 There is a significant non-linear relationship between managerial
ownership and firm performance.
H4A There is a significant non-linear relationship between managerialfamily ownership and firm performance.
H4B There is a significant non-linear relationship between managerialnonfamily ownership and firm performance.
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8.2 S u m m a r y of Findings II
Chapter 7 was designed to confirm the robustness of the results regarding the
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the period prior to

the crisis (1993-1996) as presented in chapter six. It was also expected to capture t
difference if there was one in this relationship between the period prior to (19931996) and after the crisis (1998-2000). Chapter 7 began with an investigation of the
ownership structure of Thai non-financial firms between 1998-2000. The same
sample from the period prior to the crisis (1993-1996) was used. There were only a
few firms dropped from the sample because of incomplete data. The ownership
structure of Thai firms between 1998-2000 can be summarized as follows. First, it
was found that the largest shareholders controlled, on average, 29%, while the top
five shareholders controlled around 54% of outstanding shares in the firm.
Secondly, the results reported that individual or family shareholders controlled
most Thai firms (35%-44% of firms in the sample). Their ownership concentration
was found to be around 32% of outstanding shares. Domestic-corporation
shareholders were the second largest shareholders controlling most Thai firms
(around 29%-33% of firms in the sample). Their ownership concentration was
approximately 26% of outstanding shares. The third largest shareholders who
controlled most Thai firms between 1998-2000 were foreign shareholders. They
controlled approximately 24% of firms in the sample, and their ownership
concentration was around 33% of outstanding shares. Other financial institutions,
banks and government shareholders controlled less than 5% of firms in the sample in
the period after the crisis.
Thirdly, the number of firms with managerial ownership was found to be
around 55%, and those with non-managerial ownership would be around 45% of
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firms in the sample. Managerial ownership concentration in those firms was found
to be around 28% of shares in the firm. Surprisingly, it was found that nonmanagerial shareholders were holding around 30% of shares in the firm. Moreover,
the results in chapter seven also showed that the number of firms with managerialfamily ownership was found to be approximately 25% of firms in the sample, while
those with managerial nonfamily ownership were around 28% of firms in the sample.
The results also revealed that concentration of managerial-family ownership (around
28%>) was greater than that of managerial-nonfamily ownership (around 24%).
Fourthly, there was a comparison of the ownership structure in the period prior
to (1993-1996) and after the crisis (1998-2000). This study found that the ownership
concentration of the largest and the top five largest shareholders between these two
periods was not significantly different (approximately around 29%> for the largest

ownership, and 55%> for the top five largest ownership). Also the results pointed out
that the concentration of managerial ownership and non-managerial ownership
between these two periods was similar. It was maintained around 26% to 29% for
managerial ownership, and it was 28% to 29% for non-managerial ownership
between the period prior to and after the crisis.
Interestingly, the study found that the managerial-family ownership
concentration declined from 35.71% (between 1993-1996) to 27.55% (between
1998-2000), while managerial-nonfamily ownership concentration increased from
17.64%) to 21.14%) during these periods. This study suggested that even though the
ownership concentration of managerial-family shareholders declined during these
two periods, it was still greater than that of managerial-nonfamily ownership. Also
managerial-family shareholders still had adequate controlling power over the firm's
management since they, on average, held at least 25% of outstanding shares, while
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managerial-nonfamily shareholders held less than 25%> of outstanding shares in the
firms (cf. chapter four).

8.2.1 The Relationship between Controlling Ownership and Firm Performance
between 1998-2000
The later section of chapter seven provided the results of the relationship between
ownership structure and firm performance in the period after the crisis (1998-2000).
This study found that controlling ownership was positive and significant to firm
profitability (ROA and S/A) but it was less significant for market returns. In
addition, firms with controlling ownership had a higher performance (sales-to-asset
ratios) than firms with non-controlling ownership. Overall, this study suggested that
the relationship between controlling ownership and firm performance in the period

after the crisis (1998-2000) was similar to that in the period prior to the crisis (199
1996). Based on the results regarding the relationship between controlling
ownership and firm performance in the period after the crisis, this study accepts the
hypotheses Hi and HIA-

8.2.2 The Relationship between Controlling Ownership Categories and Firm
Performance between 1998-2000
By classifying controlling ownership into three main categories (family,
domestic-corporations and foreign ownership) and examining their effects on firm
performance, the results shown that there was a positive relationship only between
family-controlling ownership and profitability. Neither domestic-corporations nor
foreign-controlling ownership was significantly related to firm performance. In
comparison, this study suggested that firms with family-controlling ownership had
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greater profitability (in terms of R O A and S/A) than firms with non-controlling
ownership. Firms with domestic-corporation or foreign-controlling ownership
performed significantly higher (based on S/A) than those with non-controlling
ownership. The results were consistent with those found in the period prior to the
crisis (as presented in chapter six). Based on these results, this study accepts the
hypotheses HIB, HIE, HIF, HIG and rejects Hie, and HID-

8.2.3 Bank equity Ownership and Firm Performance between 1998-2000
hi the relationship of bank ownership and firm performance, this study found
that firms with bank equity ownership had a lower S/A compared to firms with nonbank equity ownership. When bank equity ownership was categorized as bankmanagerial ownership and bank-non-managerial ownership, the results shown that
firms with both of these ownership categories had a lower S/A than firms with nonbank-ownership. These results were similar to those found between 1993-1996
(except for the negative relationship between bank-non-managerial ownership and
S/A, which was not found during the period prior to the crisis). In this regard this
study suggested that it might be because those non-managerial shareholders, who
mostly control a large proportion of shares in the firms (see Table 7.6), may make it
difficult for banks to exert their influence on the firm's management. Those nonmanagerial shareholders then were free to allocate the firm's assets for their own
benefits. This study therefore rejects the hypotheses H2, H2A and H2B-
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8.2.4 T h e Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance
between 1998-2000
Regarding the results of the relationship between managerial ownership and
firm performance in the period after the crisis, a significant relationship between
managerial ownership and firm performance was not found. The results also
reported that firms with managerial ownership did not perform differently to those
with non-managerial ownership. Furthermore, the results suggested that neither
managerial-family ownership nor managerial-nonfamily ownership was
significantly associated with firm performance. Interestingly, this study found that
indeed firms with managerial-family ownership had a greater performance
compared to firms with non-managerial ownership. Firms with managerialnonfamily ownership, however, did not perform differently to those with nonmanagerial ownership. This result was inconsistent with that found between 19931996 and suggested that managerial-nonfamily ownership had a lower ROA than
firms with non-managerial ownership. This study therefore accepts the hypotheses
H3D, and rejects H3, H3A, H3B, H3C and H3E-

8.2.5 The Non-Linear Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm
Performance between 1998-2000
A non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance

in the period after the crisis was examined. It was found that there was a significan
non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and average market returns.
The results revealed that average returns were negatively related to managerial
ownership in the 0% to 12.12% range, positively related in the 12.12%) to 40.08%
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range and negatively related w h e n managerial ownership went beyond 40.08%. The
non-linear relationship, however, was less significant for profitability regressions.
Moreover, the results show that there was a significant non-linear relationship
between managerial-family ownership and firm performance (sales-to-asset ratio).
The taming points were 17.35% (maximum) and 50.51% (minimum). This implied
that sales-to-asset ratio was positively related to managerial-family ownership in the
0%> to 17.35%) range. It was, however, negatively related to managerial-family
ownership in the 17.35% to 50.51% range and positively again afterwards. These
results were inconsistent with those found between 1993-1996, which confirmed that
the non-linear relationship between managerial ownership, including managerialfamily ownership and firm performance did not exist. Interestingly, the results
reported that there was an existence of the non-linear relationship between
managerial-nonfamily ownership and firm performance in terms of the average
returns and the market-adjusted returns between 1998-2000. Their turning points
related to average returns and market-adjusted returns were 9.39% and 16.66%
(minimum), and 37.27%> and 40% (maximum) respectively. This result was
consistent with that found in the period prior to the crisis (1993-1996) confirming
that there was a non-linear relationship between managerial-nonfamily ownership
and firm performance (market returns). However, the difference in the non-linear
relationship between managerial-nonfamily ownership and market returns between
these two periods was captured. That is, managerial-nonfamily ownership in the 10%
to 40%) range (approximately) was negatively related to market returns during the

period prior to the crisis, but it was positively related (to market returns) in the pe
after the crisis (see Figure 6.3 and 7.3). This study accepts the hypotheses H4, H4A
and H4B.
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8.3 T h e Comparison between Empirical Findings I and Findings II
It is necessary to briefly dwell on the outcomes regarding the relationship
between ownership structure and firm performance between the period prior to the
crisis and after the crisis (1993-1996) and (1998-2000). The results responding to
the hypotheses are presented in Table 8.1. Based on these results, overall, the
relationship of ownership structure and firm performance between these two periods
seems to be similar. Controlling ownership, particularly family-controlling
ownership was positively related to firm performance through the period prior to and
after the crisis. Moreover, firms with controlling ownership (no matter what types
they are) had a higher performance than firms with non-controlling ownership.
This study, however, found some different aspects from the findings regarding
the relationship of ownership structure and firm performance during the period prior
to and after the crisis. The differences captured are as follows. First, this study
found that the relationship between controlling ownership and market returns in the
period after the crisis was less significant compared to that found in the period prior
to the crisis. In this regard, this study suggests that, in the period after the crisis,
other factors, for instance trader risk noise, and weak minority shareholders' rights,
may have a greater influence on stock returns than controlling shareholders. It is also
possible that after the crisis controlling shareholders may attempt to restore the
firm's conditions by increasing profitability by, for example, financing a firm's
projects or paying the dividends rather than increasing a firm's stock prices.
Secondly, the relationship between managerial ownership, including
managerial-family ownership, and firm performance was found to be positive and
significant in the period prior to the crisis but this relationship was less significant
the period after the crisis. In this regard, it is possible that those managerial
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shareholders m a y expropriate outside shareholders by diverting the firm's assets
away from profitable investment projects for their personal use or private benefits
and the result being that the firm's performance decreases (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997). Also it is possible that a less significant positive relationship may be
influenced by the entrenchment of managerial shareholding at a certain level(s). This
issue is probably linked to the third aspect of the difference of ownership structure
and firm performance between the period prior to and after the crisis. That is,
thirdly, a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership (including
managerial-family ownership) was significantly related to firm performance in the

period after the crisis whilst it was not significant in the period prior to the crisis
The existence of the non-linear relationship may be interpreted that after the crisis
managerial shareholders and managerial-family shareholders perceived that the
private benefits were large enough and it was worth extracting them from the firm to
their own accounts.
Table 8.1
T h e Results of the Relationship between Ownership Structure a n d Firm
Performance in the Period Prior to the Crisis and After the Crisis
Hypotheses

Between
1993-1996
Accept

Between
1998-2000
Accept

H,

There is a significant relationship
ownership and firm performance.

Hu

Firms with controlling ownership perform significantly higher
than those with non-controlling ownership.

Accept

Accept

HIB

There is a significant relationship between family-controlling
ownership and firm performance.

Accept

Accept

HJC

There is a significant relationship between domesticcorporations-controlling ownership and firm performance.

Reject

Reject

HID

There is a significant relationship between foreign-controlling
ownership and firm performance.

Reject

Reject

HIE

Firms with family-controlling ownership perform significantly
higher than those with non-controlling ownership.

Accept

Accept

between

controlling

(Table Continues)
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Table 8.1
T h e Results of the Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm
Performance in the Period Prior to the Crisis and After the Crisis (Continued)
H,F

Firms with domestic-corporations-controlling
ownership
perform significantly higher than those with non-controlling
ownership.

Accept

Accept

HIG

Firms with foreign-controlling ownership perform significantly
higher than those with non-controlling ownership.

Accept

Accept

H2

Firms with bank equity ownership perform significantly higher
than those with non-bank equity ownership.

Reject

Reject

H2A

Firms with bank-managerial ownership perform significantly
higher than those with non-bank equity ownership.

Reject

Reject

H2B

Firms
with
bank-non-managerial
ownership
perform
significantly higher than those with non-bank equity ownership.

Reject

Reject

H3

There is a significant relationship between
ownership and firm performance.

managerial

Accept

Reject

H3A

Firms with managerial ownership perform significantly higher
than those with non-managerial ownership.

Reject

Reject

H3B

There is a significant relationship between managerial-family
ownership and firm performance.

Accept

Reject

H3C

There is a significant relationship between managerialnonfamily ownership and firm performance.

Reject

Reject

H3D

Firms with managerial-family ownership perform significantly
higher than those with non-managerial ownership.

Reject

Accept

H3E

Firms
with managerial-nonfamily
ownership
significantly higher than non-managerial ownership.

perform

Reject

Reject

H4

There is a significant non-linear relationship
managerial ownership and firm performance.

between

Reject

Accept

HtA

There is a significant non-linear relationship
managerial-family ownership and firm performance.

between

Reject

Accept

H4B

There is a significant non-linear relationship between
managerial-nonfamily ownership and firm performance.

Accept

Accept

8.4 Implications, Limitations, and Further Research
This section aims to discuss the research implications, limitations and make
further study suggestions.
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8.4.1 Research Implications

Shareholders Protection
Even though the outcomes of this study confirms the positive relationship
between controlling ownership, including family-controlling ownership, and firm
performance, it is possible that these controlling shareholders may extract excess
benefits for their own account through self-dealing, or establish the policy that only
benefit their group, for example. The question then is how to protect minority
shareholders against those controlling shareholders. These inappropriate actions of
controlling shareholders can be alleviated by relaxing minority shareholding
requirements to claim against such behaviour. This is based on the fact that, in
Thailand, a shareholder or a group of shareholders who can appoint an inspector to
examine the firm's business, financial condition and the board of director's conduct
must hold not less than 20% of shares in the firm. This requirement seems to be very
high for the minority shareholders to be able to claim compensation or request an
investigation in a case where they suspect the management's operations. This is
because most shares in the firm are under the control of the largest shareholders or
the top five largest shareholders (cf. chapter four and chapter seven).
Moreover, the effectiveness of transparency and disclosure of information
should also be improved to ensure that firms release reliable information to the
outside shareholders. This is because these shareholders need such information to
evaluate a management's performance and to make a decision for their investment.
In order to do this, an international accounting practice standard should be adopted,
and sufficiently well qualified accountants and auditors made available in Thailand.
In addition, the 'independence' of audit committee members is necessary in order to
improve the transparency and disclosure of information. This is because some of the
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audit committee members have connections with the major shareholders and they
may not be willing to produce unsatisfactory reports.

Creditor Protection
Interestingly, this study confirms that firms with bank ownership do not
perform greater than those with non-bank ownership in both pre and post-crisis
(1993-1996) and (1998-2000). In fact, firms with bank-managerial ownership had a

poorer profitability than firms with non-bank ownership. In this regard, it is possible
that (as suggested by Limpaphayom and Polwitoon, 2001), the creditors may not be
well protected by the law in having adequate rights to exert their power over the
borrowing firms, especially firms with managerial shareholders or controlling
ownership. These shareholders may circumscribe the power of the banks. They
therefore can allocate funds on their preferences or even on risky projects for which

they will receive benefits if these projects succeed, while banks have to bear the cost
if these projects fail. Protecting banks from the influence of these managerial
shareholders may be necessary to encourage banks to be able to improve the
borrowing firm's performance.

Board of Directors
Surprisingly, this study suggests that firms with managerial shareholders,
particularly managerial-nonfamily shareholders, did not perform better than those
with non-managerial shareholders. As well, at a certain level of shareholding, these
managerial shareholders (especially in the period after the crisis) were negatively
related to firm performance. These aspects may be attributed to the weakness of law
and enforcement in Thailand that leads to managerial shareholders neglecting to
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perform their duties well, and somehow they m a y expropriate a firm's assets. Also,
it may be because the model of the board of directors, which is a one-tier board of
directors model. With this model there is an insufficient check and balance
mechanism within the board. This underscores the necessity to adopt the two-tier
board of directors model. This model comprises (i) an operating board and (ii) a
supervisory board. The operating board operates in management and decisionmaking under the monitoring of and inspection by the supervisory board.

8.4.2 Limitations and Problems
The limitations of this research were related to first, family ownership. That is,
family ownership in this study was defined as the percentage of shares held by
family shareholders. Also the percentage of shares held by shareholders (in the top
five largest), who had the same family name as the largest family shareholders, were

combined as a single unit with that of the largest family shareholders. The limitation
was that this study did not combine the percentage of shares held by the family
members in the top five who used the different family name to that of the largest
family shareholder due to, for example, marriage or being only distant relatives.
Secondly, regarding the other largest ownership categories (domesticcorporations ownership and foreign ownership), this study did not combine the
percentage of shares of the affiliated domestic-corporations or foreign ownership
with those of the largest domestic-corporations or the largest foreign ownership.
Finally, this limitation was related to managerial-family ownership, which was
defined as having managerial shareholders where at least two of them have the same
family name. Family shareholders, who are also members of the board but use a
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different family n a m e to those managerial-family shareholders, were not considered
as managerial-family shareholders.

8.4.3 Suggestions for Future Studies
This study has examined the relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance in the case of Thailand in the period prior to and after the crisis. For

future research, this study suggests that, first, the effects of the size of the board
directors should be considered. This is because a large board of directors tends to be
less effective in a number of ways such as (i) there is less communication among

board members in a firm, (ii) the directors may not believe that their input afford wi
be valuable within a large number of board members (Gitman and Madura, 2000).
Secondly, this study suggests conducting a case study by focusing on a firm with

particular ownership structure (such as family structure) and examining the effects of
such ownership structure on its performance. Also, interviews and investigation of
the firm's operation in-depth may bring new outcomes. Thirdly, expanding to
examine the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the
current period (after 2000 till the present) is interesting as it may provide new
findings of such a relationship in the current period. Fourthly, the effects of
ownership structure and firm performance in the case of Thailand and other
developing countries should be compared so that new outcomes will be captured.
Finally, the adding and subtracting of some control variables may provide new
findings about other factors that may influence a firm's performance.
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Appendix A

Performance of Thai Firms Listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand
between 1993-2000

Profitability of Thai Listed Firms between 1993-2000
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Appendix B
A Review of International Best Practices

T h e United States: Council of Institutional Investors
The Council of Institutional Investors represents over 100 pension funds in the United
States whose assets exceed $1 trillion and is recognized as a significant voice for
institutional shareholder interests.

The council's Core Policies provide voluntary

guidelines for members and companies in reviewing corporate governance practices.
They state:

• One Share, One Vote: All shareholders should have voting rights on resolutions
and approve election to the board of directors, proportionate to their share
holding.
•

Equal and Fair Treatment of All Shareholders: All shareholders have therightto
full disclosure and procedural fairness in corporate matters.

Each share,

regardless of its class, should be treated equally with respect to dividends,
distribution, redemption, and to tender or exchange offer.
•

Independence of Directors: At least two-third of a corporation's directors should
be independent. T h e board of directors should have nomination, audit and
compensation committees comprising only independent directors.

•

Shareholder Approval of Certain Corporate Decisions:

A

majority of

shareholders should approve significant share acquisitions by the corporation or
an outsider, changes to the annual general meeting shareholders or any attempt
to abridge shareholderrightsregarding the board of directors.
•

Shareholder Meetings: Corporations should convene an annual general meeting
of shareholders and provide adequate notice, and choose dates and locations that
are most convenient for shareholders.

Directors' attendance should be

mandatory to respond to shareholders' questions.
•

The board of directors should have between 5 and 15 members. This is large
enough to maintain expertise and independence on the board, but small enough
to ensure effective decision-making.

263

United Kingdom: Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance
The Cadbury Report issued by the London Stock Exchange's Committee on the
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in December 1992, is one of the most
respected and earliest attempts at creating a code of best practice. The Cadbury report
holds that the board of directors is the key to an effective system of checks and balances
between the power of management and shareholders.

It considers the board's

responsibility to be formulating and directing company strategy, supervising
management and reporting to shareholders on the company's progress. The board's
independence should be guaranteed through non-executive directors. The. Board should
establish an audit committee of at least three non-executive board members responsible
for insuring the accuracy of corporate financial statements, and a committee dominated
by independent board members, that determine compensation for management and
board members.

The London Stock Exchange adopted disclosure requirements that listed companies
must either comply with the Cadbury guidelines or provide an explanation for areas of
compliance. The Cadbury Code was expanded in subsequent reports by the Greenbury
and Hampel Committees. Most recently the exchange has issued a combined code
based on these three committees' recommendations. The exchange mandates public
disclosure of corporate governance principles, but allows individual companies the
flexibility to set their own. This corporate governance policy serves as a model for
current reforms being considered by the stock exchange of Malaysia, Thailand,
Singapore, and H o n g Kong.

It establishes clear standards for publicly traded

companies, yet accommodates companies that wish to adopt other standards as long as
they disclose that to the public.

Japan: The Corporate Governance Forum
The Corporate Governance Forum of Japan is a group of senior Japanese businessmen
w h o published theirfinalreport on governance principles in M a y 1998. T h e focused on
practices where the board mainly comprises in-house managers w h o are loyal to the
president. Their report recommends: "The function of the board of directors should be
rejuvenated to cope with the increasingly complex and rapidly changing global market,
through its metamorphosis into an hones and rigorous advisory body for management,
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which might otherwise tend to be complacent." The report outlines a two-step approach
to corporate governance reform. The step-A principles should be adopted immediately
and include changes in disclosure and board structure. The step B principles will
require long-term solutions and extensive legal reform
•

Step A Principles serves to improve the scope and quality of disclosure of
information on corporate performance. They advocate moving to international
accounting standards and increasing the frequency of statements-of-earnings
reports from semi-annual to a quarterly basis. They encourage that the board
includes some independent, non-executive directors w h o have no direct former
officers of the company. The board's size should be small enough to allow
meaningful discussion and decision-making.

•

Step B principles recommend that most of the board seats should be filled by
independent external directors w h o are more likely look after the interests of all
shareholders. But this committee thinks it will take time. "Currently a sufficient
supply of independent external directors does not exist in Japan. This limited
market for independent directors as well as corporate auditors m a y be an
Achilles heel". The report also recommends the formation of board committees
to decide on the appointment of directors, as well as director and executive
compensation, and most seats on these committees should be filled by
independent board members w h o should review the corporations strategy, risk
management practices as well as its financial position. Finally, it recommends
the roles of chief executive and chairman be separated and suggests that a
company give an explanation w h e n this condition is not met.

Germany: DSW (Deutshe Schutzvereingung fur Wertpapierbesitz)
The leading German

shareholders' association issued guidelines on

corporate

governance in June 1998 with the goal of protecting and promoting minority investors'
interests. It focused naturally on the German model of corporate governance, which is
characterized by the dual board ~ a supervisory board and management board. The
association feels that to provide effective oversight of management the supervisory
board should consist of "competent and reliable experts" and should be responsible for
key tasks such as auditing of the company's accounts and executive remuneration
through the establishment of committees. The supervisory board should provide
"disclosure of any conflicts on interest of members of the supervisory board" ensuring
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that there is "no cross-entanglement between management and supervisory board" as
well as "no mandates on the board of competing companies."

The association's guidelines also promote disclosure and fairness to minority
shareholders. "Shareholder value means communicating to the outside. In detail this
means that the documentation of the company's strategy and its targets, quarterly
reporting, active investor relations' politics and transparency in reporting."

The

guidelines specify shareholder voting rights and procedures: "each company should
respect the principle 'one share-one vote'.. .multiple voting rights or voting rights
limitations should be abolished...preferred shares without a voting right should in
general not be issued.

Source: Stone et al. (1998 pp 4-6)
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Appendix E
Board Composition in Thailand

1. The board of directors consists of:
1.1 Executive Directors w h o are involved in day-to-day operations or are
authorized directors.
1.2 Non-Executive Directors w h o are:
A ) Independent Directors are defined as those w h o do not hold any position in
the management and are not employees of the company. They must not be
an executive director or an authorized director. They must be independent
of any major shareholders, management, and any other related persons and
they must have the responsibility to determine if there is anything that m a y
effect the equitable treatment of shareholders. They are also responsible
for considering any transactions that m a y lead to a conflict of interest
between a listed company and related persons.
B ) Outside Directors are defined as directors w h o do not hold any position in
the management or/and are not employees of the company. They must not
represent any major shareholders buy they m a y represent stakeholders,
such as customers, suppliers, or creditors, etc.

2. The board of directors of a listed company should include independent directors
and outside directors of sufficient calibre and number of their views to carry
significant weight in the board's decisions. N o one director should have unfettered
powers regarding decisions m a d e by the board of directors. In this way, everyone can
reach an independent judgment.

3. The chairman should be ah independent director and should not be the same person
as the managing director. The reason for this is that there should be a separation of
duties in directing the company's policies and management.

(The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 1999c, pp. 1-8)
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Appendix F
Information Disclosure Requirements for the Listed Firms in the Stock
Exchange of Thailand
Type of Information

Period of T i m e

Quarterly Financial Statement reviewed by an
auditor.

Within 45 days of the end
of each quarter.

Consolidated Statement if the company has
subsidiaries.
Audited Semi-Annual and/or Annual Financial
Statements*

Within 90 days of the end
of the accounting period.

Consolidated Statement if the company has
subsidiaries.
Remarks: A listed company may choose not to
submit the Audited Fourth Quarterly Financial
Statements, but will then be required to send the
Audited Financial Statements within 60 days
instead.
3. -

Within four months of the
end of the accounting
period.

Annual Report

Information

Within three months of
the end of the accounting
period.

Information regarding a listed company's
operations and financial structure which could
affect the trading of its securities, shareholders
interest, and/or investor decisions

To be reported at least
one-hour prior to the next
trading session.
If
information is reported
during a trading session,
the S E T will halt or
suspend trading in the
security unit such
information is thoroughly
disseminated
to
the
public.

Disclosure Report of Additional
(Form 56-1)

Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand (1999a, pp. 18-19).
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Appendix G

Audit committee in Thailand
Qualification
1. They m a y not hold shares exceeding 5 percent, including shares held by a
related person, of paid-up of the listed company or of an affiliated company,
an associated company or a related company of the listed company.
(Related persons shall include the persons w h o are involved in any kind of
benefits or are related to the company's business to a significant amount, such
as suppliers, customers, creditors, or debtors, etc. These kinds of events m a y
affect the audit committee in carrying out their duties independently or
conveniently).

2. They may be a director who is not involved in the day-to-day management of
the listed company or an affiliated company, an associated company, a related
company, or with the major shareholders of the listed company.
3. They m a y be a director w h o is not an employee or a staff m e m b e r of an
advisor w h o receives a regular salary from the listed company, an affiliated
company, as associated company, a related company, or the major
shareholders of the listed company.
4. They must be free of any present, direct or indirect, financial or other interest
in the management and business of the listed company, its subsidiaries and
associated companies, or its major shareholders.
5. They must be free of any past (for at least, a period of one year), direct or
indirect, financial or other interest in the management and business of the
listed company, its subsidiaries and associated companies, or its major
shareholders, unless the board is satisfied that such relationships will not affect
the member's independent judgments.
6. They must not be a relative of any executive director, executive officer or
major shareholder of the listed company.
7. They must be acting- as a nominee or representative of any director, major
shareholder, or shareholders, w h o are a relative of any major shareholders of
the listed company.
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8. They must be able to carry out their duties, exercise their judgment, and report
the committee's performance which are assigned by the board of directors
without being influenced by executive directors or major shareholders of the
company, including related persons or relatives.

Independence
A n Independent Person means that the audit committee can exercise its judgement
and fulfills the duties assigned to it by the board of directors independently. They
must not be influenced by anyone or any group of persons or any events that m a y
affect their judgement in fulfilling their duties and in reporting, as they should.

Members of the audit committee may fail to fulfill their duties appropriately and may
fail to exercise independent judgement, since they m a y be influenced by directors,
executive directors or officers of the company. These are reasons w h y members are
not independent:
•

M e m b e r s neglect to fulfill the duties assigned to them by the board of
directors.

•

M e m b e r s accept proposals or are involved in any improper actions that could
affect the company and shareholders' benefits.

•

M e m b e r s do not exercise independent judgment or do not report to the board
of directors or shareholders.

•

M e m b e r s do not cooperate, consult, or coordinate with directors, executive
directors, or officers of the company.

(The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 1999, pp. 9-13)

Appendix H
Muliticolinerity and HeteroscedasticityTesting 1993-1996
Appendix H-l: Multicolinerity Testing
The Correlations Coefficients Matrix between Dependent Variables between
1993-1996
A) Controlling Ownership and Control Variables:
ContSH RISK E/P DEBT SIZE AGE
ContSH
RISK

0.09

E/P

0.08

0.04

DEBT

0.11

0.23**

-0.24**

0.16*

0.24**

0.19*

0.19*

0.03

0.03

-0.05

SIZE

AGE

-0.1

0.06

B ) Family-Controlling Ownership and Control Variables
FAMILY

RISK

E/P

DEBT

SIZE

AGE

FAMILY
RISK

0.05

E/P

0.03

0.03

DEBT

-0.03

0.06

SIZE

0.02

0.24**

0.2**

0.2**

AGE

-0.06

0.13*

0.09

0.18**

C ) Domestic-Corporations-Controlling

-0.2**

0.004

Ownership and Control Variables

CORP RISK E/P DEBT SIZE AGE
CORP
RISK

0.13

E/P

-0.11

0.08

DEBT

-0.01

0.16

-0.04

SIZE
AGE

-0.02

0.23*

0.3**

0.33**

-0.03
-0.03

0.18*
0.18*

0.13
0.13

0.11
0.11

Indicate significance at the 10% levels.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % levels.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % levels

0.17

D ) Foreign-Controlling Ownership and Control Variables

FOREIGN

RISK

E/P

DEBT

FORFJGN
RISK
E/P

0.13
0.08

0.17

DEBT

0.3**

0.07

0.001

SIZE
AGE

0.34**

0.12

0.3**

0.31**

0.26*

0.19*

0.11

-0.1

SIZE

AGE

0.32**

E) Bank Ownership and Control Variables
BANK

RISK

E/P

DEBT

BANK
RISK
E/P

-0.07
-0.03

0.14*

DEBT

-0.07

0.01

-0.17*

SIZE

-0.3**

0.17*

0.16*

0.31**

AGE

0.2**

0.13*

0.08

-0.13*

SIZE

AGE

-0.14

F) Non-Bank Ownership and Control Variables
NON*
BANK

RISK

E/P

DEBT

NONBANK
RISK
E/P

0.05
0.05

0.07

DEBT

0.08*

0.11**

-0.17**

0.08*

0.17**

0.16**

0.21**

0.13**

0.14**

0.14**

SIZE
AGE

-0.01

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % levels.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % levels.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % levels.

SIZE

0.08*

AGE

G ) Bank-Managerial Ownership and Control Variables

BANK*
DIR
BANK*DIR
RISK
E/P

RISK

E/P

DEBT

SIZE

AGE

-0.06
0.05

0.07

0.07

0.06

-0.24**

•0.11

0.25*

-0.06

0.34**

0.11

0.06

-0.2

DEBT
SIZE
AGE

0.25*

-0.18

H ) Bank-Non-Managerial Ownership and Control Variables
BANK*
NONDIR

RISK

E/P

DEBT

SIZE

AGE

BANK*NONDIR
RISK

-0.17

E/P

0.2

0.11

DEBT

-0.13

0.1

SIZE

-0.3**

0.25*

0.18

0.3**

AGE

0.17

0.12

-0.04

0.02

-0.26*

0.16

I) Managerial Ownership and Control Variables
DIR

DIR 2

DIR3

RISK

E/P

DEBT

SIZE

DIR
DIR2

0.98**

DIR3

0.94**

0.98**

RISK

-0.01

-0.02

-0.02

0.03

0.04

0.04

0.02

-0.11*

0.05

E/P
DEBT

-0.1

-0.11*

SIZE

-0.03

-0.03

-0.03

0.12*

0.13*

0.2**

AGE

-0.04

-0.05

-0.06

0.13*

-0.01

0.12*

* Indicate significance at the 1 0 % levels.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % levels.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % levels.

-0.3**

0.02

AGE

J) Managerial-Family Ownership and Control Variables
DIR*
Family
DIR*Family
DIR*Family2

DIR*
Family2

DIR*
Family3

RISK

DEBT

E/P

SIZE

AGE

0.98**

DIR*Family3
RISK
E/P

0.94**

0.98**

-0.01

-0.02

-0.02

0.03

0.04

0.04

0.02

DEBT

-0.04

-0.05

-0.05

0.03

SIZE

-0.03

-0.03

-0.03

0.12*

0.13*

-0.05

AGE

-0.04

-0.05

-0.06

0.13*

-0.13

-0.04

-0.02

0.02

K ) Managerial-Non-Family Ownership and Control Variables
DIR*
Non-

DIR*
Non

DIR*
Non

Family

Family2

Family3

RISK

E/P

DEBT

SIZE

DIR*NONFamily
DIR*NONFamily2

0.98**

3

0.96**

0.98**

0.03

0.03

DIR*NONFamily
RISK

0.04

E/P

0.03

0.04

0.04

0.05

DEBT

-0.04

-0.02

-0.01

0.09

-0.25**

SIZE

-0.15

-0.17*

-0.2*

0.11

0.07

AGE

-0.004

-0.02

-0.02

0.03

-0.001

0.27**
0.04

L) Non-Managerial Ownership and Control Variables

NON*DIR

RISK

E/P

DEBT

NONDIR
RISK

0.01

E/P

0.08

0.018

DEBT

0.04

0.03

SIZE

0.09

0.09

0.01

0.37**

AGE

0.15*

0.05

0.06

0.07

*
Indicate significance at the 10% levels.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % levels.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % levels.

SIZE

-0.18**

0.16*

AGE

-0.002

AGE
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Appendix H-2: Heteroscedasticity Testing 1996-1998
Normal Q - Q Plot of Residual Market Returns

§

ao •

i2

-i
Observed Value

Normal Q-Q Plot of Residual of Market-Adjusted Returns

Observed Value

Normal Q-Q Plot of Residual of Retun on Asset

Observed Value
Normal Q-Q Plot of Residual of Sales-to-Asset

T5
to

s
Observed Value
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Appendix I
Muliticolinerity and HeteroscedasticityTesting 1998-2000
Appendix 1-1: Multicolinerity Testing
The Correlations Coefficients Matrix between Dependent Variables between
1998-2000

A) Controlling Ownership and Control Variables
ContSH RISK E/P DEBT SIZE AGE
ContSH
RISK

-0.04

E/P

0.06

DEBT

0.05

SIZE

0.04

-0.07

0.14*

-0.07

AGE

-0.05

-0.14**

0.14**

-0.15**

-0.15**
0.2**

-0.3**

0.21'

B ) Family Controlling Ownership and Control Variables
FAMILY

RISK

RISK

E/P

DEBT

SIZE

AGE

-0.14

ET

0.15

DEBT

-0.15

0.3**

SIZE

0.13

-0.04

0.22**

-0.09

AGE

-0.11

-0.14

0.02

0.08

-0.12
-0.35**

0.05

C ) Domestic-Corporations-Controlling Ownership and Control Variables

CORP

RISK

E/P

DEBT

SIZE

CORP
RISK

-0.02

E/P

0.08

DEBT

0.01

0.16

-0.19

SIZE

-0.13

0.06

0.27*

AGE

0.14

-0.09

-0.15

-0.06

* Indicate significance at the 1 0 % levels.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % levels.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % levels.

0.14
-0.26*

0.17

AGE
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D ) Foreign-Controlling Ownership and Control Variables

FOREIGN
FOREIGN
RISK

RISK

BT

DEBT

SIZE

AGE

-0.12

E/P
DEBT

0.09

-0.3**

0.21

0.25*

SIZE

0.25*

-0.01

0.18

0.31**

AGE

0.23*

0.1

-0.06

0.16

-0.2*

0.13

E) Bank Ownership and Control Variables
BANK

RISK

E/P

DEBT

BANK
RISK

0.09

E/P

0.06

0.07

DEBT
SIZE

0.03

-0.02

0.1

-0.23

0.04

0.08

0.17:

AGE

-0.12

-0.17*

0.08

-0.32**

SIZE

AGE

0.01

F) Non-Bank Ownership and Control Variables

NON
BANK

RISK

E/P

DEB1

NONBANK
RISK

0.02

E/P

0.07

-0.08

DEBT

0.16**

0.33**

-0.22**

SIZE

0.05

0.2**

0.16**

-0.06

AGE

0.13**

0.2**

0.1*

-0.08

* Indicate significance at the 1 0 % levels.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % levels.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % levels.

SIZE

0.19*

AGE

G ) Bank -Managerial Ownership and Control Variables
RISK

BANK*
DIR
BANK*DIR
RISK
E/P

0.07

DEBT

•0.03

-0.05

SIZE

•0.3**

-0.15

AGE

•0.14

-0.31**

0.04

E/P

DEBT

SIZE

AGE

0.11
0.19
0.19

0.15

-0.06

0.3**

-0.02

H ) Bank -Non-Managerial Ownership and Control Variables

BANK*
NONDIR

RISK

E/P

DEBT

BANK*NONDIR
RISK
E/P

-0.36
0.04

0.11

DEBT

-0.03

-0.05

0.19

SIZE
AGE

-0.3**

-0.15

0.18

0.15

-0.13

-0.21*

-0.18

0.1

SIZE

AGE

-0.08

I) Managerial Ownership and Control Variables

DIR

DIR2

DIR3

RISK

E/P

DEBT

SIZE

DIR
DIR2

0.94**

3

DIR

0.84**

0.97**

RISK

0.1

0.08

E/P

0.001

-0.003

0.06
0.002

-0.06

DEBT

-0.03

-0.07

-0.09

0.12*

SIZE

0.04

-0.01

0.01

0.03

AGE

-0.03

-0.003

0.01

* Indicate significance at the 1 0 % levels.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % levels.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % levels.

-0.14*

-0.1
0.13*
-0.02

0.06
-0.05

0.004

AGE

J) Managerial-Family Ownership and Control Variables

DIR*

DIR*

DIR*
2

Family

RISK

DEBT

E/P

SIZE

3

Family

Family

DIR*Family
DIR*Family2

0.94**

3

DIR*Family

0.86**

0.98**

RISK

0.11

0.09

0.05

E/P

0.001

0.02
0.3**

0.06

0.01

DEBT

0.02

-0.02

-0.06

SIZE

•0.06

-0.06

-0.08

-0.02

0.18*

0.08

AGE

0.06

0.05

0.04

-0.15

0.02

-0.01

-0.17

-0.02

K ) Managerial-Non-Family Ownership and Control Variables

DIR*

DIR*

Non-

NON

Family

Family

DIR*

RISK

E/P

DEBT

NON
2

Family3

DIR*NONFamiIy
DIR*NONFamily2

0.97**

3

0.91**

DIR*NONFamily

0.98**

RISK

-0.11

-0.13

-0.13

E/P

-0.001

0.06

0.1

-0.11

DEBT

-0.17

-0.19

-0.19

-0.02

SIZE

-0.02

0.01

0.03

0.06

0.15

0.04

AGE

0.06

0.12

0.15

-0.18

0.13

0.14

-0.2*

L) Non-Managerial Ownership and Control Variables

NON*DIR

RISK

RISK

-0.11

E/P

-0.01

-0.15*

DEBT

-0.02

0.16*

SIZE

0.09

AGE

0.14**

E/P

SIZE

-0.03

-0.01

0.08

-0.07

-0.14*

*
Indicate significance at the 1 0 % levels.
* * Indicate significance at the 5 % levels.
* * * Indicate significance at the 1 % levels.

DEBT

0.21**
0.09

0.14*

AGE

0.02

AGE
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Appendix 1-2: Heteroscedasticity Testing 1998-2000
Normal Q-Q Plot of Residual of Market Returns

Observed Value

Normal Q-Q Plot of Residual of Market-Adjusted Returns

m

0.0

8L
Observed Value

Normal Q-Q Plot of Residual of Return on Asset

Observed Value

Normal Q-Q Plot of Residual of Sale-to-Asset

Observed Value

